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News Media and the Authority of Grief: 
The Journalistic Treatment of Terrorism Victims as Political Activists 
Zohar Kadmon Sella 
 
The personal and national dimensions of terrorism victimhood lend the victims 
their unique moral authority and political legitimacy.  The analysis of the news media 
coverage of victims’ campaigns, on issues such as memorialization, criminal justice, 
hostage crises and peace activism, reveals that the more such campaigns are closer in 
time, space, and relevance to the attack that the victim-advocates underwent, the 
greater are their chances for positive coverage. Deferential coverage of victims’ 
campaigns reflects journalism’s cultural role as reinforcing common values and 
myths, including by way of portraying victims as heroes. Where victims’ campaigns 
are less related to the physical memory of the attack and more concerned with the 
military or legal aspects of terrorism, journalists take on their informational role and 
employ traditional professional standards. Such standards include subjecting victims 
to potential criticism, and at the very least “balancing” their arguments with official 
views.  In issues where the victims’ arguments seem far removed from their personal 
experience, their influence over the news media is small. This range of journalistic 
notions is offered under the organizing mechanism of the Experience-Argument 
Scale. The two extreme ends of the Scale, the “deferential” end and the “disregarding” 
end, are where journalism’s missions are in danger of compromise.  Journalism at the 
“deferential” end is emotional, reluctant to bring forth opposing opinions, and in 
effect may contribute to policies that are driven more by trauma than by considered 
opinion.  At the other end of the Scale, journalism is deaf to the victims, and fails to 
enrich policy debates with the lessons of their experience. The comparative 
  
 
examination of coverage in the U.S. and Israel illuminates the different relationships 
between press and government in these two cultures, and how local responses to 
victims reflect the particular local history of terrorism, and the particular notions of 
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As modern terrorism has become a mass-mediated enterprise, its victims have been 
increasingly ubiquitous in the news media.
1
   Initially, victims tend to appear as 
unwilling participants and witnesses to the events. At the scene of the attack, the 
victims express their shock and grief, and occasionally their immediate response to 
the political circumstance that has led to violence. Some express their confidence that 
peace and justice will prevail, some cry for revenge, and others direct their anger to 
the security or policy failures that have put them in danger. During long hostage 
situations, both the direct victims (if they are allowed to) and their families lobby for 
diplomatic solutions.
2
  Victims, randomly caught up by political violence, often 
                                                           
1
 “Modern terrorism” is a term often used to characterize terrorist incidents between the years 1968-
1993.  The “modern” element of terrorist activity consisted of sophisticated exploitation of modern 
transportation, increasing availability of ammunition and explosives from terrorism-sponsoring states, 
and the utilization of an ever-evolving communication technology—both mass-media and consumer 
electronics.  The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo and the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing marked the advent of “new terrorism,” or "catastrophic terrorism," 
which was new not only in its large scale, but also in that it was characterized by lethality that was not 
accompanied by negotiable demands. The 2013 Nairobi mall massacre typified this genre, and 
highlighted its media dependency, as this was an ongoing hostage situation whose single purpose was 
to remain on the international news agenda as long as possible, making known the perpetrators, al-
Shabaab, and the political instability in Somalia. 
 
2
 This happened, for example, during the Iran Hostage Crisis, during the long captivity of Americans 







choose to engage in an array of terrorism-related policy issues long after the attacks, 
thus remaining in the media spotlight in a new, political capacity.  The political 
pressure groups that victims establish vary in form and intensity, but they all work for 
state solutions—legislation, diplomatic initiatives and judicial decisions—aimed to 
bring the perpetrators to justice and increase national security.   
 
 Terrorism victims possess a particular kind of political legitimacy, one that 
derives from their trauma and loss. More important, it derives from the fact that 
terrorism victims typically are targeted not as individuals but as members of a 
particular nationality, religion or ethnic group. Particularly when a national conflict is 
involved, their unique and tragic experience creates an aura that cannot be separated 
from their policy arguments and lends them the moral authority of national heroes.  
  
Terrorism victims’ political activism is a subset of a larger phenomenon of 
victims (of violence, disease, accidents or natural disasters)-turned-activists.  Victim-
activists possess a particular type of political legitimacy that can be called “the 
politics of personal trauma.” The politics of personal trauma capitalizes on the 
victims’ personal loss to advance policies aimed to enhance the community’s personal 
safety, health and living conditions. When facing those who obtained their political 
legitimacy by tragedy, journalists face a contradictory situation, one that calls for 
empathy toward victims on the one hand, and for their professional responsibility to 
scrutinize political players and their motives on the other.  What principles and 
practices govern the tension between compassion and critical stance?  This question is 







Covering victims-turned-activists: between deferential and critical stances 
 
 For journalists, the involvement of terrorism victims in national policy debates 
poses distinct professional challenges.  While policy debates are commonly expected 
to be highly rational, terrorism victims complicate the discourse with their sadness, an 
emotion unanswerable within the parameters of logical, institutional debate. The 
supposedly straightforward journalistic approach to a topic—be it anti-terrorism 
measures, the establishment of a memorial site, or the monetary compensation of 
victims—is more difficult to sustain once the victims’ trauma permeates the 
discussion.   
 
 Journalists may feel deference toward the victims and reluctance to 
criticize them, particularly in the midst of an armed conflict that typically involves a 
surge of patriotism and with it, a wave of adoration to the victims.  Indeed, journalism 
largely reinforces a positive, even clichéd, image of the victims and hesitates to define 
them in negative terms. The coverage of victims tends to portray them stereotypically 
as icons of moral purity who seek good, demand justice and strive for a better, safer 
world.   
 
But journalists may also suspect that victims are a part of a sinister ploy, 
brought to the stage by calculated political strategists who seek to capitalize on their 






it comes to complex national security or foreign policy issues, journalists may believe 
that the debate should only be reserved for people with professional or academic 
credentials.  They may then dismiss the victims, who seem to offer little more than 
painful personal experience and general ideas.  Or they may choose not to dismiss the 
victims, as they remember that they themselves lack actual military or public policy 
experience or education, even though this rarely prevents them from reporting 
knowledgeably on the most complicated issues.  Indeed, journalists and victims are 
connected by their non-expertise, their public mindedness and sometimes—although 
most journalists would not admit to this—their advocacy roles. 
 
 These journalistic notions are informed by journalists’ sense of commitment to 
the national purpose, which clearly tends toward sympathy for the unlucky innocents 
who have fallen victims to the random mass-violence that targeted the community’s 
national, ethnic or religious values. Loyal to their audiences’ feelings, and to their 
own feelings as members of their communities, journalists initially demonstrate great 
sensitivity when approaching a story that involves terrorism victims.  Indeed, these 
victims, who embody sacrifice and national heroism, are one of the most revered 
groups in society.   
 
While journalists strive to do the “right thing,” by their own and their 
communities’ standards, namely compassionately adopt the victims’ point of view, 
they largely suspend some of what are commonly regarded as journalistic instincts—
in particular, holding public figures and their motives up to scrutiny. Indeed, the 






American journalism ever since it took on its muckraking role.  So when victims cross 
the line from random witnesses and commentators to well-organized political figures, 
and as they begin to compete over public opinion and political power, journalists have 
an increased difficulty striking the right balance between deference on the one hand 
and skepticism on the other.    
 
In their coverage of victims, journalists must struggle with the inherent tension 
between the pity and admiration that they often express, genuinely or not, toward the 
victims, and the world in which these victims choose to operate, the landmine-filled 
terrain of national politics. The conflicting loyalties involved in victims’ coverage, as 
this dissertation will demonstrate, can impact not only journalists' responses to the 
victims (vacillating between compassion, sobriety and negativity), but sometimes also 
their own definition of professionalism. ‘Professionalism,’ in the context of coverage 
of victims, may come to include the pro-victim approach as a distinct professional 
norm—or rather, duty—usually reserved for times of national emergency. It is 
precisely because the social norms surrounding terrorism victims test journalism’s 
self-proclaimed obligation to look upon the political world with skepticism that I 
believe the case of terrorism victims is a worthy subject of study.  
 
Previous scholarship that informs this work 
 
 The premise of this work is that journalists are reluctant to risk unseemly or 
premature criticism of terrorism victims because they feel that they would be out of 






inclination most often overlaps with journalists’ authentic sympathies to the victims, 
as journalists are part of the very communities in which they and their families live. 
Indeed, journalists choose their profession precisely because of their connection to 
their communities and their confidence in their ability to truthfully represent and 
meaningfully relate to their communities in their choices of issues and in their 
storytelling. 
 
 This hypothesis follows two strands of scholarship.  The first is the cultural 
approach to communication, as articulated in James Carey’s seminal definition of 
journalism as the literary, ritualistic representation of a community’s shared beliefs 
(1975, 18).  Carey offered his seminal idea, that the primary condition for social unity 
had been journalism’s continuous expression of the consensus.  “The great and 
ongoing task of cultural maintenance, the constant process of reminding and 
reinforcing values, could only be achieved through repetition and habit” (Kadmon 
Sella 2007, 110).  Terrorism typically had the effect of bringing the attacked 
community together and solidifying it. Following Carey's line of thought, journalism 
was the social mechanism that articulated the collective insistence upon the attacked 
values and upon the community's physical rehabilitation and survival. Terrorism 
victims embodied this consensus not only because they were a living reminder of an 
ongoing danger, but just as importantly, because their personal survival carried the 
promise that the community would endure.  They illustrated, through their suffering, 
that to belong to the community—the only reason for which they or their loved ones 
were singled out—exacted a cost.  The community, in other words, was ultimately a 






continuing, repeating manner that kept the ideological basis of the community 
consistent and intact.  
 
 A second strand of scholarship that explores the journalistic deference 
to terrorism victims is specific writings from the areas of media studies and political 
science, searching for the relationship between victims' coverage, public opinion and 
policy decisions.  This literature suggests that victims strongly appeal to journalists 
(Liebes 1998, Lule 1991) because their victimhood play into media’s tendency to 
cover terrorism in a way that “[pushes news media’s] thirst for tears, grief, tragedy, 
and drama to and even beyond the limits of professional journalism’s ethics in their 
hunt for pictures and sound bites”  (Nacos 2007, 61). The victim-dominated coverage 
of a crisis has the potential effect of exacerbating public pressure over the government 
that handles the situation, pushing it either to concessions or to retaliatory measures. 
Deference, especially when shared by journalists and the political establishment, may 
lead to the establishment of pro-victim policies that have not been given due 
deliberation and consideration (Chapter 1 illustrates how in 2002, a group of 9/11 
family members, backed by the unanimous deference of journalists and the New York 
political elites, succeeded to derail the planned International Freedom Center in 
Ground Zero).  
 
The 1979-1981 Iran hostage crisis was one of the firsts to be diagnosed with a 
pro-victim oriented coverage that was believed to have eventually affected public 
opinion and U.S. policy. That approach was most memorably represented in Walter 






stating the number of days in which the hostages were held captive. Commentators 
such as Ellen Goodman tied Cronkite’s phrase with the gradually increasing public 
impatience with the standoff and the declining support for President Carter: 
Now, the nightly Cronkite count, even more than the small boxscore numbers 
on the front pages of dozens of newspapers, has become a flag at half-mast, a 
daily probe of a wound, a political statement. 
The closing hymn passes through our minds quickly like a flashcard -- do 
something! do something! -- reminding us of what we chorus night after night 
counting the 20th day, the 145th day, the 222nd day of captivity for the 




 Research validated Goodman’s intuition. Brigitte Nacos's quantitative 
analysis of the Iran hostage crisis coverage (1994:23-30) pointed to the then-novel 
phenomenon of prominent appearance of the hostages' families in the news. "From the 
early weeks of the hostage ordeal," she concluded, "when domestic opposition was 
virtually non-existent, the constant attention to the predicament of the hostages and 
their loved ones as well as to their aggressively anti-American captors dramatically 
diminished the usually dominant, preferential treatment of administration officials in 
mass-mediated foreign policy debates." (Nacos 1994:30)  Eventually, when the 
hostages were released in January 1981, it was already too late for President Carter, 
who had lost the 1980 reelections to President Reagan.  
 
Tamar Liebes attributed terrorism victims a similar role in the context of 
Israel's first Intifada, namely the Palestinian uprising of 1987 to 1993. Liebes argued 
that when the Israeli news media covered Palestinian suicide bombings they switched 
                                                           
3






into panic-filled “disaster mode,” where victims dominated the coverage. 4  There, the 
media embraced the victims’ accusations that the Israeli government had failed to 
protect them. And when journalists questioned those public officials suspect of 
contributing to the vulnerability of the nation’s security, they echoed the victims' 
accusatory arguments.  'Disaster marathons,' as Liebes called them, destabilized the 





This dissertation should serve as a useful addition to the literature on a third 
strand of scholarship – the sociology of news, and in particular, to the writings on 
journalistic values.  Terrorism victims seem to embody, for example, many of the 
themes that Herbert Gans (1979\2005) identified as the enduring values of American 
journalism.  They are considered altruistic, patriotic and heroic—traits that are 
assumed to them by virtue of their victimhood—and as such, they reinforce the 
ethnocentric belief that Americans are a morally superior nation.  As political 
advocates, they demonstrate another value which journalists appreciate, and that is 
individualism: they take initiative, many times independent of or in opposition to 
government policies, to advance a personal vision of the public good.   
                                                           
4 It should be noted, however, that Liebes’s “disaster marathon” framework is more deeply embedded 
in the “cultural approach” scholarship (as Katz and Dayan’s “Media Events”) than in the quantitative 
political sciences.  
5
 While some found the term “disaster marathon” to aptly apply to the 9/11 coverage, clearly the 
politically destabilizing element of disaster marathons was missing in the post 9/11 American press, not 
only during the initial days following the attacks, but for years to come. The American press 
demonstrated complete trust in the military and in the intelligence assessments during the run-up to the 
war, only to realize, in the midst of it, that its national security reporting was altogether lax and misled. 
It was following this chapter in the history of the U.S. press, and others that demonstrated similar, 
uncritical cooperation with the administration’s line and the voluntary confinement to institutional 
sources (one example is the institutional denial of the practice of torture of CIA detainees) that Bennett, 








 But if they wish to conform to the celebrated values of American journalism, 
victims must speak in a strictly personal way that draws heavily on their experience, 
and avoid the risk of devaluating their arguments by sounding too “political.”  While 
Gans spoke of political “moderatism” as an enduring value, for activist terrorism 
victims, moderatism is not enough.  As the following chapters will demonstrate with 
respect to all the types of victim advocacy, American victims can only retain their 
moral purity if their line of argument cannot be identified as partisan. 
 
Distance between experience and argument as a factor in victims’ coverage  
 
 While initial deference to victims is strong, it is also provisional. Political 
participation, even if successful, shifts victims from a position of reverence and media 
protection to the area of political news coverage, where they are potentially exposed 
to criticism.  The degree of such criticism largely depends on a perceived distance 
between the victims’ personal experience and their political argument, as the next 
paragraphs will explain.  
 
 My work thus far
 
(Kadmon Sella, 2006b) indicates that the journalistic 
treatment of terrorism victims is largely deferential but not necessarily defined by the 
absence of skepticism.  Journalists question or criticize victims in a variety of 






victims, especially when victims are suspected of lying or exaggerating about their 
victim status.  Journalists, particularly in the U.S. (and much less in Israel), may also 
lose trust in the victims if the latter reveal clear political affiliation. Chapter 4, which 
analyzes the coverage of victims’ anti-war activism, demonstrates how in the U.S., 
political talk by victims can have a detrimental effect on their prestige and influence. 
Journalists are also mindful of the passage of time and of the monetary compensation 
awarded to the victims, as if these two factors—time and money—somehow decrease 
the victims’ tribulations and legitimize rougher journalistic treatment. The coverage of 
victims both decreases and “normalizes” (namely, reclaiming the average emotional 
distance of journalism from its topics of coverage) as the memory of the tragedy 
slowly fades.
6
  Lastly, journalists—and this is the crux of my dissertation—are 
particularly critical of victims if they feel that their experience of victimhood has no 
bearing on the policy for which they advocate.  
 
 When exercising editorial discretion or source selection concerning terrorism 
victims, the press intuitively assesses the distance between the victims’ experiences 
and their arguments and consequently subjects them to either a critical or supportive 
lens.  Specifically, journalists are aware of the proximity—in time, place and topical 
relevance—between the terrorist attack experienced by the victims and the issue in 
which they are trying to exert influence.  The bigger the distance, the more 
                                                           
6
 More than 12 years from that day, it seems that now journalism scholarship is at a point that allows it 
to examine how, as time went by, the press’s interest in the 9/11 family members diminished.  The 
monetary compensation that they received, and the wish of bereaved spouses to move on with their 
lives and establish new families, may have also played a part in their media fade-out.  At the same time, 
new victim-related issues surfaced, in particular, the medical treatment of bystanders and rescue 
workers who suffered from respiratory and other ailments caused by their exposure to debris and 






comfortable journalists feel abandoning their initial deferential stance and treating 
victims as regular sources or subjects of coverage. 
 








 In this dissertation I conceptualize this distance between Experience and 
Argument, as well as its journalistic ramifications, in the form of a scale.  At one end 
is press deference to victims; it then moves through doubt and criticism to journalistic 
disregard of the victims or the dismissal of their claims on the other end.  The closer 
the victims’ argument to their tragic, but politically empowering, experience, the more 
likely they are to be treated with journalistic deference and be positioned on the left 
end of the Scale.  For example, victims’ involvement in remembrance issues is 
generally welcome by media because the conceptual distance between the victims’ 
argument and their personal experience is very short:  remembrance sites and 
anniversaries are direct representations of the attack and are deeply connected to the 
physical event both in time and in place.  When victims try to shape the way the 
attack is remembered, the news media allow them to dominate the debate. 
 
Experience 













Professionally oriented, Critical 






Victims’ typical political endeavors and the Experience-Argument Scale 
 
 The overall news coverage of terrorism seems to suggest that victims’ political 
endeavors can be categorized into five major policy areas, which have varying levels 
of “conceptual distance” from the victims’ personal experience: 
1. Ongoing hostage situations. 
2. Remembrance: the symbolic preservation of the terrorist attack through 
memorials and anniversaries. 
3. Compensation of survivors and family members. 
4. Counterterrorism and antiterrorism policy (including safety measures 
such as aviation safety and regulatory control over international money 
transfers), and criminal and civil justice. 
5. Geo-political conflicts related to the particular attack (e.g. the war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11). 
 
 The coverage that I have surveyed led me to position these policy areas on the 
Experience-Argument Scale, as follows: 
 



















Professionally oriented, Critical 









 Of the policy areas that appear on the Scale, I elaborate in depth on the topics 
of remembrance in Chapter 2, abducted soldiers (an interesting subset of hostage 
situations) in Chapter 3, and victims’ involvement in the overarching conflict that has 
bred political violence in Chapter 4. The issues of anti and counterterrorism are 
represented by examples in the various chapters and mostly appear in comparison to 
the other topics, usually demonstrating "regular," namely not deferential neither 
excessively negative, journalistic practices.  
 
Anti and counterterrorism lobbying is located at the “middle” of the 
Experience-Argument Scale, where journalists apply their everyday reporting 
standards, because in these areas the victims’ claims are contrasted, or "balanced"—if 
to call upon another professional ideal—with judicial norms or with the concerns of 
the security apparatus. Antiterrorism and counterterrorism policies attempt to prevent 
future terrorist acts and the formation of new terrorist organizations (antiterrorism), 
and to retaliate against the actions of active terrorists (counterterrorism).  As with all 
national security issues, antiterrorism and counterterrorism are handled in formal 
executive and legislative forums.  Journalists are highly respectful of these traditional, 
structured mechanisms.  This is a contested, insider-driven, political terrain where 
victims do not easily fit, and where their moral gravitas competes with the mutually 
dependent relationship of news media and the established political system.
7
  If a 
                                                           
7
 The various organizations formed by the families of 9/11 victims have been a formidable force in 






policy issue is perceived to be a technical one, or if it concerns the use of force, 
journalists seem to prefer sources that can demonstrate sufficient credentials or a high 
degree of expertise.  Victims are considered qualified to speak in general terms about 
the need to address a threat or to punish the perpetrators of terrorism, rather than to 
assess specific details of national security or diplomacy policy proposals.   
 
The absence of a chapter dedicated to anti and counterterrorism should not 
imply that these are issues where victims are relatively less involved. Quite the 
contrary: Beyond their well-known involvement in the trials of the perpetrators of 
terrorism, victims have been successfully lobbying for advanced security measures 
and against their early release.
8
  Nevertheless, I found this type of victim involvement 
to be less telling about journalism as a profession and as a cultural institution than the 
issues that involved the ends of the Experience-Argument Scale. Extreme deference 
(demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3) threatened to bend journalists’ professional norms 
to the point of redefining the pro-victim approach as a stand-alone professional duty, 
reserved for troubled times. And when victims became involved in political issues that 
were perceived to be outside the authority granted by their victimhood (see Chapter 4 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of 9/11 family members’ activism was the “Jersey Widows,” who forced a reluctant Congress and 
White House in 2002 to form the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—
commonly known as the 9/11 Commission—as an independent authority, separate from and potentially 
critical of the White House.  Another notable example was the success of an organization called “9/11 
Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism” to overturn the Bush administration's decision to let the Dubai 
Ports World Company operate six East Coast ports.  Today, some 9/11 family organizations have 
joined human rights organizations and civil liberties activists in a campaign to shut down the U.S. 
detention center at Guantanamo Bay and American “Black Sites” in Europe and the Middle East. 
8
 One of the most influential endeavors in this area was the success of relatives of the victims of the 
Pan Am 103 downing in 1988 in lobbying for improvements in aviation safety. Moreover, they 
relentlessly lobbied Washington and the United Nations to pressure Libya into extraditing agents 
believed to have carried out the bombing, and continued to pressure for sanctions against Libya. These 
families may well have had a hand in Gadhaffi’s turn-around—swearing off terrorism and abandoning 
his nuclear program—to the point where international sanctions were lifted, and Libya was no longer 






on victims' involvement in the overarching conflict), journalists were less inclined to 
embrace the victims. The danger in that area of the Scale was that in their negativity, 
journalists abandoned their normal cultural role to uphold the victims' special status 
and didn't listen to them. Victims, by virtue of their status, were normally forgiven for 
expressing unpopular views. But where the right end of the Scale was concerned, the 
opportunity that the victims presented, to expand the range of opinion to include the 
anti-war alternative at the outset or the midst of an armed conflict, was passed over. In 
the example of victims' anti-war campaigns, rejecting their agenda ultimately meant a 
refusal to consider an earlier end to the "rally around the flag" period.  
 
Identifying the Scale's journalistic modes 
 
 In order to evaluate the modes of journalistic treatment that characterized the 
various topics—deferential, professionally oriented, critical or oblivious—this work 
approached the coverage of victims with some specific questions in mind. Among 
them—   
 
 Are victims’ reported opinions exempt from the “balancing act” that signals a 
commitment to the ideal of objectivity?   
 Are the victims automatically perceived as representatives of the larger victim 
population (rather than assumed to be speaking only for themselves)? 
 In quoting victims’ opinions, do journalists add a personal, sentimental 







 If the answer to the above questions in a particular case was “yes,” then we 
were facing a clear case of journalistic deference.  When dealing, for example, with 
issues of remembrance, as Chapter 2 has shown, journalists sometimes treated the 
more vocal victims as spokespersons for the entire group of victims, even when the 
speakers were merely voicing their own opinion.   
 
Example: hostage situations and the left end of the Scale 
 
 While remembrance issues exhibit close connections between the victims’ 
Arguments and their Experience, hostage situations exhibit the full convergence of 
these elements, as the victims are at the center of the ongoing terrorist event.  No 
wonder, then, that the news media are attracted to hostages and their family members 
more than to any other player in the hostage drama, except for, perhaps, the terrorists 
themselves.  The victims’ views on how to resolve the crisis are given equal—and 
often greater—importance to those offered by the authorities.9   
 
 During the typical hostage situation, the hostages and their families beg their 
government to negotiate for the hostages’ safe release, while the government is 
                                                           
9
 Hostage situations raise crucial counterterrorism and antiterrorism policy issues.  Every decision that 
aims to resolve the particular incident (counterterrorism) bears on the prospects of the recurrence of 
similar attacks (antiterrorism).  The short term and long tern consequences of hostage crisis 
management make it a matter of national policy.  In attempting to influence government decision-
making with respect to the specific event, hostages and their families are taking a stance in a policy 







reluctant to give in or even to communicate with the kidnappers, fearing that in doing 
so it would encourage recurrence of similar acts, perhaps even by the same people.  
Faced with such conflict, the media are potentially torn: on the one hand, their 
sympathies are with the families’ heart-wrenching pleas to end the crisis.  On the 
other, they acknowledge the legitimacy of the government’s hardline, and long-term 
oriented, approach.  
 
 But are the media really torn between these two forces? The literature— as 
well as the experience of the average media consumer—suggest that in reality, 
journalists experience no conflict at all, as the temptation to focus the coverage on the 
hostages and the hostage scene is too great, and journalists cannot resist the complete 
identification with the hostages and their families.  Translating this reality to the 
Experience-Argument Scale, hostage situations, in which the victims' Argument 
pertains directly to their Experience, qualify for the very left, "deference" end of the 
Experience-Argument Scale.   
 
 During the 17-day TWA hostage crisis in June 1985, for example, U.S. 
television networks sent massive crews and star anchorpersons to Beirut to interview 
the American hostages and their Hezbollah hostage takers.  As the hostage scene 
quickly developed into a frenzied media circus, American journalists became blind to 
all but the need to secure the hostages’ release.  In their ambition, they interposed 
themselves between the hostage takers and the Reagan administration to the point of 
virtually assuming the role of negotiators, posing the terrorists questions such as: 






scholars agreed that the hysterical coverage of the Beirut crisis pushed the United 
States and Israel to concede to the terrorists’ demands and to compromise their 
national security interests.   
 
 In their attraction to the tragedy and suspense associated with the hostage 
drama, the news media downplay any strategic policy options other than the 
immediate release of the hostages.  The media are constantly preoccupied with the 
possibilities of either mounting a military attack on the terrorists, or accepting the 
terrorists’ demands—options that would end the crisis without delay.  Indeed, if we 
look at hostage situations through the Experience-Argument prism, the media 
dominance of victims (provided that they are visible) and their families is inevitable.  
The victims are the protagonists of the terrorist spectacle as it unfolds.   
 
Example: victims’ antiwar activism and the right end of the Scale 
 
 At the right end of the Scale, the politically empowering loss and the victims’ 
Arguments are conceptually remote and so the news media are consequently 
disinterested or even negative.  There, I situate victims’ attempts to influence public 
opinion in favor of an end to “the overarching conflict,” namely the larger geo-
political conflict that has generated the attack and has often exacerbated following it.  
Terrorism victims often call for peace in the name of the civilian victims of both sides 
involved.  Chapter 4 analyzes the media coverage of one such U.S. organization, 






organization, the Parents Circle, whose members are both Israeli and Palestinian 
bereaved family members. The Parents' Circle took upon itself to build bridges 
between bereaved people and exemplify the potential for co-existence, and perhaps 
mutual forgiveness, of Israelis and Palestinians.  Peaceful Tomorrows connected 
similarly with Afghan and Iraqi victims, but  Peaceful Tomorrows' mission was 
particularly challenging because the war that it was dealing with was taking place in a 
far-away land and the civilian victims on whose name it was speaking were, in the 
eyes of the American public, the faceless residents of the third world.  
 
Journalism's "dual duty": the cultural role and the informational-democratic role 
 
 The relationship between victims and the news media greatly depends on 
whether the victims hold a politically adversarial stance to that of their government.  
Official government policies, to be sure, are always taken seriously by media, and 
probably nowhere more than in the news coverage of national security matters.  But 
when the victims' personal and painful voice meets the military and bureaucratic 
jargon of generals and state officials, journalists need to simultaneously satisfy two 
distinct expectations.  The first and more “culturally oriented” duty—to follow James 
Carey—calls journalists to mirror the experience of a traumatized nation that fully 
identifies with the victims.
10
  The other duty has more to do with the press’s 
democratic role, and it requires journalists to serve as the information channels that 
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 This expectation clusters together several journalistic loyalties.  Among them, the patriotic loyalty to 
the shared experience of terrorism, the stylistic practice of personifying arguments, and the loyalty to 






notify the citizenry—the ultimate overseers of government—of the actions and policy 
options of its elected ruling institutions.  I refer to these two duties as a “dual duty.” 
 
 The potential dilemma that journalists' “dual duty” can generate is sharply 
manifested in hostage situations.  There, the great terrorist drama pulls journalists—in 
tune with the popular sentiment (which most often overlaps with their own) and with 
their cultural role—toward the victims, and away from the government’s long-term, 
strategic considerations.  However, once the conflict between victims and government 
lacks the urgency of the hostage situation, journalists are ambivalent, and seem to 
exercise their traditional professional norms in a much more visible way.  This is 
evident, for example, in the coverage of victims’ advocacy for antiterrorism and 
counterterrorism policies. 
 
Scope of research: A U.S.-Israel comparative study 
 
 This is a comparative study of press-victims relations in the United States and 
Israel, aimed to highlight similarities and differences between these two journalistic 
cultures, as reflected from the struggle between the press's conflicting loyalties to the 
particular, local public sentiment on the one hand, and to its similarly particular 
journalistic normative system, on the other. 
 
 Comparison promises a release from an ethnocentric point of view that might 






resided in the United States for six years, I could be suspected of failing to notice 
important political and cultural undercurrents in both these countries.  A comparison 
should help to transcend the self-evident and to lend an explanatory dimension to 
what is otherwise obvious (Hallin and Mancini 2004:2). One of the major findings of 
this dissertation, in this respect, is that the political spectrum reflected by the 
mainstream Israeli news media is broader, and more open to extreme views, than the 
U.S political spectrum of the mainstream media discourse, which is constricted to the 
traditional, well known views of the two-party system. 
 
 The factual basis of the comparison is the modern history of terrorism in the 
United States and Israel.  The American experience of terrorism in the past 40 years 
has been very different from the Israeli one.  While American citizens were 
occasionally hit on foreign soil (Americans traveling abroad have been an easier and 
more popular target for anti-American terrorism), domestic terrorism has been 
relatively rare.  Conversely, Israel has endured routine terrorism by various 
Palestinian and Lebanese groups, most recently during the Second Palestinian Intifada 
(also known as the Al Aksa Intifada, 2000-2005), the armed conflict with the 
Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, and Hamas’s frequent rocket attacks from the Gaza 
Strip on the southern region of Israel in the past 15 years.  While terrorism against 
Israelis has always been perceived as part and parcel of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, the United States—at least until 9/11—regarded terrorism as an isolated 







The most notable example of the U.S. treating terrorism as a burst of 
extraordinary criminality—rather than as a systematic product of dangerous 
ideologies—was the Oklahoma City bombing. After the initial suspicion that the 
bombing was a case of Muslim terrorism was proven false, and Timothy McVeigh 
was identified as the perpetrator, it became clear that the attack was inspired by the 
right-extremist, White Supremacist, Christian Identity milieu in revenge for the FBI’s 
assault on a compound of a Christian sect in Waco, Texas and other incidents. But 
although this was a classic case of domestic terrorism, it did not register as an 
announcement of war between pro and anti-government positions, nor did it result in 
fundamental political changes or shake the American belief system as much as 9/11 
did.  More than anything, it was attributed to the deranged character of McVeigh and 
his fellow conspirators. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center was similarly 
and famously dismissed as extraordinary rather than indicative of a looming threat.   
 
9/11, however, marked the change of a world order, defining it in terms of an 
ideological clash between Western civilization and Islamic fundamentalism.  While 
singular and devastating in scope, 9/11 (together with the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings, the 2005 London bombings and other attempted attacks that were 
prevented) situated Islamic terrorism in a larger, long-term narrative of war, parallel 
in some respects to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (although the “war on terror” lacks 
the clarity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the reactions of the U.S. and Israel to 
terrorism have also been different).  In this dissertation I reflect on these distinct 






in both countries, on the values that they embody and the extent and nature of the 
attention that they receive.   
 
Comparative perspective: adversary relations between media and government 
 
 The difference in scale, context and frequency of terrorism is but one factor 
that affects the portrayal of the victims in the news.  Much more challenging and 
important for this dissertation would be to try and attribute any differences in the 
media coverage of the victims to the systemic differences between Israeli and 
American news media.  One such systemic difference that has direct bearing on the 
relationship between victims and the news media is explored in Chapter 3's discussion 
of abducted soldiers, and that is the degree of journalistic loyalty to the government's 
point of view.   
 
The coverage of victims largely depends on the extent to which the press feels 
free to air anti-establishment grievances.
11
  The very nature of political activism is 
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 The importance of the systemic factor of an adversarial press-government relationship in the context 
of the coverage of terrorism victims is evident in regions where the press is oppressed and does not in 
the first place work in the public interest.  One blatant example has been the consistently negative 
coverage of the Beslan Mothers Committee by the Russian daily Pravda.  The Committee, which 
represents families who lost their children in the September 2004 three-day siege of the Beslan’s 
School by Chechen terrorists, has been the most active voice in Russia condemning President Putin’s 
administration’s mishandling the hostage situation.  Pravda, known as the Russian government’s 
mouthpiece, showed nothing but contempt for the Committee and its pleas.  It denounced the mothers 
who left Beslan to meet Putin as “ready to leave their children's graves and thus abuse their memory,” 
and went on to provide an “expert opinion” angle to that story, in which a psychologist diagnosed the 
Beslan mothers as displaying “desperate aggression… in a combination with the eternal role of a 
victim, which they doomed themselves to play” (“Beslan Anniversary Darkened With Blasphemous 







that it aims to create change by challenging the ruling government's position, and 
victims' campaigns, in all of the topics that this dissertation illustrates, do exactly that. 
In order to succeed, they need a free press whose ideological ties and sense of 
commitment to the government line are not too strong to accommodate opposition.   
 
The assumption that political activists go hand in hand with confrontational 
journalists is romantic but not always true. The news media can take an anti-
establishment position that is more sophisticated, and less risky, than direct 
confrontation.  The dedication that the Israeli press exhibited toward the Shalit cause, 
for example, and the pressure that it mounted on the Netanyahu government to 
advance an exchange deal, were not framed in the news as an opposition to the 
Netanyahu government in the traditional, political sense of “opposition.” As Chapter 3 
illustrates, the coverage was not negative or critical toward Netanyahu as much as it 
took the form of a catatonic reiteration of the unspecified idea that Gilad Shalit must 
return. The militaristic values that constructed the obligation to return Shalit, mostly 
the “leave no man behind” principle, defined the coverage in patriotic, emotional and 
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 Chapter 3 goes further to show that the U.S. coverage of the Bowe Bergdahl case, on the other hand, 
was characterized by the same matter-of-factness that characterized the coverage of all military issues, 
without any apparent journalistic agenda, including not an anti-establishment one, not direct nor 
indirect. The Shalit-type overflowing emotionalism may have been missing from the Bergdahl 
coverage because of the different circumstances, namely the suspicion that Bergdahl defiantly deserted 
his post before he was captured, or the Bergdahl family’s cooperation with the administration’s request 
to keep a low profile, yet it is hard to imagine the U.S. press demonstrating the same frenzied devotion 






 To what extent are the American and Israeli presses critical of the political 
establishment of their respective countries?  For American journalism, an adversarial 
relationship with the government defines its sense of purpose (even as a good deal of 
coverage follows governmental frames).  It is one of the rationales for the First 
Amendment, as the prohibition against enacting press laws protects the press’s 
freedom to irritate the government by holding it accountable or its actions (although 
this Constitutional provision similarly protects bad, biased and government-compliant 
reporting).  
 
 In the service of its watchdog role, American journalism has embraced 
“objectivity” throughout the 20th century—as it still does—like no other journalistic 
culture worldwide.  Objectivity, acknowledged from the outset as an unattainable 
ideal, inspired journalists to monitor the great powers of society—government, 
corporations, workers’ unions, religious associations—using a rhetorically detached 
approach, and a transparent, consistent methodology of balance. Walter Lippmann 
championed objectivity as the “scientific” practice of journalism (Schudson 1978, 
154), meriting it the title, protections and esteem of a “profession.”  Michael 
Schudson, wondering how a myth has become a professional tenet, argued that the 
significance of objectivity lay in the recognition of the shortcomings to which it 
responded, namely “relativism, a belief in the arbitrariness of values, a sense of the 
hollow silence of modernity” (1978, 158).  In the 1960s, when the civil rights 
movement and an unpopular war cultivated a culture of dissent, and as the U.S. 
government was experimenting aggressively with “news management,” the dispassion 






unquestioning of the social order, “a complicity with official sources whose most 
alarming feature was that it so self-righteously claimed to above partisan or political 
considerations” (Schudson 1978, 162). Journalistic values adapted to this criticism, 
and objectivity developed in a different direction, embracing the evolving expectation 
from journalism to participate in the ongoing struggle for social equality. This is how 
“fairness” became objectivity's most salient feature. 
 
Israeli media scholars take “objectivity” for granted as a primary professional 
norm among the Israeli press (Zandberg & Neiger 2007), and it also appears as a 
formal professional obligation within various journalistic codes of ethics, such as the 
Rules of Journalistic Ethics issued by the Israel Press Council.
13
 But objectivity’s 
practical manifestations have been much more limited compared to the U.S.  Israeli 
journalism employs an opinionated, even judgmental language. And the structure of 
Israeli dailies is such that commentary is not always physically or editorially distinct 
from hard news.  The two appear side by side, occasionally on the front page (though 
less frequently in news websites, which are more clearly divided into news reporting 
and opinion). It seems that the Israelis’ stated commitment to journalistic objectivity 
has been more the result of the influence of American media studies over Israeli 
academia and Israeli journalists than an organic, self-motivated development.  
Moreover, Israeli journalists defined “objectivity” quite narrowly while holding other 
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 Rule No. 6 of the Israel Press Council, titled “Objectivity,” states as follows: 
A. A newspaper and a journalist shall distinguish in the publication between news items and opinion. 
B. A news item which is published within the framework of an expression of opinion shall be subject to 
the rules of ethics concerning news items. 
C. The publication of news items shall be fair and not misleading. 
D. The headline shall not be misleading. 
E. A newspaper and a journalist shall distinguish in the publication between an advertisement and 
editorial material, in such a manner that an advertisement shall not be published which represents itself 






values in a higher place.  A 2005 survey commissioned by the highly esteemed media 
criticism website The Seventh Eye and the Israel Democracy Institute showed that 
Israeli journalists valued “the presentation of both sides of the story” more than they 
valued “neutrality,” (this is similar to the U.S. emphasis on "balance") and that the 
least valued journalistic norm was the rhetorical representation of objectivity, namely 
the “the avoidance of first person language” (Tzfati and Libio 2005).  
 
As for the identification of objectivity with non-partisanship, Israeli print news 
organizations, for the most part, cannot be politically recognized as either 
conservative or liberal (although when Sheldon Adelson’s pro-Netanyahu daily Israel 
Hayom challenged the hegemony of Yedioth Aharonoth, the latter became 
increasingly hostile to Netanyahu). Ask Israel’s leading political journalists, and they 
will tell you that they are basically contemptuous of politicians, and that Israeli 
politics is a rather sad contest between selfish ambitions, devoid of any sincere 
commitment to public service. Here is how Yedioth Aharonoth’s political columnist 
Nahum Barnea described in 2006 a meeting he and Yedioth’s Shimon Shiffer had held 
with Benjamin Netanyahu, as the latter was campaigning for Prime Minister.  
The stated purpose of our meeting was an interview. When we 
were done, Netanyahu asked that our written piece would 
highlight certain phrases from the interview. We agreed, as he 
indeed had said things that were of public interest. 
But he didn’t stop there. “I want them also in the subhead,” he 
demanded.  
We looked at him in confusion. This man has been in the public 
arena for 24 years, three of which he served as Prime Minister. 
As Minister of Finance, he controlled billions. He could have 
left us, the little guys, the phrasing of our subheads.  







“A-Ha!” he exclaimed in a “gotcha” tone. “You will use a tiny 
font, such that no one sees.” And he put his thumb next to his 
middle finger, to illustrate the miserable size of the letters. “I 
want to know now the size of the font,” he demanded. And I 
recalled something I once wrote on another politician, that he 
was not big enough to afford to be so small. 
  
Israeli journalists often try to embarrass politicians over their obsessive 
attempts to control their public image, and the exposure of “backdoor” exchanges of 
the type that Barnea and Schiffer had with Netanyahu is but one way to do that. But 
beyond opinion columns such as Barnea’s, the Israeli news agenda itself manifests 
negativity toward the political world, as a great deal of journalism’s investigative 
energies are directed at exposing political figures’ egregious personal spending of 
public funds, or nepotism behind appointments to public office, or any other self-
serving misdeeds.  This antagonism does not imply, however, that Israeli journalism 
has a particularly revolutionary or anti-establishment streak.  Yuran suggests that the 
media’s manifested disdain over Israeli politics is in fact a form of compliance, as if 
discontent replaces a deeper critical gaze and active oversight. The assumption that 
politicians are corrupt, he argues, becomes a tool in the hands of those who defend the 
corrupt politician of the hour, because if all politicians are corrupt, and corruption is 
the norm, then how come that particular person takes all the fire? (Yuran 2001, 191.) 
 
American journalists share this antagonistic view of the political world, yet 
they seem to see things in a way that harmonizes with governmental definitions of 
problems.  As Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston observed with respect to the 






Most of the time, on the surface at least, there is plenty of 
antagonism between reporters and the officials who try to feed 
them. […]But the daily rituals of feeding the beast (as the 
White House press corps is known to those who handle press 
relations) tend to be relatively bloodless affairs in which there 
is much ado about nothing—rather like posturings of wary 
adversaries who recognize their respective niches in the curious 
ecology of Washington politics. (Bennett, Lawrence and 
Livingston 2007:5) 
 
While Israeli journalism is openly scornful about the petty and egotistical 
forces that navigate Israel’s policymaking, the American press is more understated 
and reserved in this respect (and its criticism of U.S. politics probably also complies 
with Yuran's observation that the nitpicking chat substitutes for a meaningful probe of 
the establishment). Israeli journalists, for example, have much less patience with—
and attribute lesser importance to—formal political speeches or government-initiated 
press conferences, and their visible dialogue with the political system, as heard, for 
example, in radio’s leading political shows, is much more interrogatory, and much 
less courteous, than the American one.  
 
Ideological backgrounds of Israeli and U.S. journalism 
 
 The American and Israeli presses come from significantly different historical 
and ideological backgrounds. While they both have a publicly minded orientation, 
there is a difference in the way they discharge their commitment to the public interest. 
America’s liberal tradition perceives its news first and foremost as a free-market 
enterprise that enjoys a Constitutional protection against government intervention, 






strong socialist tradition, journalism historically and voluntarily behaved as a public 
service. 
 
From its early days and until the 1980s, Israel’s strongest ethos was a 
“survivalist” ethos that demanded collective subordination to the national state-
building efforts.  In a manner typical of developing countries, the press was expected 
to serve national solidarity, follow the government line and abide to military 
censorship (Nossek and Limor 2011).  Specifically to Israel’s two historical main 
dailies, Ma’ariv and Yedioth Aharonoth, although most of their reporters have not 
personally favored the Socialist Mapai (the Workers Party of Israel)-led government, 
these newspapers nevertheless kept a “national,” patriotic line that refrained from 
harsh criticism of government policies. Ma’ariv’s legendary editor, Azriel Karlibach, 
declared the paper's goal to be a “national” establishment, safeguarding the legitimacy 
of the state and its governing authorities (Lehman-Wilzig 1999). 
 
As the media market became commercially-oriented and press organizations 
severed their affiliations to political parties, the notion of the press as a public service 
remained but confined itself to two central obligations: the first was to cater to the 
entirety of the Israeli population and to address the problems of all segments of 
society; the second was to hold government accountable in a manner commensurate 
with the complaints and concerns of the ordinary citizen. Yedioth Aharonoth, after 







..a diverse range of opinion (without deviating from the consensus when it 
came to fundamental issues.) There was a twofold brilliance in this approach: 
First, the entirety of readers were spared from any “cognitive dissonance” 
because within a day or two they could find a commentator whose worldview 
matched theirs. Secondly, the joint appearance of contradicting viewpoints, 
side by side on the same page, created an impression of conflict. Yedioth 
became the place where the action was. (Lehman-Wilzig 1999, 7.) 
 
Committed to the entire populace, the Israeli press was never forced to pledge 
its “objectivity” to its audience in order to prove its ideological detachment from 
government and its effectiveness as a watchdog.  Rather, it positioned itself on the 
side of “the people,” with an emphasis on all people.  The Israeli press celebrated 
egalitarianism, much more than objectivity, as its basic professional norm.  
Journalists were proud when they spoke to power in the voice of the unpleased 
ordinary citizen.  
 
 Another factor in the dominance of egalitarianism in Israeli journalistic culture 
has been the small size of the Israeli news market.  In Israel, whose population is 
similar in size to that of New Jersey, the number of national mainstream news outlets 
is limited to three broadcast evening newscasts (the public Channel 1 and the 
commercial broadcasters Channel 2 and Channel 10), two main national newspapers 
(Yedioth Aharonoth and Israel Hayom hold altogether approximately 70% of the 
market), three online news websites (Walla, Yedioth Aharonoth-owned Ynet and 
Mako) and two news and current affairs radio stations (the IDF station Galatz and the 
public Reshet Bet).  These Hebrew language news sources dominate the entirety of the 
Israeli market (together with some niche Russian and Arabic language TV channels, 
websites and dailies). The Israeli audience has a preference for Hebrew, and while 






and satellite viewers, their popularity, as the popularity of foreign news websites, is 
marginal.  The size of the Israeli market is such that segmentation is a largely 
irrelevant business model, and mainstream news organizations (with the exception of 
the left-leaning and more upscale Ha'aretz and religious Jewish publications) must 
cater to the entire Jewish population in order to survive.  Israel’s “mass press” news 
culture—in broadcast, print and online—has a wide, a-political appeal, which 
emphasizes the human, personalized, aspect of stories and is willing to attack the 
political establishment regardless of the party in power.
14
   
  
 In the United States, the economic hardships of journalism pulled the news 
business in the entirely opposite direction.  There, the press leaned toward 
demographic and ethnic segmentation.  The economic strategy of American 
journalism in the beginning of the 20
th
 century, of expanding exposure to the widest 
audience possible—and using objectivity to signal that it fit all audiences—was 
replaced with a focused appeal based on class, income and, as far as cable news was 
concerned, political affiliation.  In such an environment, Fox and MSNBC presented 
two contrary and irreconcilable versions of reality. Fragmentation expanded, or rather 
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 These mass-press features of the Israeli press dominated its coverage of the conflict with Hezbollah 
in the summer of 2006 in a way that is typical of the press’s reaction to terrorism.  Initially, the Israeli 
press rallied behind the government’s decision to strike Lebanon in retaliation for Hezbollah’s killing 
and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers on the Israeli side of the international border.  But the rallying period 
was short, soon replaced with fear for the lives of Israeli forces in Lebanon, and great doubts over the 
decision to conduct massive ground operations against Hezbollah strongholds embedded in Southern 
Lebanon’s densely populated areas.  The increasingly critical attitude of the press toward Israel’s 
military strategy culminated in an almost unequivocal call for a retreat from Lebanon.  In the soul-
searching that followed the conflict, the Israeli media were criticized for morally siding with soldiers 
and soldiers’ families, creating a national atmosphere of defeat that undermined the military effort.  
The persistent expressions of anguish and outrage in the media throughout the conflict culminated in—
or at least contributed to—the formation of a government investigative committee found the cabinet 
liable for over-extending combat.  The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict is a recent display of the mass-press 
characteristics of Israeli journalism: over-emphasizing emotional themes of loss and revenge and 







exploded, with the advent of online journalism. The economic downfall of print 
journalism called for constant experimentation with online journalism business and 
subsidy models, such as publicly funded, not-for-profit investigative reporting 
projects, collaborations with journalism schools and foundations, and the erection of 
pay walls within the online editions of legacy newspapers. The Tow Center for Digital 
Journalism termed this era “Post Industrial Journalism,” where the journalistic work 
(writing) no longer took place where newspaper production (printing) did, and which 
was characterized mostly by uncertainty. "We are plainly in an era where what 
doesn’t work is clearer than what does, and where the formerly stable beliefs and 
behaviors of what we used to call the news industry are giving way to a far more 
variable set of entities than anything we saw in the 20th century." (Anderson, Bell and 
Shirky, 2012) 
 
Just as online news organizations and initiatives invented new strategies for financial 
sustainability, they were also reconsidering traditional journalistic norms and 
questioning their adequacy to the realities of Post Industrial Journalism. The liberty to 
adopt or relinquish the methodologies and rhetoric of objectivity, or any other 
professional norm, and to engage in political partisanship or any other form of 
advocacy, ultimately obscured “journalism” as an institution and a profession.  Online 
journalism offered “different definitions of news” (Downie and Schudson 2009), and 
the difficulty of news organizations in this confused environment to convince the 
public that they were offering a dependable version of reality was reflected in a 
catastrophic loss of the U.S. audience’s trust (Jay Rosen referred to the audience as 






disseminating news via social networks).
 15
  The scholarly preoccupation with the 
economic survival of journalism, particularly of the investigative type, has left the 
question of the state of journalistic professional norms unattended.  With journalism 
entering a survival mode and large-scale wrongdoing is in danger of remaining 
undiscovered, the burning wish among journalism scholars and educators has been 
that stories be funded, researched, written and seen the light, while their seeming 
objectivity has simply become less important. The online world provided political 
pressure groups, victims included, with opportunities to work outside the known 
parameters of established journalism, in blogs or in single-issue advocacy websites. 
The personal voice of the victims fit well with the already increasing personal, blog-




Terrorism victims as representations of national identity  
 
 Terrorism triggers a negotiation process of core meanings, a process that takes 
visible place in the media.  One concept that strongly underlies the coverage of 
terrorism, and particularly terrorism victims, is national self-identity, because it is a 
fundamental component of the terrorism narrative.  The attacked community rarely 
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 Jay Rosen, “The People Formerly Known as the Audience,” Huffington Post, June 30, 2006. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-rosen/the-people-formerly-known_1_b_24113.html 
 
16 September Eleventh for Peaceful Tomorrows had started its journey, as described in Chapter 4, as a 
disparate group of victims' relatives who individually expressed themselves online in different venues, 
and were brought together by a peace organization that came across their messages and identified their 
common purpose. Chapter 4 also reveals the difficult interactions that Peaceful Tomorrows had with 
mainstream television, both the hyper-partisan cable news as well as the more internationally oriented 
and supposedly balanced CNN. For organizations like Peaceful Tomorrows, whose anti-war message 
was, at least until 2007,outside the legitimate range of opinion (as defined by the bi-partisan political 
system), online journalism offered hope for an expansion and diversification of the publicly debated, 






perceives terrorism as a criminal story about evil perpetrators attacking innocent 
victims.  Rather, terrorism narrative explicates the fact that the attack has targeted the 
community for ideological reasons, and the story of the attack includes a vigilant 
defense of the attacked ideology as well as the belief that it will endure and prevail.  
 
One way to mount an ideological defense is that is to craft a story that puts 
forth victim-protagonists who most adequately represent the community’s ideals and 
let them recount the events, interpret them and express belief in retribution and 
victory.  Terrorism victims are more newsworthy as sources, commentators and 
political actors if they can demonstrate compatibility with a desirable, pre-ordained 
concept of the national self-image.  This choice of “preferred victims” is, of course, 
not a unique phenomenon to terrorism coverage. It is part of the routine exercise of 
news judgment, a product of journalists’ working assumption, that people want the 
news to be about “themselves,” and the habit of prioritizing the news according to the 
proximity of their protagonists to the self-image of the audience.  
 
 In the case of international terrorism (rather than terrorism targeting a religious 
or an ethnic group), journalists are attuned to any “national” features embedded in the 
biographies and personalities of individual victims.  When casting victims for this 
role, news organizations establish what are, in effect, “victim hierarchies.”  As a 
desirable minimum, they should be local citizens, native in the local language, from 
upper-middle class, and from wholesome looking families.  After all cultural 






some victims are recognized as occupying a demographic and ideological national 
“center” while others are deemed more “peripheral” and thus, uninteresting.   
 
 A comparison between the characteristics of “preferred victims” in terrorism 
coverage in Israel and the U.S. reveals that these two cultures define their countries’ 
national “centers” quite similarly. In the U.S., the most influential group of 9/11 
family members has been the “Jersey Widows,” who rose to immediate fame as they 
fought for the establishment of the 9/11 Commission, as well as Lisa Beamer, wife of 
United Airlines flight 93 hero Todd Beamer.  Their coverage emphasized the “all 
American” family life that these women had lost. But media critics did not fail to 
notice the fact that these were the wives of Manhattan lawyers and bankers (Todd 
Beamer was an account manager for Oracle), and not of the immigrant service 
workers who also perished in 9/11.  
 
One of the striking differences between the national media coverage of 9/11 
and that of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was the fact that none of the Oklahoma 
victims achieved the media prominence of some 9/11 family members (although the 
local Oklahoma press, as Chapter 2 describes, did grant them endless honors, 
especially given their principle role in the establishment of the Oklahoma memorial). 
Was this simply because of the lower death toll of the Oklahoma attack, or the fact 
that it was a case of domestic terrorism, presumably easier to contain that the ominous 
and more elusive international terrorism? Was it because the national media did not 
find Oklahoma City residents as newsworthy as Northeasterners or that 9/11 happened 






family members of Oklahoman federal employees failed to match the American ideal 
the way that 9/11 victims did? Or was it for much more mundane reasons, such as the 
fact that the Oklahoma victims’ lobbying took place in the local level, for example 
their engagement in the trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, while lobbying 
in the context of 9/11 took place primarily (not including the rebuilding of Ground 
Zero) at the federal level? 
 
Similar questions arise with respect to the Israeli media’s coverage of victims 
of Palestinian suicide bombings inside and outside the Green Line (Israel’s 
international border prior to the 1967 war).  The scale and tone of the coverage of 
attacks perpetrated inside the Green Line—particularly within Israel’s big cities—
have been much more extensive and emotional than coverage of attacks against Israeli 
settlers in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, although both cases involved Israeli 
citizens. This was because the victims who embodied the Israeli “national center” 
were the secular Jewish residents of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.  A personal 
history of sacrifice, like past service in a combat unit in the Israeli Army, comported 
even better with the desirable Israeli self-image, as well as an advanced academic 
degree.  The settlers, on the other hand, were perceived as “outsiders,” who chose to 
live in a dangerous area for ideological convictions not shared by most Israelis.   
 
The relative inferiority of the settler-victims was apparent in Israeli 
broadcasters’ reluctance to cancel commercial breaks as they broke the news of a 
Palestinian attack on settlers.  As a rule, commercial broadcasters executed 






awareness of the intolerable dissonance between the gruesome news footage and the 
glamor of television advertising.  But when the attacks targeted settlers, broadcasters 
were less willing to incur the financial losses associated with lost advertising time.  
Their reluctance to cancel commercial breaks in these circumstances drove the Second 
Authority for Television and Radio—which supervised commercial broadcasting—to 
initiate in 2000 a directive that straightforwardly stated: “No commercials shall be 
incorporated in a news report of a terrorist attack.”17  This regulatory measure was 
intended to “correct” what the Second Authority perceived as the broadcasters’ 
skewed sense of “newsworthiness” in their coverage of terrorism victims.  All Israeli 
victims should receive equal journalistic treatment, implied the new directive, so not 
to be subject to journalistic calculations of proximity and audience appeal (Kadmon 
Sella, 2006a). 
 
Coverage of terrorism victims vs. coverage of other victims 
 
 Terrorism victims do not have a monopoly over the politics of personal 
trauma.  The political arena accommodates representatives of the endless variety of 
human tragedy: car accidents, fatal diseases and natural disasters are but a few. As 
terrorism is a topic of the highest national priority and involves questions of national 
security and often also foreign policy, the participation of terrorism victims is 
different than the participation of other victims in that it involves high-level politics 
(as it does in the case of war veterans and relatives of POWs and MIAs).  Unlike other 
victims, terrorism victims are unwilling players in an ongoing ideological—be it geo-
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political, ethnic or religious—struggle.  The efforts of terrorism victims to participate 
in the national security debate that follows their calamity are fascinating because these 
are ordinary people determined to impact the most acute, existential challenges a 
community can face.   
 
The incongruence between terrorism victims’ personal voice and the high-
powered, professionally closed culture of the government’s security apparatus is most 
striking in discussions on how to address a national threat as grave as terrorism.  And 
this incongruence presents unique challenges to journalists: should they accept the 
victims as legitimate participants, despite their lack of the typical education, 
experience or credentials shared by the officials that they wish to influence?  Or 
should journalists keep them in the background, more as reminders that wrong 
policies carry a human toll, than as advocates of pragmatic solutions?  The 
involvement of victims in the most critical policy junctures forces journalism to 
handle complicated questions such as how to regard expertise or a lack thereof, how 
to express disagreement with these venerable symbols of national sacrifice, and more.  
The high-profiled nature of the issues makes these questions more pressing than in the 
coverage of other policy areas that involve the politics of personal trauma. 
 
 It is also the exceptional clout of terrorism victimhood that makes it unique 
and particularly challenging for journalism to address as it is for society at large.  As 
living evidence of their nations’ physical vulnerability and the enemy’s barbarism, 
terrorism victims embody national endurance and moral perseverance.  Certainly, 






“legitimate”—and not entirely unpredictable—consequence of war.  There is no such 
“legitimacy” in the death and suffering of civilians who are attacked while going 
about their everyday lives.  
 
 The unique status of victims is deeply connected to the horrific randomness of 
terrorism.  Terrorism regards all members of a community as potential targets, and 
forces each of its members to face the threat of her own death by an attack.  Terrorism 
victims, more than casualties of war, symbolize the community’s greatest fears. 
 
Terrorism victims defined 
 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, “victims” are people who suffered 
significant physical or emotional wounds, or who lost close family members, in a 
terrorist attack.  
 
 Defining “terrorism” is challenging and inherently controversial.  There is no 
definite, agreed-upon definition for this term, which is used in both a descriptive and a 
pejorative way.
18
  Most common definitions of “terrorism” share the following 
elements: an organized activity carried out by non-state actors and driven by political 
ideology, conducted as a tactical surprise, and targeting civilians or non-combatant 
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military personnel.  Media scholars enriched this definition by adding media 
dependency to the list of terrorism characteristics.  As terrorism’s aim is to terrorize a 
larger population than the directly victimized group, unreported acts of terrorism are 
futile.
19
   
 
 This dissertation is not limited to any strict definition of terrorism, which 
might unnecessarily limit the analysis and prevent discussion in analytically 
comparable and applicable phenomena.  Therefore, I occasionally explore other forms 
of political violence if they are similar to “traditional” terrorism in ways that 
significantly illuminate the arguments that this work examines.  Moreover, because 
the definition of terrorism is in the eyes of the beholder, I concentrate on events that 
are considered terrorism by the attacked community, even if they do not necessarily 
comply with common “terrorism” definitions.  In Israel, for example, the kidnapping 
of soldiers on active duty for use as bargaining chips is considered an act of terrorism, 
even though it is not directed at civilians. The kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by a 
non-state actor (as opposed to the capturing a soldier within a conflict that 
international law recognizes as "war") qualifies, in the eyes of the Israeli public, as a 
terrorist attack.   
 
Moral confusion between terrorism victims and terrorists 
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 This perspective was implied, for example, in Walter Laqueur’s claim, that “the media are the 
terrorist’s best friend.  The terrorist act by itself is nothing; publicity is all” (1976:104), in Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s assertion that “unreported terrorist acts would be like the proverbial tree falling in the 
silent forest” (1986:109), and in Brian Jenkins’s proclamation: “Terrorism is aimed at the people 






 Since I began my work on this project, I have often found myself having to 
explain why I was studying media representations of terrorism victims rather than 
those of terrorists.  In fact, it happened so very often that when I introduced my 
research topic to people in or outside the field, they actually confused “terrorism 
victims” with “terrorists.”  While they heard me say “terrorism victims,” in their 
mind’s eye they saw suicide bombers.  I realized how easily victims could be 
confused with perpetrators, particularly as the perpetrators were sometimes perceived 
as victims themselves—victims of political oppression, of a dire economic situation, 
or even of their own mental instability.  Israeli novelist and thinker Amos Oz 




The modern social sciences were the first major attempt to kick 
both good and evil off the human stage.  For the first time in 
their long history, good and bad were both overruled by the 
idea that circumstances are always responsible for human 
decisions, human actions and especially human suffering.  
Society is to blame.  Painful childhood is to blame.  The 
political is to blame.  Colonialism.  Imperialism.  Zionism.  
Globalization.  What not.  So began the great world 
championship of victimhood.  (Oz, 2005) 
 
 According to the perspective that Oz criticizes, terrorism can become—as it 
does both for students of terrorism and for the general public—an equation where 
victims fight victims to the point of morally canceling each other out.  This blurring 
process comes to completion when terrorism victims become perpetrators of violence 
(an extreme, yet useful, example for this state of moral vagueness has been the 
confused and hesitant international response to the Balkan wars in the 1990s).  Given 
the psychological fascination with terrorists, and the belief that understanding their 






why terrorists’ “victim” status has been much more extensively studied than that of 
the victims themselves. 
 
The need to critically examine the politics of personal trauma 
 
 It was terrorists, then, and not victims, who have occupied the primary interest 
of media scholars.  And while largely absent from media studies, victims have been 
the center of extensive research in psychology, which focused on their trauma and 
healing process, as well as the law, which compared their legal status and eligibility 
for disability benefits with those of disabled war veterans or of war widows.  But 
media scholarship on victims has been scarce, and tended to concentrate on their 
appearances in the live, breaking news from the scene of the attack.  Scholars 
recounted the typical heart-rending narratives of the victims: the shocked eyewitness, 
the accidental survivor and the bereaved family member telling of a deceased victim 
whose prospects were destroyed by the attack.  They argued that these roles pushed 
the coverage toward the hyper-emotional and sensational, and that the media’s 
fascination with the personal stories of terrorism victims lay in the much-regretted 
entertainment value of human sorrow.  These were important observations, yet they 
were limited to one aspect of victims’ media presence and rarely continued to follow 
victims’ political endeavors in the months and years that followed. 
 
 This dissertation is an opportunity to critically examine victims of political 
violence as an overlooked political pressure group.  More importantly for our field, it 






between victims’ revered social status and their explicit political ambition.  This 
tension brings journalists to question, and sometimes to relinquish, the traditional 
practices of political coverage.  
 
 While largely absent from media studies, the practices and consequences of 
the “politics of personal trauma” have been the subject of a robust philosophical 
debate.  Thinkers worldwide, numerous enough to be collectively called “anti-
victimists,” have been expressing concern that victimhood as a moral argument was 
over-dominating the political discourse. Joseph Amato (1990), for example, 
articulated this concern dramatically:  
Taking the side of victims, which has been so important for the 
advance of decency, justice, and well-being in the world, has 
also been an exploitative moral rhetoric in modern history.  At 
its extremes this rhetoric elevates the claims of suffering 
beyond all other claims, even those of justice and fairness.  
Transformed into ideologies on the one hand, yet understood to 
be embodied in specific groups of victims on the other, this 
rhetoric, in the hand of its proponent, lays claims to such lofty 
responses as compassion, mercy, forgiveness, and love.  None 
of these responses belong to the natural emotional perimeters of 
everyday morality and work-a-day politics.  (p. xxii) 
 
 Amato may be overstating his case.  There is no reason to exclude 
“compassion” from the lexicon of rational public discourse.  And yet, Amato 
represents an anti-victimist concern that has been taking hold in the past two decades 
(as elaborated in Chapter 4), that the language of victimhood outweighed rational 
political language, if only because the language of victimhood derived its insights 
from personal experience (shared by a homogenous category of victims—blacks, 






issues of national interest in a comprehensive, multi-perspective way. The anti-
victimist approach is in fact a reaction to the moral hegemony of individual “rights” in 
Western social, political and legal thinking.  “Rights,” be it ethnic minority or gay 
rights, have always begun with the outcry of victims of violence or discrimination, 
and the over-sensitivity of the political establishment toward the victims reached a 
point, anti-victimists argue, that the state rushed, without proper consideration, to 
rectify all claims of disadvantage and victimhood. 
 
Similar arguments regarding the unseemly power and inflated definition of 
victimhood were also implied in the scholarly reconsideration of modern reparation 
policies. Reparations, historically introduced through Germany's monetary 
compensation to Holocaust survivors, were occasionally awarded, for example, to 
victims' descendants, highlighting the philosophical and definitional complexity of the 
relationship between suffering and reparations.  For John Torpey (2006), the idea of 
reparations signaled disillusionment from the belief in the ability of the existing social 
order, and in particular, left-wing universalism, to achieve social justice. In this 
respect, reparations were a retroactive ad-hoc substitute for meaningful change, a 
practical way of addressing a problem on an individual basis rather than taking on the 










Journalism and the politics of personal trauma 
 
 Journalism, which defines itself in professional terms, may seem too self-
conscious, too committed to “balance,” “detachment,” and “objectivity” to allow itself 
to surrender to the rhetoric of victimhood warned by anti-victimists.  But in fact, as 
Chapter 1 contends, journalism sometimes demonstrates the moral tendencies that 
Amato is warning against.  Journalism as a cultural institution takes upon itself a 
responsibility to rework, reflect and articulate the popular sentiment of the community 
it serves, so that expressing sympathy to victims is almost an instinctive journalistic 
response.  As previously noted, journalists themselves often genuinely share many 
such impulses and assumptions, drawing them from the milieu in which they live and 
raise families. These tropisms, however, are sometimes at odds with professional 
canons.  Some media scholars see this sympathy as leading to over-exposure of the 
victims arguments, which in turn amounts to irresponsible journalism.  As Tamar 
Liebes argued: 
The use of victims as policy experts on terror has become an 
accepted news convention in the process of defining news as 
melodrama.  This convention alone seems responsible for the 
worst sample of public opinion that one can have at the precise 
moment, as victims are too involved at their own predicament 
to provide a considered opinion. (1998: 80) 
 
 But Liebes’s insights referred to the initial coverage of an attack, when the 
victims typically cried for revenge.  This dissertation, however, followed the victims’ 
engagement in national politics as it became much deeper and institutionalized.  






different mandate, a professional mandate that required them to treat victims in the 
same non-sentimental way that they treated all other political players.  The special 
social status of terrorism victims offered a unique opportunity to expose a conflict 
between two concepts of news: as a cultural unifier that expressed the popular 
sentiment, and as a democratic institution that kept a critical eye over the democratic 
















Deference to Terrorism Victims 
 
 
The Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma, situated at the Columbia Journalism 
School, educates journalists on how to cover traumatic, violent events.  The Center’s 
ethical tip sheet for interviewing victims begins with the rule, “[a]: Always treat victims 
with dignity and respect—the way you want to be treated in a similar situation.”  (Hight and 
Smyth, 2003) 
 
 The expectation here is that journalists would employ a gentle interviewing 
approach and editors would guarantee the dignified portrayal of victims.  Beyond its 
plea for courtesy, the rule calls for humanity – for empathy – in victims’ coverage.  
Journalists would be able to do that, they are reminded, if they bear in mind that only 







 While the tip sheet speaks of victimhood in general, it has particular validity in 
the case of indiscriminate terrorism, given the role played by chance in the terrorist 
scheme. What makes indiscriminate terrorism so powerful is its randomness; it strikes 
down anyone who chances to be in the targeted location. Indeed, fatal illnesses or 
accidents are always, to some extent, the product of chance.  But in terrorism, the 
victims are beyond unlucky – they are losers in a malevolent man-made game of 
chance.  
 
The uniqueness of terrorism victimhood 
 
 Terrorism is a national tragedy of a particular kind.  Many disasters – such as 
floods, plane crashes and high school shootings – are referred to and mourned as 
national tragedies, but that is because all or most of their victims happen to belong to 
a particular national group.  In terrorism, the targeted population’s nationality, 
religion or ethnicity, are not coincidental but are the symbolic targets of the 
premeditated attack.  Terrorism targets people who embody the attacked ideology. 
While the dead and injured and their loved ones are either the direct or secondary 
victims of the attack, all other members of the collective entity are also victimized by 
the danger from which they were lucky to escape, by the threat of a subsequent attack 
or the prospect of war. By power of their shared identity, and the knowledge that they 
have been, and remain, desirable as potential targets, the members of the attacked 
community constitute a “third rank” of victims, after those directly affected and the 







 The notion of shared victimhood is felt in the national press’s coverage of 
terrorism, where the story it tells is much larger than the typical crime-reporting 
account of perpetrators, violent acts and individual victims. The media also speak of 
the attack’s blow to the national pride, the collective fear of future terrorism, and also 
the determined intent—articulated through military jargon or through the aggressive, 
bloodthirsty vox populi—to retaliate, persecute the perpetrators, and even demolish 
them. And sometimes, when the media can accommodate political opposition without 
being suspected of anti-patriotism, the media deliberate on the root causes of 
terrorism, and criticize the government for its gross security failure.   
 
 In order to understand the journalistic attitudes toward terrorism victims, it is 
necessary to make an initial conceptualization of terrorism as a media phenomenon, 
and then to situate the victims within the suggested framework. The most compelling 
theoretical concept that has been suggested thus far for media coverage of breaking-
news terrorism has been the well-established and yet still-evolving concept of media 
events. 
 
Terrorism as a media event 
 
 The commanding "must see TV" quality of mass-mediated terrorism, its 
increased appearance during the 1980s, and – particularly – its new “breaking news” 






examine terrorism coverage within the framework of Katz and Dayan’s live, historic 
media events (for an early example of this application see Weimann 1987), and 
demanded its inclusion. Retrospectively, this critique has been so persistent and 
consistent that it achieved the same conceptual validity and scholarly status as its 




 were described by Katz and Dayan as live, ceremonial and 
symbolic events, preplanned, scripted and co-produced by the establishment and 
television networks, commanding the attention of the whole nation, and sometimes 
the world.  To recognize a television live drama as a media event meant to endow it 
with particular social importance – one of value reaffirmation, integration and 
solidarity. Katz and Dayan’s enigmatic title, Media Events: On the Experience of Not 
Being There, meant to draw our attention to the fact that media events did not merely 
offer a compensation for our inability to be physically present at an event, but rather a 
superior experience to physical presence.  No wonder that terrorists similarly strove to 
produce their own media events and usher in the entirety of the targeted community, 
by means of mass media, to the terror scene. 
 
 While Katz and Dayan’s media events were socially unifying and celebratory 
occasions, critics maintained since the late 1980's that mass-mediated terrorism 
belonged to this exclusive club of extraordinary television moments. Spectacular 
terrorism attacks, argued Weimann and others, were media events in that they were 
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transformative, produced “time-out” television, interrupted social routine and 
constructed some of society’s most fundamental collective images.  Indeed, mass 
mediated terrorism stood out in a media environment that increasingly became what 
Todd Gitlin described as “a perpetually vanishing present streaking by [where] images 
stream on, leaving traces in our minds but […] strangely indifferent to us”  (Gitlin 
2001:20-21.)   
 
 The original media events concept was quite rigid.  Its architects specifically 
refused to open it up to breaking news of all kinds, and in particular breaking bad 
news. For Katz and Dayan, traditional media events remained meticulously and 
grandly scripted, reflecting the happy, peaceful consensus.
2
  But spectacular terrorism 
undoubtedly answered to some of the crucial elements of the media event model, such 
as the event’s place at society’s center, its massive exposure and the profound social 
change that it marked.  James Carey (1998) offered the first widely accepted 
expansion of the media events concept, when he suggested that media events could 
contain high-profiled “rituals of excommunication” that performed institutional and 
ceremonial social rejection.  As for mass mediated terrorism, Weimann (1987) ignited 
an academic debate when he argued that hostage situations constituted a new category 
of media events, “Coercions,” which were pre-planned by terrorists rather than co-
produced by media and government.  While the ceremonial element was clearly 
absent from these events, “the symbolic presentations of national unity (flags and 
yellow ribbons), human grief (families united in their trouble, funerals with full 
military honors), and leadership (the White House, the President) [were] latent 
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messages of social order and unity.” (Weimann 1987:27)  Liebes (1998) used the 
Israeli television coverage of suicide bombings in 1996 as her first illustration for a 
new genre of “disaster marathons” – kin to media events – in which the press incited 
hysteria, over-criticized a vulnerable government and precipitated a political shift to 
the right (see also Liebes and Peri 1998). 
 
 The scholarly demand to acknowledge terrorism spectacles as media events 
intensified following the September 11th attacks and the Madrid and London 
bombings of 2004 and 2005, respectively. Indeed, "New Terrorism" dominated the 
media through digital multi-platforms, attaining the “exceptional and extraordinary 
status” typical of media events (Bouvier 2007:53).  The coverage – by international 
news channels and in most countries – demonstrated ideological assimilation with 
Western authorities, integrated Western society and enacted not only social change 
but a new world order (and disorder). 
 
 Finally, early in 2007, Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes suggested a fundamental 
revision to the original idea of media events. They acknowledged that shocking news 
events – mainly war, terror and disaster – came to dominate the media much more 
than pre-planned and happier media events, that the fragmented media market had 
turned “shared viewing” into an unlikely circumstance, and that in our cynical times, 
celebratory ceremonies had lost their popular appeal. They declared a new category of 
“disruptive” media events – mesmerizing, sudden, messy, and most importantly, 






government.  These were the media events of our time, they claimed, titling their 




 century media events – integrative or destructive? 
 
 Current scholarship on terrorism as a media event is still in need of a refined 
direction.  While there seems to be an agreement that New Terrorism constitutes a 
new form of media events, scholars differ over the socio-political implications of 
these events.  Broadly speaking, most of those who have analyzed Al Qaeda’s 
spectacular terrorism of the past 20 years have argued for the socially integrative 
potential of the journalistic narration of the events.  They ascribed less importance to 
the initial chaos and concentrated instead on its quick shift to the orderly, calm and 
professional journalistic style, the journalists’ focus on national leadership and the 
reaffirmation of national values.
3
 Other scholars, however, saw the terrorist media 
event as a trigger to social upheaval.  Most prominently, Katz and Liebes’s above 
mentioned “disruptive” media events (2007) – partially grounded on Liebes’s 
“disaster marathons” (1998) – engendered blame and despair, to the extent of 
undermining the legitimacy of the governing institutions.
 4
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 Media events aside, Davis and Walton argue that since the news represents a universal aspiration for 
peace and order, terrorism is treated as a disruption and as an offense to society. News of international 
terrorism, just as domestic one, aspires to a “moral closure” that favors the state and condemns the 
terrorist (Howard Davis and Paul Walton, “Death of a Premiere: Consensus and Closure in 




 Specifically to the 1996 suicide bus bombings, Liebes argued that the press’s fierce criticism of 
Shimon Peres’s labor government contributed to his loss of the May 1996 elections to Likud leader 







 Apparently, the crucial point of disagreement between these views has been 
the question of control over the unfolding events and over their meaning-making 
process.  Advocates of the traditional view believe that journalists strive – and 
ultimately succeed – to coordinate with the authorities a body of accepted 
explanations and narratives, while those who view media events as disaster marathons 
see them as irreversibly hijacked by terrorists, leaving the press and the government 
perplexed and hard pressed for solutions. 
 
 These scholarly trends are difficult to reconcile.  The September 11
th
 attacks – 
to name the most important and researched example – received such different 
readings.  On the one hand, some scholars reviewed them along the same lines as a 
traditional media event, where despite the initial confused and conflicted media 
discourse, journalism soon embraced a therapeutic role (Sreberny, 2002), termed by 
Michael Schudson “pastoral journalism.”  “It offer[ed] reassurance, not information; 
It [sought] to speak to and for a unified people rather than a people divided by conflict 
and interested in conflict. It [sought] to build community rather than to inform it” 
(Schudson, 2002:43. See also Bouvier 2007). Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro’s 
(2011) careful reading and analysis of the television coverage on the day of 
September 11, 2001 showed that TV anchors hyped the idea of war and, together with 
the Bush administration, laid the groundwork for the war on terrorism right then and 
there. 







 The opposite, "disaster marathon" strand of scholarship, suggested that the 
improvised nature of the coverage “amplifie[d] the terrorists’ intent to produce 
uncertainty, instability, and anxiety.” (Blondheim and Liebes 2002:275).  Scriptless 
media were “in the position of an inadvertent accomplice of the perpetrators” (ibid, 
275), thereby weakening American leadership.  James Carey offered a third reading, 
distinguishing between the coverage on the day of September 11 itself – which he 
commended for its supreme journalism, “calm, poised, systematic, without panic or 
speculation”– and the following days, in which it gave in to uncontrolled grief and 
deteriorated through the “unhappy rediscovery” of patriotism. (2002:74).  
 
 In retrospect, it is clear that the news of the events of 9/11 served  – for a few 
years – to increase the American public’s support for the Bush administration rather 
than diminish it, and that the nationalistic response to 9/11 allowed that administration 
to mount the War on Terror despite its factually unsubstantiated reasoning. In other 
words, it seems that the traditional media event view of 9/11 was better suited to its 
political outcome than the "disaster marathon" view. The “non stop” elements of the 
9/11 coverage lacked the hysteria and political unrest that have come to characterize 
marathons: the New York Times’ “Portraits of Grief,” for example, appeared 
continuously for more than a year, but it was a solemn, composed and entirely non-
political journalism (to the extent obituaries qualified as journalism), and the 
continuing search for bodies was also intensely covered but again, without the urgent 
despair and political rage of the Israeli marathons, and with the patriotic overtones 






acknowledged and regretted its submission to the administration’s 9/11-driven war 
propaganda (Bennett, Laurence and Livingston 2007; Montgomery 2005).  In short, 
the journalistic response to September 11 resembled the ideological compliance 
typical of a traditional media event much more than the vocal political frustration that 
characterized a disaster marathon.  Certainly, it is important to acknowledge the 
elements of marathon that existed in the continuing coverage – such as the New York 
Times’ “Portraits of Grief” and the ongoing search for survivors and human remains – 
yet in terms of political atmosphere, coverage conformed to the national, patriotic 
rally-ness of media events.  
 
 New, cataclysmic terrorism, I wish to argue, does not take the form of a disaster 
marathon.  It has such traumatic effects that the press’s role is first and foremost to 
reclaim and delineate a bruised collective identity and work for social unity.  It cannot 
do so without backing the existing political leadership.  But when terrorism displays 
signs of repetition, and when it is continuously destructive but not to the point of 
posing an existential threat, disaster marathons can ensue, demanding answers and 
challenging an evidently weak government.  Finally, terrorism may become utterly 
routine, in which case it is no longer a media event, neither a disaster marathon. Such 
was the succession of terrorist attacks in Israel during the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-
2005.)   
 
 The Al-Aqsa Intifada broke out in September 2000, following the visit of Ariel 
Sharon, then Israel’s opposition leader, to Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, site of the holly 






Strip in September 2005.  The Intifada took the form of clashes between Palestinians 
and Israeli armed forces in the Occupied Territories, as well as Palestinian suicide 
bombings aimed at Israeli civilians both within and beyond the so-called “Green 
Line” — Israel’s international border prior to the 1967 war. Even though suicide 
bombings have been hitting Israel since 1993, the wave of suicide bombings during 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada was the fiercest.  Gradually adjusting to this reality, the Israeli 
public turned to media for updates rather than consolation, and indeed, Israeli 
television responded by covering the incidents in an informative, standardized and 
non-melodramatic way. 
 
Victims – protagonists of terrorist media events 
 
 The debate over the definition and scope of terrorist media events informs a 
discussion of the place of the victims in terrorism coverage. Once terrorism is 
regarded a media event, two immediate implications should be considered.  First, 
media events center on their protagonists; they are “rituals of coming and going” 
(Dayan and Katz 1992:119), rites of passage where audiences identify with the heroic 
transformations of the events’ central characters. According to the traditional 
interpretation of a media event, the public officials who “star” in these events are 
admired for their fatherly concern and for effectively voicing collective grief (the 
example of Rudolph Giuliani is inevitable), while in the disaster mode, they are 
scorned for negligently allowing for the attack.  The rescue workers and victims are 






and civil servants into figures of bravery and national sacrifice.
5
  Here is a typical 
September 11
th
 victims-related report from the New York Times: 
Abraham Zelmanowitz, a computer programmer praised as a hero for 
remaining with his quadriplegic friend rather than flee the World Trade 
Center on Sept. 11, was buried in Israel today. […]Mr. Zelmanowitz, 
who worked for Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield on the 27th floor 
of the north tower, refused to leave behind his friend and co-worker of 
many years, Edward Beyea, 42, who could not descend the stairs in his 
wheelchair. Both men died when the tower collapsed (New York Times, 
August 6, 2002). 
 
 Or, consider this AP report from June 17, 2009, with regard to the similar 
honor bestowed on the rescue forces:    
Scientists in California say they have cloned a dog that helped with 
search-and-rescue after the New York terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 
2001. Five German shepherd puppies cloned from a dog named Trakr 
have been delivered to owner James Symington, a former police 
officer.  
 
 An acknowledgement of mass-mediated terrorism under the auspices of the 
traditional media events model further means that the reverential tone of the coverage 
embraces the victims and establishes their special status.  A central feature of 
traditional, ceremonial media events is the news media’s suspension of their critical 
outlook in favor of a celebration of society’s core values such as progress (moon 
landing) and peace (President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem).  In terrorist media 
events, on the other hand, the news media join the establishment not in celebration but 
in defense of national values (Weimann 1987). 
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 In the case of 9/11, President G. W. Bush’s first public address set the defiant 
tone echoed in the media in the days and weeks to come: “Today, our fellow citizens, 
our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and 
deadly terrorist acts.”  American news media reverberated this sense of urgency – A 
Nation Challenged was the New York Times’ special supplement during the following 
months – and engaged in the national effort of restoring belief in the United States and 
in its commitment to democratic values.  As in traditional media events, the 
journalistic voice coalesced with the official voice, leading to an absence of “sides,” 
namely, of a debate upon which “objectivity” could be applied.  
 
 "When terrorists struck on September 11, there was only one side.  No editor 
demanded a quote from someone saying why it was fine to fly airplanes into 
buildings.  No one expected reporters to take an “objective” view of the terrorists" 
(Goodman 2001, quoted in Schudson 2002).  When the occasional commentator ventured 
to make an incongruent statement—like Bill Maher’s suggestion, a week after 9/11, 
that firing U.S. cruise missiles from hundreds of miles away was a more cowardly act 
than flying planes into buildings—the outrage was overwhelming.  The vast majority 
of journalists were swept by the ”we are all New Yorkers” sentiment. "We were 
supposed to be detached journalists, but I’m an American citizen first," said former 
CNN anchor Judy Woodruff. "This was not just another story for me.  It was my 
country, my city." (Gilbert, 2002:171). 
 
 This sentiment was echoed by journalists globally, constituting, as Sreberny 






when the media slide from neutrality to the “we” voice and the public discourse is 
dedicated to reclaiming national ideals, the victims are perceived as the 
personification of those ideals, and everyone is in part, a victim.   
 
 In such times of crisis and togetherness, victims cannot be portrayed other than 
as courageous, resourceful and hopeful.  The sad optimism of the injured victims 
represents national endurance, and victims’ heroic deeds gain mythic dimensions.  
Todd Beamer’s call for revolt on board of United Airlines Flight 93 – “Let’s Roll” – 
memorably embodied the American spirit.  The phrase, first offered by President 




Victims – protagonists of disaster marathons 
 
 Disaster marathons typically display rage against both enemy and government.  
The escalating frequency of the attacks suggests a systemic security failure to which 
the leadership should be accountable.  In disaster marathons, the political debate 
erupts immediately, at the scene of the attack, with the victims voicing the popular 
discontent, as they are accompanied with repeated images of blood, panic and 
destruction.  Given the jaggedness of Israeli politics, at least at times, it is less 
surprising that the political debate erupts already at the scene of the attack. The 
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dramaturgy of terrorism breaking news echoes what is already the national political 
culture. 
 
 Replacing reason with grief, disaster marathons elicit emotions beyond the 
emotional range appropriate for political discourse. And the tendency of print 
journalism, in disaster mode, is to duplicate to the extent possible the “live” quality of 
electronic media, where imagery precedes narrative and experience precedes 
explanation. Yuran (2008)
7
 usefully illustrated this point using a Yedioth Aharonoth 
front-page story about the May 14, 2008 Qassam rocket attack, the first one to hit the 
town of Ashkelon.  The newspaper’s headline read “This is How a Visit to the Mall 
Ended,” and below it, it displayed a photo of a bloodied baby shoe. 
 
 
Figure 1: Yedioth Aharonoth cover photo by Avi Rokach, May 15, 2008 
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 The headline and the photo combined did not reveal any meaningful detail 
about what had happened, except for the fact that there was some bloody violence 
involving a child in a mall.  The shoe, taken away from the scene of violence and 
displayed instead on someone’s palm, lost its original context and became an 
enigmatic object.  In order for the horrified reader to learn what the story was about, 
he or she had to read on.  This was a similar dynamic to the one offered by 
television’s live disaster marathon, where the viewer was initially introduced to an 
event through the shocking imagery of violence and devastation, and the factual 
information necessary to clarify the upsetting images arrived later (Yuran, 2008).  
Moreover, the print version of the paper was surely produced with the awareness that 
readers had formerly learned of the attack from the electronic media.  Having no new 
information to offer, the paper settled for rage. 
 
 In the 1990s, Israeli television coverage of what was at the time a novel 
phenomenon of Palestinian suicide-bombings entered, for the first time, marathon 
mode.  The established public Channel 1 and the new entrant to the broadcast news 
market, the young private-owned Channel 2, both new to notions of competition, were 
dramatic to the point of hysteria.  Both channels showed extensive interviews with 
victims, and their expressions of grief and fury escalated the chaos.   
The frame of “disaster” calls for people who scream the most, 
either in agony or rage – the louder, the less controlled, the 
better.   
We saw people who “miraculously” escaped, we saw victims in 
hospital beds and we saw families waiting outside the operating 







 The victims’ expressions of despair and political outrage did not help to 
elevate the already shallow journalistic discourse.  As Liebes and Kampf pointed out 
– using perhaps a phrase more accusing than they intended it to be – “at the most 
emotional moment in their lives, [victims’] responses did not quite fit the 
Habermassian idea of considered, altruistic, and rational opinions.” (2007: 109) 
 
Palestinian media and disaster marathons 
 
 Disaster marathons are not an exclusively Israeli phenomenon. Just as 
September 11 has been interpreted through the marathon prism, so can any other 
instance of mass mediated, multi-victim violence.  The Palestinian media coverage of 
Israeli strikes in the Occupied Territories is particularly interesting and important 
because the accepted truth of the Israeli Palestinian conflict is that any violence is 
retaliatory and essentially parallel to a former violent act by the other side. 
 
 Of the frames offered thus far for coverage of political violence, the frame of 
disaster marathon is most suitable for the Palestinian television news in their coverage 
of large scale Israeli violence.  In their illuminating comparison of the so-called 
“victim mode” of Israeli and Palestinian television during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 
Wolfsfeld et al found basic similarities in the graphic style and ethnocentric 
ideologies of these two media systems.  They reviewed the Palestinian Broadcast 
Corporation’s (PBC) coverage of the Israeli Air Force killing of Hamas leader Sheik 






including nine children.  Initially, and similarly to Israeli disaster marathons, victims 
were referred to in personal terms, identified by their names, their backgrounds and 
their particular circumstances.  Also similarly, television did not spare gruesome 
images and continuous displays of chaos and grief.  But different from Israeli 
television, PBC also appropriated the victims, shifting them from the personal realm 
to the national one by declaring them shahids, namely martyrs.  The explicit evocation 
of martyrdom meant that the personal narratives have given way to complete 
ideological dominance of Palestinian nationhood.  The obvious reason for PBC’s 
uber-nationalistic line was the fact that it was controlled by the Palestinian Authority, 
and that Palestinians were engaged in a bloody nation building process.  In that 
respect, Palestinian disaster marathons stood in a stark opposite to Israeli disaster 
marathons, which were characterized by rage against a failed government.  In their 
powerful, even brutal evocation of the patriotic sentiment, Palestinian disaster 
marathons bore ideological characteristics of the classic media events, where 
journalism and state were assimilated. 
 
Victims and patriotic sentiment 
 
 A lot has been written about the way nations “rally around the flag” as they 
prepare and carry out military onslaughts, and how a patriotic press is indispensable to 
the war effort.  A review of the American literature on this subject should begin with 
Walter Lippmann (1922), who identified this phenomenon in the context of World 






the flag – to generate visceral public support.8 The rallying effect was a response to 
foreign policy crises that involved the nation and its leader—the President—directly, 
and it was a temporary effect, diminishing with the increase in the war’s casualty toll 
(Mueller 1973). Hallin (1986) saw the press’s enthusiasm at the initial phases of the 
Vietnam war as a reflection of similar sentiments held by the majority of political 
actors and the public at large, collectively sharing a sphere of consensus.  Entman and 
Page identified the rallying effect in the news leading to the 1991 Gulf War, ascribing 
it to the press’s dependency on official sources: “the higher [the sources’] power to 
shape newsworthy events, the more attention they receive,” hence the administration’s 
media superiority over its dissenters within the political establishment (1994: 97).  
Finally, in the period leading up to the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
American news media “tossed away skepticism in favor of cheerleading” the Bush 
administration in its claims for an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection and the existence of Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction (Gitlin 2009), earning Bennett, Lawrence and 
Livingston’s infamous title, a “semi-independent press.” (2007).  
 
 The reverential treatment of victims in the aftermath of a terrorist media event 
is a manifestation of the “rally around the flag” phenomenon.  After all, victims are 
national symbols, and not so different from the flag, they evoke one’s love for one’s 
country.  Of the abovementioned scholars who conceived and discussed the “rally 
around the flag” syndrome, I found Daniel Hallin’s analysis of the mass-mediated 
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discourse about and throughout the Vietnam War to be most useful for elucidating the 
special place journalism reserved for terrorism victims.  In his monumentally 
influential “spheres” model, Hallin distinguished three areas of journalism, which 
accommodated different modes of political discourse.  The sphere of consensus 
celebrated shared values; the sphere of legitimate controversy involved issues on 
which there was an institutional debate, and the sphere of deviance was concerned 
with socially illegitimate views. It is in the sphere of consensus where terrorism 
victims usually resided.  
 
 Hallin argued that in the initial phases of the Vietnam war, like most wars, the 
journalistic discourse was situated in the sphere of consensus, because journalists 
were attuned to the public that rallied behind the administration, and to the unanimity 
of opinion between Republican and Democrat representatives.  But most importantly, 
the press gradually feeling and projecting the growing skepticism of military officers 
in the field, trickling down and leading to the decline in the morale of the troops.  As 
long as the troops’ spirits were high, the newsroom projected a positive and patriotic 
mood.  But when the troops began to doubt their mission, the coverage reflected their 
distress, which contributed to the gradual shift of the war to the “sphere of legitimate 
controversy” (Hallin, 1986).  
 
 Victims of indiscriminate terrorism can have similar influence.  They can 
heighten the patriotic tones by rallying behind the anti-terrorist effort, or express 
anxiety of and distrust in the security forces’ ability to prevent future attacks, or offer 






unwillingly – at the ideological forefront of a conflict.  But unlike soldiers in combat, 
victims are more visible, and much less bound by censorship or other, softer, forms of 
control (e.g. the system of embedded journalists).  In their freedom to express content 
and discontent in the critical period following an attack, victims have an impact on the 
spirit and essence of the public discourse, be it a one of consensus or of controversy.   
 
Victims – residents of the sphere of consensus 
 
 The coverage of victims of indiscriminate terrorism is usually set deep within 
the sphere of consensus.  At least, they are situated in the sphere of consensus in the 
limited sense that their sincerity and public-mindedness are hardly ever questioned.  
Victims can express political agitation during protracted disaster marathons and offer 
anti-establishment points of view, but as long as the memory of the attack is still 
fresh, their sacrifice validates them as heroes of the establishment and they bear but a 
minimal risk of being confronted for their views.  Be their political convictions what 
they may, victims begin their political life at the sphere of consensus, and at a 
fundamental level, they never entirely leave it.  Even in instances where their opinion 
is considered outrageous, there is usually a level of respect and acceptance that is 
maintained. Indeed, the spheres model has been typically used to trace shifts in the 
political legitimacy of social issues and political groups, such as anti-war movements 
(see Murray et al, 2008). But the spheres model can also be useful in identifying 
constant social statuses of particular social groups. Corporate CEOs, arguably, occupy 
the sphere of legitimate controversy because they act out of monetary interest, which 






types may break the law and cross over to the sphere of deviance, but their 
fundamental social locus, or point of departure, is the sphere of legitimate 
controversy.  Similarly, people who embody national sacrifice take up steady 
residence at the sphere of consensus. They may orbit around the sphere of legitimate 
controversy when they attempt to influence anti-terrorism policies, or even further – 
to the sphere of deviance – if their pacifism seems out of touch with the patriotism of 
a nation embroiled in war (see Chapter 4).  Nevertheless, victims’ coverage will 
always reflect, to some degree, the fundamental respect that is reserved for figures of 
consensus.  This means that the coverage of the most controversial victims will 
always include, in the least, a respectful nod to their circumstance of victimhood. 
 
 This consensus also means that offending the victims may be equivalent to 
betrayal.  When the right wing political extravaganza Ann Coulter wrote in a new 
book that the group of 9/11 widows known as the Jersey Widows “enjoyed their 
husbands’ deaths” which had put them in the political limelight, not only was she 
lambasted, but the media who interviewed her and confronted her were also criticized 
for airing her views and plugging her book.   
 
 Moral purity, however, is not always sufficiently interesting to deem 
newsworthy, and the consensus surrounding the victims does not necessarily mean 
that they have the necessary appeal to ensure media exposure.  Some victims are in a 
socially disadvantaged place to begin with, and this chapter’s subsection on “preferred 






chapters will show, when individual victims take on explicitly political missions, they 
sometimes find themselves compromising their own social acceptance.  
 
The sphere of consensus: legitimization of victims of targeted terrorism 
 
 Targeted terrorism aims at political leaders or people who are otherwise well 
known and politically representative.  The tendency to portray terrorism in 
mythological terms of good vs. evil serves to “centralize” these targeted victims, so 
that in their deaths or their pain, they shift from the sphere of legitimate controversy, 
which they previously occupied, to the sphere of consensus (Schudson 2003:187.)  
“Terrorism is treated as a disruption and as an offense to society, regardless of its 
motives.  It aspires to a ‘moral closure’ that favors the state and condemns the 
terrorist” (Davis and Walton, 1983.)  In their effort to re-legitimize the existing power 
structure and institute order, the media orient victims of targeted terrorism toward the 
consensus.   
 
 Yoram Peri, a proponent of hegemony theories, argued that after the 
assassination of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli media reconstructed Rabin’s 
biography to conform to the ideals of the secular, left-leaning Ashkenazi Jewish elite 
that dominated the mainstream media.  Rabin’s life story was rewritten in a way that 
downplayed his warrior image and emphasized his achievements as a peacemaker and 
a 1995 Noble laureate.  Accused throughout his life of being aloof and friendly to the 






Sabra, authentic as your average Israeli (Peri 1997.)  Several years later, the Israeli 
press beautified the legacy of Rehavam Ze’evi, the right wing general and politician 
who was assassinated in October 2001 by members of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine. Portraying Ze’evi as a fatherly figure and an elderly 
statesman, Israeli media obscured the fact that he was a “transferist” – a term denoting 
a proponent of the transfer of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories to 
neighboring Arab countries. 
 
Victims – protagonists of routine terrorism 
 
 Routine terrorism is no longer a media event, nor is it a disaster marathon. 
Similar to other violent incidents, its reporting is governed by news production habits 
and procedures.  The beat system applies here too, and the prescribed sequence of 
coverage begins with the eyewitnesses and security personnel at the scene of terror, 
then the nearby emergency room, where hospital officials assess the death toll, and 
finally, the political circle, where politicians voice their well-known, clichéd 
reactions.  The coverage lacks authentic public outrage because routine and socially 
contained terrorism no longer calls forth new policy questions, or at least, public 
interest in these questions seems to wane  (This does not imply, however, the 
existence of a political stalemate. While each act of violence during the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada received routine media coverage, the constant wave of terrorism did instigate 







 During times of routine terrorism, fundamental issues are pushed to the 
political background.  In fact,  
Terrorist attacks are shown [on Israeli television] through a civil prism 
rather than a political one. This is expressed by a sequence of news 
items that cover central landmarks of civic life (the mourning family, 
the hurting neighborhood, the educational institution, the workplace, 
etc.)  The news program ignores the broader issues of possible political 
ramifications and the conflict at large, dwelling mostly on the human 
perspective (Liebes and Kampf 2007:112.) 
 
 Routine terrorism thus takes on a more personal media frame.  The victims are 
no longer the heroic figures associated with spectacular or otherwise shocking 
terrorism.  Instead, the seeming inevitability of terror brings them closer to victims of 
other misfortunes, such as car accidents.   
 
 “I, We, My Town, Our Town” was the title of a Yedioth Aharonoth 
commentary on August 20, 2003 following a suicide bombing in Jerusalem.  The 
piece, written by Yedioth’s correspondent Gad Lior – a Jerusalem resident – 
demonstrated not only the depoliticized news frame of routine terrorism, but also the 
power of the “we” voice to underline the personalized outlook: 
For 68 days, the terrible bang was not heard in my town.  We 
yearned to forget the gunpowder smell, the sirens that tore the 
city with their terrible howls, the horrible sights. 
Every Jerusalemite knows those horrible sounds and smells.  60 
attacks in five years.  These are the numbers in this city. 
[…] and suddenly it was over. 
The bang was heard throughout the city.  Nobody asked what 
had happened.  Everybody knew. 







 And indeed, the Al-Aqsa Intifada presented a classic case of routinization of 
terrorism.  Between June 2001 and August 2004, Israel experienced 21 terrorist 
attacks that individually claimed the lives of at least 10 people, and many other 
attacks  that were less deadly.  Of the 21 major attacks, seven took place in buses, six 
in restaurants or bars, and the remaining eight in other public spaces – among them 
markets and bus stops.  The combination of repetitive attacks and constant Israeli 
military and Shin-Bet (the clandestine General Security Service) operations in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank created the likeness of a war of mutual attrition, and 
Israelis and Palestinians alike were getting strangely accustomed to this new chapter 
of violent normalcy in the history of their conflict.   
 
 
Figure 2: An illustration by Orit Bergman, describing the growing public apathy 







Israeli television had to adapt its production mechanisms to the frequent 
interruptions of Israeli civil life.  Beyond the on-the-spot beat reporting from police, 
hospitals, and army headquarters, producers of entertainment shows prepared somber, 
alternative openings and endings, ready to be rolled out for the next incident.  
Routinization also meant that Israeli television struggled to keep its regular 
programming schedule intact and to avoid protracted disaster marathons that meant 
painful cancellations of commercial breaks.  The victims’ “blood bar”—a term 
invented by television executives to determine whether an attack justified breaking 
from the programming schedule and going on an advertising blackout—was raised 
repeatedly: while once an attack which claimed the lives of two Israelis justified such 
interruption, in 2003 only a much deadlier attack merited it.  This ongoing ethical 
struggle meant constant negotiations with the Second Authority for television and 
Radio—the regulator of commercial broadcasting in Israel—over the sensible middle 
ground between television’s economic pull toward normalcy and the public’s 
expectation for a commercial-free grieving period.  
 
Routine terrorism and television’s economic sacrifices – advertising blackouts 
 
 Despite the fact that advertising blackouts are a defining element of television-
mandated national mourning periods, such blackouts are a phenomenon that has been 
hardly – if at all – studied by the communications research community, or, for that 
matter, by any other discipline.  Following the assassination of President John F. 






airing commercials for four full days.
9
 On September 11, 2001, some networks took 
up a five-day suspension of commercials.
10
  These blackouts are probably the most 
valid, quantitative representation of the tribute the media are willing to pay – literally 
and figuratively – to victims.  And they are particularly telling in small countries like 
Israel, where the relatively limited resources of advertisers prevent them from 
alternative solutions such as the ad hoc production of serious commercials that speak 
of the difficult moment. 
 
 The Second Authority’s oversight on commercial blackouts before and during 
the Al Aqsa Intifada was – typically of routinization – a process of constant 
adjustments.  With the losses of advertising revenue mounting, networks became 
increasingly pragmatic.  They hesitated to start advertising blackouts and rushed to 
end them.  The Second Authority, on its part, reacted with vigorous regulation.  The 
regulatory saga began in November 2000, when the Second Authority Council 
promulgated an unequivocal directive: “No commercials shall be incorporated in a 
news report of an attack.”11  The directive’s sweeping language applied it on many 
gray areas, such as news reports of relatively minor attacks, developing news reports 
that could not yet determine whether an attack involved any fatalities, and follow-up 
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reports that repeated the news of earlier attacks as part of a daily summary.  Yet, this 
directive, as well as other rules which prohibited the juxtaposition of entertainment 
shows with news reports of attacks, were strictly enforced: The Second Authority’s 
Annual Reports of 2001 to 2004 reveal no fewer than seven administrative 
proceedings that resulted in the imposition of sanctions for violations of these 
directives.   
 
 In an attempt to minimize the risk of penalty, networks started to consult on 
“gray area” cases with the Second Authority and obtain specific, ad hoc exemptions 
from blackouts. The constant, de facto regulatory monitoring became de jure in 
February 2002 with a directive that stated that once a blackout began, “the return to 
the normal programming schedule would be subject to specific authorization by the 
Second Authority’s Director General.”12  This directive closed a full circle of 
complete control by the Second Authority over advertising blackouts – now, one 
directive forced a blackout on every terrorism situation unless it was specifically 
excused by the Second Authority, and the other directive locked the network in a 
blackout situation until the Authority permitted it to end.  It is possible that the 
antagonism that culminated from such regulatory pressures led network executives to 
search for ways to escape advertising blackouts in cases where their conscience may 
have otherwise not allow them to keep advertising on the air. 
 
 The regulatory imposition of commercial blackouts, and the increase in the 
frequency and lethality of suicide bombings, caused Channel 2 to cancel a total of 
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15:02 hours of advertising time throughout 2001 and 7:56 hours throughout 2002.
13
  
These figures represented a loss of approximately 2% of the total annual advertising 
time.  The Second Authority understood the grave financial implications of these 
massive cancellations and was therefore amenable to a standardized system that 
would provide the networks – once they returned to their normal programming 
schedule – with increased per-hour advertising quotas in comparable times on other, 
non-violent, days.  These detailed legal structures mean that routinization of terror, in 
the Israeli context, not only engendered the development of adjusted news genres and 
production habits, but also created the distinct regulatory area of advertising 
blackouts.   
 
 The networks naturally resented this detailed regulatory intervention.  Beyond 
the general argument that advertising blackouts fell within the privileges of their 
freedom of speech, they insisted that they were aware of their responsibilities as 
national markers of mourning periods and had no interest in offending their audience 
by dangling images of happiness in the face of death. Moreover, they argued, 
advertisers themselves were aware that once thrown in the context of violence, the 
most innocent ads could become grotesque.
14
  But the Second Authority remained 
distrustful, especially following the controversial “split screen” incident. 
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 An insurance ad, which ran on ITV during the reports of the July 7th, 2005 London transit bombings, 
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unexpected could be just around the corner and when it happens, it will be too late.”  (“ITV Rapped for 








, 2002, more than a year into the Al-Aqsa Intifada, a suicide bomber 
detonated himself on a busy street in Jerusalem.  At the time of the attack, Telad, a 
Channel 2 network, was broadcasting an important Premier League soccer match.  In 
its belief that the routine of terrorism made it acceptable for its audience, Telad 
decided to physically split the television screen in two, so that while two-thirds of it 
showed the typical breaking-news report from the scene of the attack – with its harsh 
imagery – the remaining third displayed the ongoing soccer match.   
  
 
Figure 3: Channel 2’s (Telad) split-screen, March 3, 2002.15 
The title reads: “A number of casualties and dozens of injured in an explosion" 
 
 
 But Israelis were outraged.  They perceived the juxtaposition of death and 
soccer as a sacrilegious mix of the sacred and the mundane.  Telad defended itself by 
arguing that giving up the soccer match would have meant giving up to the terrorists’ 
wish to disrupt everyday life.  The Second Authority condemned Telad for the split-
screen incident, but perhaps in recognition of Telad’s problematic situation, did not 
impose a monetary fine. 
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 Routinization of terror is further characterized by its permeation of the most 
mundane forms of journalism.  Constant, socially contained violence is 
simultaneously processed through "serious" journalism and lighter, more entertaining, 
genres, such as morning shows and political satire.  The Al-Aqsa Intifada provided 
ample examples for this process, and in particular, the Qassam rockets fired from the 
Gaza strip to the Israeli town of Sderot in the Negev beginning at 2000. The shelling, 
and the ways in which the region was coping with a state of constant alert, were 
initially hard news material, but by 2007, a year of particularly intense firing, Israeli 
media alluded to the situation in a vast range of journalistic forms, allowing for ynet – 
Israel's leading online news source – to include this humorous report in its gossip 
column: 
Baby Boom 
The shelling of Qassams ceased for one day in honor of the visit 
of (Sderot-born Israeli top model) Miri Buhadana and her 
growing belly to Sderot.  [...] Qassam launchers ceased fire 
today in salutation to Buhadana, Sderot's first lady (Keren 




 Yedioth Ahronoth was also looking for original journalistic forms to drive 
away the fatigue from the routine Sderot coverage.  Among its initiatives were a 
project in which Sderot residents were asked to document their everyday lives using 
cameras provided by the paper, and a home-swap between a Sderot boy and a Tel 
Aviv girl.  These and other citizen journalism projects brought about the inevitable 
accusation that the paper was degrading the coverage into reality TV (Tausig, 2008.)
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 Political violence fractures the ideological status quo and prompts the media to 
actively defend and reconstruct the main ideology.  Advocates of hegemony theories 
challenge the existence of a “main ideology,” and argue that the media propagate an 
elite agenda (Hall et al, 1980.)  Journalists would argue that the journalistic product 
does not reflect an “agenda,” but rather their independent judgment according to their 
professional criteria for newsworthiness.  But in any case, coverage of victims, as any 
news material, reveals a social hierarchy, which particularly distinguishes between the 
geographic, demographic and cultural center and the periphery.   
 
 Moran and Tzfati’s content analysis of Israeli print news of terrorist attacks 
during 2002 confirmed that the coverage of attacks perpetrated inside the Green 
Line—particularly within Israel’s big cities—was much more prominent and 
extensive than coverage of attacks against Israeli settlers in the West Bank or the 
Gaza Strip, although both cases involved terrorism against Israeli civilians (Moran 
and Tzfati, 2006.)  To the mostly secular practitioners of mainstream media, the 
settlers were perceived as “outsiders,” who chose to live in a dangerous area for 
ideological convictions not shared by most Israelis.   
 
 The relative inferiority of the settler-victims of the Al Aqsa Intifada was also 
apparent from Israeli broadcasters’ reluctance to respond to such attacks with 






commercials shall be incorporated in a news report of an attack” – was intended to 
“correct” what the Second Authority perceived as the broadcasters’ discriminatory 
attitude toward victims who lived outside the Green Line, and to a lesser degree, 
victims who were not city dwellers.  All Israeli victims should receive equal 
journalistic treatment, implied the new directive, so as not to be subject to journalistic 
calculations of proximity and audience appeal. 
 
 One memorable incident took place on February 16, 2002, at 7:45 PM, when a 
Palestinian suicide bomber detonated himself near a pizzeria in the West Bank 
settlement of Karnei Shomron, killing two people and injuring 30.  At that time, 
Channel 2’s Telad was broadcasting, again, a premiere league soccer match. 
Conscious of the fact that such breaking news would require an advertising blackout, 
Telad decided to postpone the story for about an hour and a half, while benefiting 
from the match’s commercial breaks.  The Second Authority was outraged by the 
delay and declared the Karnei Shomron incident a violation of the commercial 
blackout rules.
18
  It is not a coincidence that news reports of attacks have usually 
followed commercial breaks, with networks routinely taking “one last breath” of 
commercials before surrendering to the mandatory blackout.  However, at this time, 
the Second Authority suspected that the delayed reaction to the incident had much to 
do with its remote, politically contested, place of occurrence and its settler victims.  
 
                                                           
18
 Information about broadcasters’ violations and Second Authority sanctions is available at the Second  







 Victims of Qassam rockets complained of similar marginalization. Residents 
of Sderot and the western Negev felt that despite the shelling of their area by rockets 
launched from Gaza since 2000, their plight received much less attention from the 
media than Israeli victims of Intifada-related suicide bombings of the same time.   
While it is difficult to determine whether the media were practicing a hegemonic, Tel-
Aviv centric agenda or simply reflecting the general disinterest in the remote area, 
there is at least a kernel of truth to the allegation that the media displayed an 
“orientalist” approach toward the region and its residents, many of whom are 
Sephardic Jews and Russian immigrants (Gottlieb, The Seventh Eye, 1/1/07.
19
)  When 
the shelling intensified throughout 2007 and 2008 and the media finally championed a 
wave of national support to Sderot, coverage remained episodic, focusing on the 
specific tragedies and damage caused by the shelling, while the much needed media 
discourse on the poor state of the region and its economic hardships remained largely 
absent. 
 
 The weakest victim group in Israel, however, is probably Israeli and 
Palestinian Arabs.  To the extent that Jewish terrorism is reported, it needs to be 
blatantly deadly, spectacular or systematic in order to be termed terrorism by 
mainstream media.  In the reports of the November 2009 arrest of Ultra-Right terrorist 
Yaakov Teitel, he was immediately dubbed “the Jewish terrorist,” but it is 
questionable whether he would have earned the terrorist title had he not – in addition 
to the murder of two Palestinians – attacked a prominent Jewish university professor.  
Unlike the case of Jewish victims in remote areas – whose disregard can be explained 








by the media’s practice of cultural hegemony – it is clear that the low status of Arab 
victims of terrorism in the Israeli media is indeed a reflection of their general 
inferiority within Israeli society.  Arab victims, for example, lag behind in terms of 
their legal rights for state recognition and assistance.  Only in September 2005, and 
following the deadly Shfar’am incident,20 did these victims win an amendment to the 
law that guaranteed monetary compensation to terrorism victims.  Whereas until then, 
only victims of violence perpetrated by “an organization hostile to the state” were 
entitled to redress, now the scope of victimhood broadened to include people who 
were subject to violence “in the context of a national conflict.21”  Israeli Arab victims 
may not be reported frequently or extensively.  However, on the occasions that the 
media display visible sympathies to Israeli Arabs – such sympathies are particularly 
strong when Israeli Arabs fall victim to Palestinian terrorism – such sympathies come 
natural and Jewish audiences approve of them.  Of course, the press takes great care in 
mentioning that the Arab victims are Israeli citizens. 
 
 A hierarchy of victims, particularly in the context of routine terrorism, may 
include victims of the other side of the conflict.  The normalization of political 
violence, typically characterized by a depoliticized news frame, can allow for the 
development of a more humane, or better, less demonized frame with regard to the 
victims of the “other side” (Liebes and Kampf, 2007).  An acknowledgment of the 
“others” as similarly entangled in the conflict creates the emotional and political space 
needed to consider them as victims.  And yet, as victims, they will always remain 
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 In the Shfar’am incident, Israeli Jew Eden Natan-Zada opened fire inside a bus, killing four Israeli 
Arabs and wounding 22. 
  
21






inferior to “our” victims.  Persiko (200822) drew attention to a Yedioth Aharonoth 
story headlined “From both Sides of the Qassams,” which told of Osher from Sderot 
and Mohammed from Gaza, both lying unconscious in an Israeli hospital.  While 
Osher was told to be “critically wounded from a Qassam directed at Israeli citizens,” 
Mohammed was “wounded by an IDF shell which was aimed at terrorists but 
accidentally hit him.”  With Israeli victimhood portrayed in “unjust” terms compared 
to the Palestinian one, the apparent symmetry between the mishaps of those boys was 
ultimately a fake one.  Overt media sympathy for Palestinian victims of Israeli 
assaults, however, is not well tolerated within Jewish-Israeli society.  Israeli 
journalists who take upon themselves to illuminate the life conditions of Palestinians 
are perceived by Israeli society as political ideologues, judged according to the 
political convictions of Israelis as either great humanitarians or anti-Zionists.  In any 
case, systematic coverage of the plight of the Palestinians – such as the one carried 
out by Ha’aretz’s Gideon Levi and Amira Hass – is never regarded by fellow 
journalists or media critics as objective journalism. 
 
 A U.S. hierarchy of victims may partly account for the fact that none of the 
Oklahoma victims achieved the media prominence of some 9/11 family members.  
Was this simply because of the smaller scale of the Oklahoma incident, or perhaps 
because the national media did not find Oklahoma City residents as newsworthy as 
Northeasterners?  Have families of Oklahoman federal employees failed to match the 
American ideal the way that 9/11 victims did, or is it that Oklahoma is too far away 
from New York, the media center of the universe?  The national press covered the 








Oklahoma victims extensively, focusing initially on individual tragedies and later, on 
their attendance and testimonies at Timothy McVeigh’s and Terry Nichols’s trials.  
But again, no individual victim or group of victims achieved the symbolic status or 
political prominence of some 9/11 victims.  The local coverage of the Oklahoma 
victims by the leading local paper, the Journal Record – which centered on the trials 
but also on the construction of the memorial – lacked controversy, save for concerns 
over the appropriate allocation of charity funds or the question of allowing the 
opening of businesses adjacent to the bombing area.  There was nothing and no one in 
the local coverage that national media found worthy of amplifying.  The relative lack 
of interest in the victims in the national media can be ultimately attributed to the fact 
that the bombing was the doing of “fringe terrorism” in a relatively remote place, 
rather than the existential threat represented by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in their 
much deadlier and coordinated attacks on United States’ economic and military 
centers on September 11, 2001.   
 
 The following chapters will examine the coverage of victims of political 
violence as they are transformed from participants and witnesses of attacks – in other 
words, from news sources for facts and personal narratives – into outspoken figures of 
political conscience who get involved in the issues that emanate from attacks, such as 
remembrance and anti-terrorism policies.  The patriotic journalism that accompanies 
violent media events (disaster marathons not included) over time regains its critical 
mode, and journalists once engage in unsentimental reporting rather than keeping with 
their role as guardians of the consensus.  For the proponents of the watch dog role of 






[feels] redemptive, as if a fever had just broken after a prolonged illness” (Schudson 
2002:39.)  When the victims are involved in contentious public affairs, the initial 
deference toward them is negotiated with antithetical orientations that govern political 
coverage, and in particular, the professional methodologies associated with the ideals 























Remembrance does not happen automatically.  Without purposive commemorative 
work, society is bound to forget all but the most traumatic events. In the United 
States, the first national commemorative effort was the establishment of military 
cemeteries following the Civil War. As Faust (2008) observed, the sacrifice of 
620,000 soldiers in that war demanded the enormous federal task of burials, 
identification of the bodies and memorialization, underscoring the notion that 
"sacrifice and the state became inextricably intertwined." That "work of death," 
according to Faust, was a socially and culturally defining task for the recovering 
North, to a point where "death created the modern American union – not just by 
ensuring national survival, but by shaping enduring national structures and 






Remembrance requires the “moral entrepreneurship” (Pacifici-Wagner, 1996) 
of individuals and organizations that have an interest in imprinting an event in the 
collective memory.  In their competition over commemorative genres and forms of 
anniversaries, memorials and museums, these moral entrepreneurs aspire to cement a 
particular version of the events, one that is affixed to a final set of preferred values.  
Commemoration is an ambitious enterprise, in that it intends to produce – by means of 
“symbolic simplification and concentration” (Collins, 2004) – objects and rituals that 
convey timeless ideals and provide long-lasting moral guidance to society. 
 
These commemorative contests over the symbolic and tangible social memory 
take place in various public arenas. Institutional and non-institutional parties meet 
formally and informally in municipal hearings, protests, and court sessions, where 
they cajole, argue for moral superiority and form alliances.  The press is imperative in 
this process. Given its power to amplify certain views and delegitimize others, it is 
considered indispensable for raising public support.  After all, the success of a 
commemorative project is largely measured by its popularity. 
 
Victims and survivors are a constant and predominant feature in the 
commemoration battle.  Having paid the heaviest price, they believe they have the 
strongest claim over the memory of a war or a terrorist attack. The least they are 
entitled to—mandates conventional wisdom—is an appropriate occasion and space to 
reflect on the event and their loved ones who perished.  In his book Shadowed 
Ground, cultural geographer Kenneth E. Foote surveys America’s remembrance sites.  






always remain close to the heart of the debate—and usually insist upon this position—
but their role should not include the power to veto all decisions” (2003:342).   
Journalists who attempt to narrate the contested field of commemoration, and who are 
vulnerable to the victims’ moral authority, may virtually and publicly ratify the 
victims’ right of veto over remembrance projects. 
 
The Experience-Argument Scale 
 
I propose to examine the media influence of victims using a qualitative system 
that I devised and termed the Experience-Argument Scale.  The Scale offers a 
framework for assessing the level of journalistic attitudes—that I termed “deference,” 
“professionalism” and “disregard”—manifested in the coverage of a particular topic.  
 
The Experience-Argument Scale is not reserved for the analysis of the 
relationship between terrorism victims and the media. In fact, terrorism victims are 
only offered here as an example for the larger phenomenon of journalism’s response 
to the authority of grief.  The Experience-Argument Scale can be used to evaluate the 
press treatment of any citizen group whose moral authority derives from painful 
personal experience, such as ailing people who lobby for better healthcare or family 
members of victims of car accidents who work to improve road conditions.  In these 
cases and others, the Scale may help illuminate and even foresee situations where the 
press would either bend its self-proclaimed professional standards or adhere to them 







To be more precise, the Scale is designed to evaluate situations where the 
press encounters political players who had previously undergone a traumatic event 
that granted them what we could call “an authority of grief.”  The coarse (and 
nevertheless valid) psychological assumption at play here is that in the face of 
tragedy, journalists are engulfed in their own humanity, and led to identify with the 
victims, to avoid offending them and to side with their arguments. Consciously or not, 
the affected journalists put aside the professional standards that, in the course of 
everyday political reportage, are supposed to guard them from their own biases—at 
least, in the classic, albeit much contested, sense of “objectivity.”  The resulting 
coverage, in such circumstances, is deferential to the victims and it lacks traditional 
markers of objectivity.  “Deferential” news stories are sometimes of a lesser quality of 
journalism, if the topic at hand requires an extensive review of conflicting 
considerations, but deference stands in the way of a comprehensive analysis of the 
issue. 
 
My examination of individual print news items combined a search for formal 
signifiers of the objective method, and other—informal and more fluid—indications 
of journalistic attitude. I was mainly looking for signs of detachment, heard-
headedness, criticism and empathy.   
 
A victim-related story that displayed formal features of the practice of objectivity 







(1) The story brought forth and elaborated on opinions that were contrary to the 
victims’ claims. 
(2) It did not overplay victims’ emotional utterances.  
(3) It was mindful that a single victim, or even a victims’ organization, may not 
necessarily represent the entire victim population.  
 
My main finding, which became the underlying principle of the Scale, was that the 
proximity of a debated terrorism-related topic to the tragically and politically 
empowering attack qualified the victim-advocates in the eyes of journalists and 
deflected press criticism.  
 
The element of argument in the Experience-Argument Scale denotes an issue that 
the victims promote, for example aviation safety, compensation by perpetrators or 
state, anti-war activism, etc.  “Argument” is therefore synonymous with “topic,” 
“issue” or “debate,” all referring to a conversation whose proximity to the original 
event will largely determine the extent to which the media will be sympathetic to the 
victims and embrace their claims.  Proximity, in fact, appears to be a stronger factor 
than the essence or the merit of the victims’ argument.  In other words, even an 
unpopular argument, once voiced by the victims rather than by—for example—public 
officials, will be well received by the press, if it is sufficiently pertinent to the 
terrorism event.  Among other things, an attitude of deference means that even the 
voice of a single victim bears an unparalleled moral force, let alone claims made by a 






The term proximity is understood here in both pragmatic and conceptual terms.  A 
political action by a victim that is close in time to the attack, or directly relates to its 
place of occurrence, possesses an inherent media appeal and power of persuasion.  
This chapter, which deals with remembrance, is really about victims’ attempts to 
cement their interpretation of the events and retain control over the objects that 
signified the attack. The victims hold the power to authorize and stipulate the 
appropriate use of the attack’s markers of memory: the location of the attack, the 
names and biographical details of the deceased, photographs from the scene of terror, 
etc.  These signifiers of memory possess close conceptual approximation to the 
calamity and as such, they are considered the victims’ property.   
 
The coverage that I examined confirmed that the more the victims’ arguments 
pertained to the specific circumstance of their tragedy, the better they fared with the 
press.  This was most strikingly displayed in the journalistic treatment of two topics: 
remembrance issues (memorials and anniversaries) and coverage of families’ appeals 
for the release of loved ones who were held hostage (which Chapter 3 explores).  A 
close reading of news items related to these topics revealed the frequent absence of 
the conventional markers of journalistic professionalism, and their replacement with 
an uncritical and supportive journalistic approach. All of these merited the positioning 
of the issues of “remembrance” and “hostage situations” at the “Media Deference” 
end of the Experience-Argument Scale.  Other topics, which were further removed 
from the original terror experience, elicited a more “professionally oriented” 
journalistic response, which included, for example, skepticism and formal displays of 















The “Distance from Experience” arrow of the Scale represents proximity—the 
receding distance between the particular attack that the victims underwent, and the 
topic of their argument.  This arrow runs parallel to the gradual shift from “Media 
Deference” to “Media Disregard,” to show that the greater the distance between the 
victims’ argument and their politically-empowering terror experience, the more they 
are likely to meet a critical or indifferent press.  In this and in the following two 
chapters, I will report on my findings derived from the use of the Scale, beginning 
with this chapter’s examination of the topic of remembrance.  I will introduce topics 
that are typically subjects of victims’ activism—remembrance, the call to free 
abducted soldiers, and anti-war victims families’ organizations—assess them in terms 
of their distance from the politically originating terror attack, and examine the 
journalistic response that they induce.   
 
The essential purpose of remembrance projects is to invoke memory through a 
representational form of the events.  In terms of the Experience-Argument Scale, the 
fact that remembrance stands in direct reference to the original terror experience 
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positions this topic at the reverence side of the Scale.  It is slightly right of “Hostage 
Situations” because in hostage situations, the families’ activism takes place as the 
terrorist event is actually happening, so there is no distance between the Argument 
and the Experience (Chapter 3 will elaborate on that). But back to the subject of this 
chapter, victims, who bear the live memory of violence and endure the greatest loss, 
are considered the appointed guardians of the meaning of the attack.  The press, in this 
context, takes an instrumental role in impressing the victims’ narrative on the 
collective memory.  
 
The following sections will describe the victims’ role in the establishment of 
memorials commemorating the victims of the attacks, and the ways in which the 
American and Israeli news media validate—in different ways because their journalism 
is different—the victims’ central role in the commemorative debate. 
 
 The cultural geography of violence 
 
In order to fully understand the coverage of memorialization efforts, and 
specifically—the particularly complicated and tortured memorialization of terrorism, 
we need to first acquire a basic understanding of how different types of memorial 
designs correspond to certain memorialization purposes. Indeed, there are tragic 
events that communities want to mark and remember for eternity, while there are 






social approaches to places where violence and tragedy have taken place: 
sanctification, designation, rectification and obliteration.   
 
Sanctification commemorates events through a creation of a dedicated, 
permanent monument.  Sanctification enshrines events that are “seen to hold some 
lasting positive meaning that people wish to remember.” (2003:7)1   
 
Designation is a more modest form of commemoration, suitable for events that 
are considered significant but that “lack the heroic or sacrificial qualities associated 
with sanctified places” (2003:18). Designation may mark an event in the landscape 
through name plaques and parks.  Unlike sanctified sites, designated sites are not the 
loci of public commemorative rituals. 
 
Rectification and Obliteration are acts of purposeful forgetting.  Rectified sites are 
restored to their previous state, their signs of violence erased.  In obliterated sites, an 
acute sense of shame associated with the events leads not only to the eradication of 
any evidence of violence, but also to the effacement of the actual place of occurrence. 
 
 
                                                           
1 Foote's framework leaves the important example of Nazi death camps unresolved and unaccounted 
for within Foote's categorization. Concentration camps mark phenomena that hold no lasting positive 
meaning, but their preservation is testimony to the immensity of historical events that commands 







Sanctification and the social consensus 
 
Sanctification is mostly associated with the heroic sacrifice of soldiers who 
perished in a triumphant war.  Bravery and sacrifice warrant explicit sanctification in 
the form of a designated, well-tended and prominent monument, a commemoration 
genre Foote terms “a field of care” (2003:9).  Sanctification can be accomplished only 
if it enjoys perfect agreement with the feelings and memories of the survivors, the 
families of the dead and society at large.   
 
Sanctification of military defeat is a much more complicated task.  
Commemoration of defeat calls for the negotiation of conflicting moral 
interpretations.  The difference in circumstance between victory and defeat parallels 
the difference between monuments and memorials. As Sturken notes, "monuments are 
not generally built to commemorate defeats; the defeated dead are remembered in 
memorials. Whereas a monument most often signifies victory, a memorial refers to 
the life or lives sacrificed for a particular set of values." (Sturken 1997:48) 
 
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial presented the complicated challenge of 
commemorating defeat. The next paragraph will recall the particular conflicts that the 








The Vietnam War Memorial: sanctification of defeat 
 
One of Foote’s main observations in Shadowed Ground is that sites of 
violence that do not fit a victorious, patriotic vision, rarely achieve sanctification.  
Instead, they are abandoned or marked in the most modest of ways.
2
 The American 
landscape, he argues, is mostly shaped by the belief that acknowledging the darker 
side of violence—as oppose to the bright victories that it may bring—will detract 
from society’s cohesiveness and strength. 
 
Memorialization of defeat, indeed, is scarce, and once accomplished, it tends 
to concentrate on the fallen, as if to compensate retrospectively for the war’s lack of a 
just cause or to distract from its undesirable ending (Mayo, 1988). Such ambivalence, 
for example, has been the legacy left by the 1982 Lebanon War on the Israeli 
collective psyche, which is why "when Israeli officials speak in ceremonies 
occasioned by the Lebanon War, they extol its soldiers in words that are vivid and 
inspiring. Their remarks on the war itself are vague and pointless. They affirm the war 
as a historical entity but deny it an elevated place in the national experience." 
(Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, 1991:380) 
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 An important exception is Gettysburg, which introduces many sanctified Civil War battle 
monuments, some glorifying both the North and South, and some even exalting the South as loser over 
the North as winner.  “Gettysburg was recognized as significant by both sides soon after it was fought,” 
explains Foote. “Once the war ended, retrospective assessments reinforced the judgment of Gettysburg 
as a turning point— even the midpoint—of the war. This judgment in turn allowed veterans on both 
sides of the conflict to use the Gettysburg battlefield as a point of reconciliation.” (2003:123) With 
respect to the famous, bipartisan High Water Mark of the Rebellion Monument, Foote writes: “It is 
remarkable insofar as it was commissioned exclusively by Northern states but paid tribute to units of 
both sides. It was a critical step in reinterpreting the battlefield as a place in which all Americans could 






Similarly, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial had to contend with the 
divisiveness of the war and the fact that it was ultimately lost.  The Veterans 
Memorial Fund, which was in charge of the memorial design and construction, 
required in its mission statement that "The memorial will make no political statement 
regarding the war or its conduct. It will transcend those issues. The hope is that the 
creation of the memorial will begin a healing process." (Scruggs and Swerdlow 
1985:53, quoted in Sturken 1997:50). The eventual design, erected seven years after 
the American withdrawal from Vietnam, projected these negative associations by 
dedicating itself to the memory of the fallen in the explicit way of name inscriptions 
and also through its ascetic style (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, 1991.)  As Danto 
(1985) noted, "The paradox of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington is that 
the men and women killed and missing would not have been memorialized had we 
won the war and erected a monument instead" (quoted in Sturken 1997:48).
3
 Also 
unique to this memorial was the fact that unlike typical war memorials, and also 
different from its neighboring monuments at the Washington Mall, the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial could not be seen from afar. Only visitors who approached its 
sunken, black structure (both, non-triumphant elements of the memorial) could see it 
(Sturken 1997:46).  
 
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the only war memorial in the United States 
devoid of any expressions of glory, heroism or national pride, marked an important 
milestone in the history of the U.S.’s culture of grief.4  American grief has been 
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 Arthur Danto, "The Vietnam Veterans Memorial," The Nation, August 31, 1985. 
 
4
 The divisiveness of the war translated to continuing divisiveness over its memorial.  The persistent 






gaining social legitimacy and visibility, shifting from private, secluded spaces to the 
public sphere. These changes have allowed for the creation of a new memorialization 
genre, marked for the first time by the Vietnam War Memorial: sanctification of 
tragedy.  Unique to this genre is its openness to displays of visitors’ grief. The 
Vietnam Memorial set the precedent for that by allowing visitors to leave personal 
offerings, such as notes and flowers, at the wall (Linenthal 2001: 134).  
 
Memorializing terrorism: from designation to sanctification 
 
In their close examination of the processes that led to the establishment of the 
Vietnam War Memorial, Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz (1991) fully attributed the 
initiation of the memorial to a war veteran, Corporal Jan Scruggs, who came up with 
the idea for a monument that would list the 58,000 war dead, and established the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund.  Had he not introduced his initiative to the 
Vietnam-Era Caucus, the national remembrance marker of the war would have 
been—as suggested by the Caucus before the memorial idea gained prominence—a 
Vietnam Veterans Week.  
 
While the success of a single veteran in achieving the construction of the 
Vietnam War Memorial was unusual for its time, today victims' endeavors are 
common when it comes to memorialization of political violence.  Shifting social 
norms—in particular, the increasing value of individual rights and the growing 
                                                                                                                                                                      
led to an addition of a more traditional monument to the memorial grounds, a statue of three soldiers—






acceptance of public grief—allowed victims and survivors to play an increasingly 
central role in the conception and conceptualization of commemorative projects.  
 
The centrality of victims in the memorialization process can also be attributed 
to the fact that the state’s regulators of commemoration—such as governmental and 
municipal committees—have an inherent difficulty in deciding on the set of meanings 
associated with political violence and particularly, terrorism.  Given that both military 
defeat and terror attacks are public displays of national humiliation, state officials 
normally perceive designation – rather than sanctification – as a sufficient and 
relatively uncomplicated commemorative solution.  Through designation, which 
requires no more than a plaque with the victims’ list, social memory of terrorist 
attacks can evade difficult questions and instead, preoccupy itself with the victims.  
Indeed, Israeli terrorism-related memorials are typically modest stone structures 
bearing the names of the deceased, and they adhere to Foote’s designation category in 
that they lack national markers and avoid the grandiosity and patriotic overtones 
characteristic of sanctified sites. 
 
After the Vietnam War Memorial externalized public grief, the next 
development in the U.S. memorialization history was the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing, which introduced an era of large-scale terror-related sanctification sites.  
The Oklahoma City National Memorial and the National September 11 Memorial 
both address terrorism in new, defiant and dramatic ways.  More than anything, they 







Sanctification of U.S. terror sites 
 
In his analysis of the cultural geography of American violence, Foote positions 
terrorism under the category of criminal mass murder.  Mass killers, he argues, leave a 
shameful imprint on the life of a community, their survivors “caught between 
conflicting desires, both to efface and to memorialize.” (2003:180) The instinctive 
response to mass murder, he observes, is rectification, namely eradication of the 
tangible memory of violence through the restoration of the site.  Episodes that 
produce a particularly high level of shame, argues Foote, result in the complete 
obliteration of the site.  
 
While the categorization of multi-victim terrorism as a subtype of mass 
murder is valid, I believe that terrorism victims’ memorialization needs are markedly 
different than those of victims of non-political murder.  Foote’s assertion that “the 
higher the death toll, the more likely becomes its obliteration,” does not apply to 
terrorism, where deadliness is considered today to require sanctification.
5
 (p. 204)  
The sense of shame that Foote ascribes to communities that had undergone mass 
killings is related to the fact that they had unknowingly let a killer flourish in their 
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 While terrorism victims tend to press for sanctification, their need to obliterate the site nevertheless 
exists.  In his account of the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, Linenthal reported that many 
victims expressed a wish to efface the destroyed site, which was too painful for them to see: “’for me,’ 
said Philip Thompson, whose mother’s remains were recovered after the building’s implosion, ‘it was 
like a tomb, and for many of us, it just couldn’t stay. It would drain you every day.’ Pam Whicher 
thought that the building, like her husband, was dead. It symbolized to me the broken bodies of those 
that died inside it.’” (1991:136). There are a few sites that purposefully incorporate broken buildings as 
a reminder of the scars of violence or even as penance: e.g. the tower of the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial 
Church (Gedächtniskirche) on the main street in Berlin, badly damaged in the Allied bombing raids, 









 Terrorism, however, should not be categorized along with non-political mass-
murder because it is usually perpetrated by outsiders. The affected community bears a 
much weaker sense of responsibility, let alone shame. Writing on the public 
perception of the Oklahoma City bombers, Edward T. Linenthal pointed to the 
“outsider” quality of terrorists: 
Interpretive strategies portrayed McVeigh and Nichols as “in” 
but not “of” America, peripheral beings who did not threaten 
[America’s own] convictions of innocence. […] Portraying 
both men as “animals,” “monsters,” “drifters,” “loners,” ”right 
wingers,” “robots,” “mutated creatures,” served to separate 
them from “real” Americans. (Linenthal 2001, p. 19) 
 
Beyond the perpetrators’ insider-outsider distinction, there are other 
differences in the perception of victimhood of these two types of atrocities, the purely 
criminal and the politically driven.  Terrorism victims are deemed particularly worthy 
of sanctification because their victimhood derives from their random association with 
a specific national, religious or racial group.  Given that the ideological target of 
terrorism is a chosen identity, each and every person bearing that identity is an 
indirect victim of the attack.  As noted in Chapter 1, the individual victims are private 
persons, but at the same time they are representatives of the shared, and attacked, 
ideology.  Seen as wounded embodiments of their community’s core values, terrorism 
victims consider themselves and their deceased loved ones worthy of sanctification.
7
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 Foote also equates terrorism with racial massacres, whose places of occurrence were rectified or 
obliterated, as the black communities’ wish to honor the victims was met with the white communities’ 
embarrassment over the acts (2003:327), and, perhaps, the shameful triumphalism with which they had 
been committed. (One of Foote’s most compelling arguments is that the American landscape is 
physically silent with respect to the mass scale violence against blacks during the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century, as well as to the former brutal conquests of Native American peoples.  These communities are 
still in the process of gaining the sufficient powers required for claiming memorialzation.) 
7
 Victims of sheer criminality, on the other hand, may refuse memorialization and opt for rectification 
or obliteration in order to prevent a situation where an aberrant, inexplicable act perpetrated by 






Ironically, the choice between sanctification and rectification is in the hands of the 
perpetrators.  The more they succeed in relating the attack to an existing national or 
international political conflict, the more likely it is that their act will be enshrined in a 
sanctified form. Violence that is politically obscure, or understood as sheer 
criminality, has lesser chances of being grandly sanctified. 
 
Foote concludes that the after-effect of terrorism on the affected landscape—
similarly to the general response to non-ideological mass murders— is rectification. 
My review of terror-related memorials leads to a different conclusion, that the 
American terrorism landscape – however new and scarce – is one of sanctification.  
The first terrorism-related memorial to signal the shift from rectification to 
sanctification was the mid-sized memorial fountain honoring the six victims the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
shootings in educational institutions.  The shooting sprees at Columbine High School in 1999 and 
Virginia Tech in 2007 were commemorated by large memorials.  Erected in the past decade, these 
memorials reflect the growing acceptance of public displays of grief.  Also, the young age of the 
victims made these crimes stand out and merited their sanctification.)  However, once violence 
succeeds in communicating itself as an episode within an existing ideological conflict, it essentially 







Figure 4: The World Trade Center Memorial, commemorating the victims of the 1993 
WTC bombing 
 
The design of this memorial, which was destroyed on September 11
th
 2001, 
was halfway between designation and sanctification.  Its inscription explicated the 
rationale for sanctification, namely, the public dimensions of terrorism victimhood: 
 
On February 26, 1993, a bomb set by terrorists exploded below 
this site. This horrible act of violence killed innocent people, 
injured thousands, and made victims of us all. 
 
This inscription marks an interpretation of terrorism that is commonly driven 
by victims in the U.S. and Israel, which is that terrorism is everybody’s business, and 
that their wounds and the death of their loved ones constitute a piece of national 
history that deserves to be prominently enshrined.
8
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 The memorial grounds dedicated to the victims of the August 1998 attack on the American embassy 
in Kenya—although outside the geographical scope of Shadowed Ground—demonstrate the post-
Oklahoma-City-bombing tendency to sanctify terror sites.  The August 7
th






Terrorism landscape in Israel 
 
The terrorism landscape in Israel is different from the American landscape in 
that it reflects routine terrorism. A survey of institutional terrorism-related memorial 
sites in Israel – those erected by local municipalities or other official regulators of 
commemoration – reveals a landscape that addresses terrorism but contains it within 
Israeli normalcy in non-punctuated, non-dramatic forms.  Israeli memorialization thus 
takes the more modest form of designation. 
 
There is no legal or otherwise set standard for form, language or size of terror-
related memorial constructs, and they differ from each other.  However, the typical 
site includes a small and plain looking monument displaying the victims’ names 
(figures 1&2).  It possesses very subtle national markers, such as a uniform 
appearance of names (Shay 2005.)  The memorial object is not necessarily 
commensurate with the lethality of the attack. Some of the deadliest attacks were 
remembered through plaques (such as the 2001 Sbarro and Ben Yehuda St. attacks in 
Jerusalem,) while attacks that resulted in two or three casualties were sometimes 
remembered through monuments.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
offers a Peace Memorial Museum, a Peace Building Kids Club and a conference center, promoted on 








       
Figure 5: The Matza Restaurant Memorial     Figure 6: The Dolphinarium Memorial 
     
Within all forms of memorialization, however, victims’ names are an 
indispensable feature. 
9
 And just as the names of the victims have to appear, the 
names of the perpetrators are never there. Committed to the ideology of the attacked 
communities, memorials refuse to award the perpetrators with any kind of 
recognition. While Israeli memorials sometimes mention that the victims “were 
murdered by vile people,” they do not identify the perpetrators’ religion or ethnic 
group. 
  
The Central Memorial for the Victims of Hostile Acts and Terrorism in Mount Herzl, 
Jerusalem, is the largest terrorism monument in Israel and the only terror-related 
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 In Israel as well as in the United States, survivors, family members and friends advocate for explicit 
identification of their loved ones.  In the case of small-scale attacks or at times of particularly routine 
terrorism, victims may insist on name lists because they work against the public instinct to ignore the 
event and move on. With the precedents set by the Vietnam Memorial and the Israeli Central Memorial 






sanctified site. Interestingly, the monument’s design evocates personal grief as it lists 





Figure 7: The Central Memorial for the Victims of Hostile Acts and Terrorism, Mount 
Herzl, Jerusalem 
 
Press coverage of remembrance battles 
 
The involvement of terrorism victims in remembrance battles is well reflected 
in the design of American and Israeli memorials.  But before a monument is erected, 
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 The curious fact that the time period that this memorial represents begins in the 19th century – 
decades before the formation of the state of Israel -- indicates an interpretation of terrorism that 
includes violence perpetrated against Jews in Ottoman and British Mandate-era Palestine.  The 
memorial clearly avoids commemorating the victims’ sacrifice to the State of Israel, and instead, the 
sacrifice sanctified here is a broader one, associated with Jewish life in the land of Israel.  Israel is 
absent from the monument, and the purpose of sacrifice remains secondary and vague.  Instead, the 
memorial’s central theme is loss.  A large square surrounded by walls carrying name plaques, conveys 
emptiness, and a hole in a tall reclining structure similarly speaks of a void and communicates 








the memorialization battle is well reflected in the national press, which serves as one 
locus, perhaps the most important one, for gaining legitimacy and public support. In 
the following paragraphs, I will employ the Experience-Argument Scale to examine 
journalistic attitudes toward victim-led memorialization efforts. The analysis will 
concentrate on four memorials:  In Israel, the Beit Lid and Maxim memorials, and in 
the United States, the Oklahoma City National Memorial and, perhaps most 
importantly, the National September 11 Memorial and Museum.   
 
It should be clarified from the outset that in all of the cases surveyed—both in 
the United States and Israel—victims were met with journalistic deference. This is the 
unequivocal premise of the coverage of memorialization. But a close reading of the 
coverage provided more nuanced features of deference. Deference had different 
manifestations and it had its limitations, which differed in the U.S. and Israel 
according to the different journalistic cultures—and broader social differences—of 
these two countries.  
 
Beit Lid: A victim-driven attempt at sanctification 
 
The Beit Lid attack took place on January 22, 1995.  It was the first “double 
suicide bombing,” in which two suicide bombers affiliated with the Islamic Jihad 
detonated themselves on a bus stop busy with soldiers, with the second bomber setting 
himself off minutes after the first, killing those who rushed to the scene to help.  A 






construction of a memorial in the place of the attack took 13 long years, mostly 
because of difficulties in securing a piece of land for the memorial.   
 
I surveyed the entire coverage of the Beit Lid memorialization process in three 
major publications. Ynet is an online newspaper published by Yedioth Aharonoth, and 
while it is considered a separate publication, it is the second leading Internet news 
source in Israel and reflects Israel’s news values.  Nrg Ma’ariv is affiliated with 
Ma’ariv and similarly represents mainstream Israeli journalism, although it is much 
less popular (5
th
 in popularity among Hebrew language online news sources), and 




As described in the Chapter 1, mainstream Israeli newspapers do not express 
avid commitment to the American tradition of objectivity. Their commitment is rather 
to an ethos of inclusiveness, and they purport to speak on behalf of the Israeli public 
at large, and in particular, the aggrieved citizen.   
 
Historically, Israeli journalism began in the 1940s as a party press. During the 1980s, 
with the growing influence of American values on Israel’s culture (and in particular, 
American philosophies of justice and personal freedoms that found their way to 
Israel’s Constitutional law), Israeli journalism developed an awareness of 
“objectivity” and the fairness that it is supposed to engender.  But the Israeli notion of 
“objectivity” has had a limited scope: it was only expected from political coverage, 
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mainly in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where journalistic partisanship 
was seen as an obstacle to truthfulness. There was much less expectation of 
objectivity in other contexts, and objectivity was completely absent from coverage of 
social issues. There, the primary interest that was served was that of the typical 
citizen, and it was served in an openly non-objective approach. 
 
Deference to the Beit Lid victims 
 
The pieces surveyed here with connection to the Beit Lid remembrance 
project, as well as all the press surveyed with respect to the Maxim memorial, 
belonged to the category of political “hard news.” Nevertheless, and typically to the 
coverage of victims, the coverage by these publications was entirely sympathetic to 
the families, and lacked most markers of objectivity. Typical headlines read: 
“Bureaucracy Delays Construction of Monument to the Victims of the Attack” (Ynet, 
by Felix Frisch, January 23, 2001) and “A Monument of Pain” (nrg Ma’ariv, by Elad 
Hoffer, November 10, 2007).  A Globes story took the narrow form of a Q&A with 
the chairperson of the Beit Lid families’ organization who complained about their 
difficulties securing land for the memorial. The story did not seek the response of 
those allegedly responsible for the delay (“Grief is not Interesting, the Monument is 
Interesting,” Globes, Ron Paz, June 15, 2008).   
 
There were stories that attempted to bring a multi-sourced, fuller picture of the 






of the families, while those accused of complicating the project were either not sought 
for comment or quoted as making general and formal statements, such as the 
following one:  
The Israel Land Administration recognizes the importance of 
allocating a piece of land to the victims of the Beit Lid disaster.  
We are doing what we can to materialize the memorial. 
Planning and allocating land take time because of their 
complexity and because of the need to coordinate between 
many different authorities. (Or Glaser, Nrg Ma’ariv, 2002)12 
 
Some stories employed openly judgmental language on the part of the 
reporter, ascribing the standstill to “heartless bureaucracy” and blaming “legal 
requirements” for  “bedeviling” the families (ibid, Or Glaser, 2002.)  Most tellingly 
perhaps, Nrg reports ended with the contact information of the families’ organization, 
“for donations.” (Or Glaser, 2002 and 22.1.2006)  
 
While journalists were genuinely trying to be helpful to the families, the 
coverage of the protracted memorialization process also revealed the weakening effect 
that the passage of time had on the victims’ influence.  The Beit Lid families planned 
an unusually ambitious memorial.  The sanctified site was meant to reflect the 
magnitude and shock of the first “double suicide bombing.” But the exponential 
increase in suicide bombings during the Al Aqsa Intifada eroded the imprint that Beit 
Lid left on the public and on the press.  While the press coverage remained 
sympathetic to the families throughout the long memorialization process, the volume 
of that coverage gradually diminished.  In the later years of the saga, coverage only 
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appeared at anniversaries, summarizing any progress that had been achieved in the 
past year and updating on the status of the families’ current hurdles. 
 
The memorial as a site of sanctification, the press as a site of designation 
 
The Beit Lid memorial was finally erected in 2008. The memorial differs from 
the generic, simple stone structures that inhabit terrorism sites throughout Israel.  The 
monument is a large statue, depicting 22 life-size figures – 21 soldiers and one 
civilian – climbing up a ladder, their posture proud and resolute, toward the sky.  The 
designer of the monument, Sara Konforty, wrote that the design was intended to 
represent "the might of the Jewish people. … Fortitude, strength and grit were what I 





Figure 8: A detail from the Beit Lid Memorial 








The memorial grounds also include an amphitheater and memorial chambers 
dedicated to the victims.  The grandness of the memorial, its various elements and its 
prideful design reflected the families’ notions that the uniquely orchestrated and 
exceptionally deadly Beit Lid attack merited a defiant reaction in the form of a 
sanctified site.  In this sense, the Beit Lid memorial endorsed, consciously or not, the 
increasing perception of terrorism victims as heroes (an interpretation elaborated in 
Chapter 1.)  The particular narrative of the Beit Lid attack included a moment of 
heroism that justified this. The victims of the attack’s second explosion, which 
targeted those who rushed to help the wounded, were not—according to this 
narrative—victims of indiscriminate terrorism, but symbols of courage and sacrifice, 
meriting sanctification. As this chapter will further illustrate, in the United States, the 
“heroification” of terrorism victims began with the design of the Oklahoma City 
Memorial and continued to dominate the National 9/11 Memorial, particularly with 
respect to “first responders.” 
 
Another distinguishing factor that tipped the scales toward the sanctification of 
the Beit Lid site—again, rather than designation—was the fact that 21 out of the 22 
victims were soldiers.  In Israel, soldiers hold a particularly dear place in the national 
conscience, and when they die, they are mourned as dead children (this point will be 
elaborated in Chapter 3’s discussion of abducted soldiers.  Fear of soldiers’ 
kidnappings is one of Israel’s major psychological and strategic weaknesses.)  The 
fact that the Beit Lid victims were mostly soldiers was also responsible for its 







But again, the escalation of Israeli-Palestinian violence diluted the effect of the 
Beit Lid attack and worked against the grandiosity of the design.  At this time of 
writing, more than 17 years after the attack, the memorial continues to suffer from a 
shortage of funds necessary for its maintenance.  The victims families’ difficulties in 
raising sufficient public donations for the memorial’s upkeep revealed the 
incongruence between what the families were hoping for the memorial to become, and 
the relatively indifferent response of the Israeli public.  Israeli culture, it seems, 
wishes to remember terrorism victims but at the same time, to move on.  For a society 
that experiences waves of terrorism, designation remains the most appropriate form of 
commemoration, not sanctification.   
 
The distinction between designation and sanctification is a useful way to look 
at the different modes of journalistic deference that the Beit Lid families met. The 
families aimed for sanctification, and indeed achieved emotional and occasionally 
one-sided stories from journalists who were trying to help them gain support for the 
memorial. But the Israeli experience of routine terrorism diminished the impact of the 
Beit Lid attack.  With the years, the Beit Lid victims’ families were only capable of 
eliciting coverage about the memorial’s problems on anniversaries, and not much 
more.  Here, too, the expectations of the families to receive a “sanctified” treatment 
were unrealistic. The press was deferential and sympathetic, to be sure, but in modest 
quantities that were commensurate with designation rather than with sanctification.  
The U.S. examples that will follow will show how the American culture was different 






Oklahoma in 1995 and in 2001 in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington.  In the 
U.S., sanctification took place both at the landscape and in the news media. 
 
The memorialization of the Maxim attack 
 
The Maxim attack took place in a Haifa restaurant on October 4, 2003, during 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada.  A female suicide bomber affiliated with the Islamic Jihad 
detonated herself at the busy Maxim restaurant on a Saturday afternoon, killing 21 
people.  When the relatives of the victims began to organize in order to plan and build 
a memorial, they wanted to locate it at the entrance to the restaurant. But the 
restaurant owners objected, claiming that the memorial should be placed nearby, yet 
far enough so that the restaurant’s business would not be affected.  The dispute 
represented a classic tension between two of Foote’s classifications, with the victims 










Figure 9: computer-generated image of the families’ design of the Maxim memorial 
 
Figure 10: the Maxim memorial, Haifa 
 
Ynet dedicated one story to the dispute between the families and the restaurant. 
Specifically, it reported on a demonstration held by family members at the entrance to 
the restaurant on the second anniversary of the attack.  A close reading of this Ynet 
story (by Ahiya Raved, Oct. 10, 2005) reveals markers of journalistic deference to the 






The story appeared both on Ynet’s Hebrew and English language online 
editions. In the Hebrew version, the headline ran: “Demonstration at Maxim: ‘This is 
the Place of Murder. Bon Appetit.’” It appears as if the editors of Ynet’s English 
edition did not think their readers would be comfortable with sarcasm, and so the 
headline of the English language version of the story ran: “Families: Don't Blur 
Victims' Memories.” Apparently Ynet attributed different sensitivities to its different 
constituencies, assuming – in keeping with the cultural stereotype – that Israeli 





The family members in this story were framed as “righteous dissenters.” The 
memorial was about to be located at a distance from the restaurant—per the owners’ 
request—and the family members were the opposing side.  Although the families 
possessed the moral upper hand, in fact—because they possessed the moral upper 
hand—they were portrayed as underdogs.  The power of the underdog frame was 
acknowledged by Herbert Gans, who argued that one of American journalism’s 
enduring values was individualism, and that the “ideal individual struggles 
successfully against adversity and overcomes more powerful forces.” (1979:50)  This 
appears to hold true to Israeli journalism as well, where the underdog frame signals 
moral superiority.  
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 Ynet’s English language editor Allan Abbey indicated that his target audience was American Jews, 
telling Forward:  “There are 6 million English speaking Jews in America, and only 200,000 in Israel.” 






Deference and the holocaust reference  
 
This Ynet story, similarly to the Beit Lid reports, laid out the victims’ 
arguments extensively and persuasively, evoking not only the victims’ own grief but 
also painful Jewish history. Eli Regev, a bereaved father, was quoted as saying: "The 
dimensions of our disaster cannot be minimized.  Entire families were destroyed in 
this attack, three generations of one family, something that has not happened since the 
Holocaust." 
 
The Israeli press’s coverage of terrorism is particularly open to Holocaust 
references. Beyond the obvious summoning of the Holocaust to heighten emotions, 
the Holocaust serves as a deep framework that lends terrorism a compendium of 
meanings.  Terrorism, suggests the Holocaust analogy, is perpetrated by Nazi-like 
evildoers, who victimize innocent Jews.  But just as the State of Israel was founded to 
protect the Jewish people from the recurrence of another Holocaust, so will the Israeli 
army hunt Palestinian terrorists down and foil the next attack (Nossek, 1994.)    
 
From the victims’ perspective, evocation of the Holocaust is a way to equate 
their own level of sanctification with that of the victims of the Holocaust.  Such 
interpretation, it should be noted, is uncontested by Holocaust survivors and Israeli 
society at large.  It is when social groups outside or in the fringes of Israeli society 
draw analogies to the Holocaust that they face fierce rejection by Holocaust survivors, 






control the memory of their attacks (a complex example was the claims made by Jews 
displaced by the Israeli Defense Force during the 2005 Disengagement from the Gaza 
Strip, equating Israel to Nazi Germany.) 
  
The Ynet story further concentrated on the family members’ demonstration—
an undeniably newsworthy action— without asking whether the families’ claims 
were, in fact, shared by the larger Maxim victim group.  Indeed, the question of 
representation, as critical as it is when establishing the dimensions of a reported 
dispute, is rarely asked in the context of victim-activists.  Representation is deemed 
irrelevant in a situation where the voice of a single victim carries great weight, let 
alone the claims of a victim group, and let alone in a context that is newsworthy on 
the criterion of conflict.   
 
The Oklahoma City Memorial: sanctification both in landscape and local press  
 
The Oklahoma City bombing took place on April 19, 1995.  Timothy 
McVeigh, a follower of militia and white supremacy ideologies, detonated a truck 
bomb parked in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown 
Oklahoma City.  He chose the Murrah Building among a few buildings that he had 
visited across the U.S., because it fit his idea of the ideal target—a building that 
hosted multiple Federal agencies, and whose destruction would produce an 
exceptionally high death toll. The explosion caused the building to collapse, killing 






McVeigh was caught, tried and convicted of murder, the use of weapons of mass 
destruction and conspiracy.  He was executed on June 11, 1997.  His accomplice, 
Terry Nichols, was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. 
 
The Oklahoma City National Memorial, dedicated in April 2000, 
commemorates the 168 victims of the attack.  The large memorial grounds include 
two Gates of Time, a Field of Empty Chairs, a reflecting pool, a Memorial Fence (a 
segment from the original chain link fence that surrounded the site of the bombing) 
and a memorial museum.  
 
Foote admits that given the strange fact that the Oklahoma bombing was 
carried out by seemingly ordinary Americans,
15
 he was surprised by the speed in 
which the memorial was constructed and more so, by its grandiose design (p. 337).  
Indeed, the memorial is extraordinary in its huge size and the richness of its aesthetic 
and symbolic elements.  The memorial, Foote believes, is the successor of the 
Vietnam War Memorial in that it continues the gradual shift in the ways Americans 
have been dealing with tragedy.  While formerly, mass murder sites were suppressed 
through rectification and obliteration, now there was a growing public 
acknowledgment of the place of violence in society and growing inclination to 
sanctify the victims.  Los Angeles Times reporter Jesse Katz observed the changing 
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 Timothy McVeigh revealed his motives in an April 26, 2001 letter to Fox network: “Foremost, the 
bombing was a retaliatory strike; a counter attack, for the cumulative raids (and subsequent violence 
and damage) that federal agents had participated in over the preceding years (including, but not limited 
to, Waco.) From the formation of such units as the FBI's "Hostage Rescue" and other assault teams 
amongst federal agencies during the '80's; culminating in the Waco incident, federal actions grew 
increasingly militaristic and violent, to the point where at Waco, our government - like the Chinese - 







American attitude toward tragedy, noting that "if a terrorist’s bomb had savaged the 
Alfred P. Murrah federal building in another day and age it’s quite possible that no 
evidence of the attack would mark the site today." 
 
This change also allowed victims to dominate the memorialization process, as 
was the case in Oklahoma.
 16
 One of the early realizations of the Oklahoma Memorial 
task force—a committee established by Oklahoma City Mayor Ronald Norick to lead 
the process— was that as complicated and heart wrenching as it may be, victims’ 
participation was crucial for the project’s legitimacy.  As Robert Johnson, the head of 
the task force, later recalled: "The credibility of the project rested on the privileged 
place of the voices of family members and survivors, and this commitment became 
the bedrock on which the entire process rested" (Linenthal, p. 176). 
   
While the memorial task force felt a moral obligation to have victims lead the 
commemorative process, this was not an obvious course of action, in the sense that 
the Oklahoma bombing was the deadliest terrorist incident on American soil to that 
day, and there were no precedents that could help assess if the inclusion of the victims 
was indeed a good idea (while it was a war veteran who initiated the Vietnam War 
Memorial, the memorial design was ultimately chosen by a professional body, the 
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 American grief, argued Katz, was increasingly public, driven by social forces such as the victims’ 
rights movement and the confessional style of daytime talk shows.  President Obama’s authorization of 
photography of soldiers’ coffins is a recent, potent illustration of the social containment of grief 
(although one could argue, that both Bush administrations refused to release photos of returning coffins 
because they feared that spotlighting casualties would undermine public support for the two Gulf wars, 
while Obama’s reversal of the policy was, in part, an effort to project greater transparency as well as to 
distance himself from the wars.) Another, related phenomenon is the transformation of places of grief 
into scenes of public debate, as manifested in the U.S. Supreme Court March 2011 decision to apply 






Commission of Fine Arts.)  At the same time, the task force’s decision to give 
primacy to the victims seems, in retrospect, an inevitable one, insofar as it is almost 
impossible to resist the particular moral and political powers of terrorism victims in 
issues of remembrance.  Today, participation of victims in memorialization is a 
universal phenomenon, just as the authority of grief is a human, culture-crossing 
moral force. 
 
Victims and survivors were involved in every aspect of the conceptualization 
of the Oklahoma City memorial, and they have had substantial authorship over the 
meanings that the final construct communicated.  Most importantly, victims 
participated in the onerous, bitterly debated task of articulating the memorial’s 
mission statement, and were represented in the committees that decided on the semi-
final and later, on the winning design for the memorial.   
 
Many features of the Oklahoma National Memorial attest to the centrality of 
the victims in the memorialization process. One of them is the Memorial Fence, where 
people continue to leave mementoes in honor of the victims, in a manner similar to 








Figure 11: The Memorial Fence, Oklahoma City National Memorial 
 
Edward Linenthal’s work on the aftermath of the Oklahoma City Bombing, 
“The Unfinished Bombing,” detailed the challenges that the memorialization process 
entailed.  In this comprehensive account, three commemoration debates loomed large: 
(1) whether to include victims in the design selection committees (they were 
included); (2) whether the memorial should include references to survivors (it does); 
(3) whether Fifth St., the adjacent street to the Murrah Federal Building, should be 







To explore the press reports on these debates, and specifically, whether journalists 
deferred to the victims the same way the task force did, I examined coverage by two 
local publications, the Oklahoman and the Journal Record, and by the national press.   
 
The Oklahoman is published in Oklahoma City but covers the entire state.  
With a weekday print edition circulation of almost 125,000, it is the largest local daily 
in Oklahoma.
17
 The Oklahoman has been owned for more than a century by the local 
Gaylord family, and although the family also owns a few country music TV channels, 
the Oklahoman is one of the few remaining papers to escape media conglomeration.  
In a June 1998 American Journalism Review piece dedicated to the history and 
performance of American independent press, James V. Risser appreciated the Gaylord 
family’s deep commitment to the Oklahoma community.  But while noting that the 
family’s donations supported numerous civic, educational and cultural projects in 
Oklahoma, Risser argued that the Oklahoman did not serve its Oklahoma readership 
all that well.  The paper was self-described conservative and used AP copy – in the 
words of one of its managers –  “nine times out of ten.” (Risser 1998)  The 
Oklahoman, Risser concluded, was “a journalistic underachiever.” A harsher June 
1999 piece by Bruce Selcraig in the Columbia Journalism Review declared the 
Oklahoman “the worst newspaper in America,” citing a strong right wing bias, lack of 
minority staff, and in particular, poor news judgment.  Its “unflattering nickname has 
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become so ingrained in the state lexicon that from Muskogee to Guymon hardly a 




The Journal Record is a “daily general business and legal newspaper,”19 with 
a modest circulation of 3411.
20
 The paper’s headquarters, located near the Murrah 
Federal Building, was damaged by the bombing.  The Journal Record Publishing 
Company is owned by Dolan Media, which specializes in business information 
services.  Dolan Media owns more than twenty business and legal publications across 
the United States, as well as public notice and legal filing services.  To judge by its 
products, the company is situated more in the business, legal/finance culture than in 
the purportedly more independent-minded and narrative-driven journalistic culture.  
The company’s commitment to the business sector was evident in the Journal 
Record’s coverage of the conflict between local businesses and Oklahoma bombing 
victims surrounding the inclusion of Oklahoma City’s Fifth Street in the memorial 
grounds. 
 
As one would expect, given the traditional role of a local paper and the ways 
in which it is immersed in its community, both the Journal Record and the 
Oklahoman embraced the victims.  Borrowing from Foote’s categorization, these 
publications’ coverage displayed the journalistic equivalent of sanctification.   
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The unmitigated empathy to the victims was exemplified in an April 18, 1996 Journal 
Record column written by the paper’s former editor Max Nichols on the first 
anniversary of the bombing.  Nichols praised the national press’s coverage of the 
anniversary, commenting that the journalists who visited the city didn’t come 
“looking for people who trade on the bombing, for problems with the Memorial Task 
Force or ways to criticize the planned memorial,” but instead “came here with 
sympathy for the victims, survivors and their families. They [the visiting journalists] 
also seemed to have great respect for what we are trying to accomplish with the 
memorial through a 350-member task force.”21 [italics added] 
 
Nichols employed the “we” voice—a mark of loyalty that presumed unanimity 
of opinion— and ended with an unequivocal statement about what he saw as the role 
of journalism in the face of the formidable task of memorialization: “Our job is to 
support it.”  And indeed the Journal Record demonstrated its support through 
selective coverage of the problems that the task force faced, and in particular, by 
leaving some of its most important internal debates unreported.  The paper mostly 
reported memorialization issues that involved political institutions and the coverage, 
on the most part, gravitated towards the victims in ways that conformed to the 
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Oklahoma: The Spreiregen dispute 
 
One of the early decisions the Oklahoma task force needed to make was the 
makeup of the design selection body.  The task force hired the Washington-based 
architect Paul Spreiregen on a trial basis to advise on the selection process.  
Spreiregen, the former chairman of the competitions committee of the American 
Institute of Architects, had previously organized the national competition for the 
design of the Vietnam Memorial.  His pertinent experience and international stature 
were supposed to ensure a smooth selection process and attract an international group 
of elite designers.  But a conflict arose when Spreiregen stated his belief that selection 
was primarily a matter of expertise and therefore recommended that the selection 
committees would only consist of design professionals.  Victims, he argued, should be 
kept out of the process because, he said, “I don’t go to an accountant to have my 
appendix removed.” (Linenthal 2001:189) The task force rejected Spreiregen’s view, 
insisted on the participation of victims, let Spreiregen go and hired three architects to 
serve as a Competition Advisory Team.  These architects, as opposed to Spreiergen, 
were amenable to the inclusion of victims in the selection committees.   
 
The Journal Record did not report on the conflict with Spreiregen. While the 
appointment of the new Competition Advisory Team was reported, it was without 
mention of the prior termination of Spreiregen’s contract.  One of the architect-
members of the new advisory team announced in a Journal Record story that they 






members, [and] that the project is all-inclusive.”22  And so, the questions of the 
suitability and potential contribution of the victims to the design selection process 
were never offered for public scrutiny and deliberation.   
 
The Oklahoma memorialization process was the first in which family 
members and survivors were given the opportunity to participate, in a profound way, 
in the establishment of a grand, national memorial sanctifying victims, and yet, the 
Journal Record did not think that the questions of their inclusion, authority and 
qualifications merited public discussion.  Rather, the composition of the selection 




The Oklahoman did cover the Spreiregen saga, not as an independently 
newsworthy item, but as a detail within general reports on the progress of the 
memorial.  The first story, “Task Force Pieces Together More Than Bombing 
Memorial,”24 began with the personal story of a survivor-turned-memorialization-
activist, Calvin Moser.  The opening paragraphs secured the victims’ perspective as 
the fundamental perspective of the story.  This is how the story began: 
To Calvin Moser, the eight-month discussion about a memorial 
to the April 19 bombing was a greater memorial to his friends 
and co-workers who died than any edifice of brick or stone. 
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The piece continued with a description of the divisions and tensions that the task force 
endured, including the conflict with Spreiregen.  Spreiregen himself was a source for 
this story, defending his support for an all-professional selection panel and warning 
that  
If that level of emotion persists, I don't know how they're going 
to do the selection process they’ve got.  It will just fall through.  
I don't think a design competition is good therapy. 
 
The story, however, ended with a stamp of approval for the task force’s 
decision to include victims in the selection committees: 
And for the bombing survivors and victims’ relatives, the 
decision to ignore Spreiregen's reservations won their trust in 
the process. 
"Bob Johnson [the head of the task force] stood up and said this 
is more important, the feelings of the families and survivors is 
more important than just putting up a stylistic memorial," said 
[family member] Gottshall.  "That took a lot of courage." 
 
This Oklahoman piece did provide Spreiregen with a fair chance to voice his 
objections to the design selection process.  At the same time, it gave prominence to 
the task force’s view.  A reader of the Oklahoman’s coverage was ultimately left with 
the impression that the Oklahoma community, as represented by the task force, the 
victims and the Oklahoman, rejected an inappropriate idea suggested by a Washington 









Oklahoma: memorializing survivors 
 
The second important conflict that Linenthal recounted in his book concerned 
the survivors’ place in the victim hierarchy and their representation in the memorial 
(“Survivors,” here, refers to people who experienced and endured the attack.)  
Relatives of the deceased were reluctant at first to acknowledge the survivors’ 
experiences and hence their legitimacy as partners to the commemoration process.  
With time, the family-member group accepted survivors into the so-called “trauma 
club” and granted them the right for explicit sanctification within the memorial 
through a Survivors’ Wall.  
 
The Survivors’ Wall, an original segment of the Murrah Federal Building 
adjacent to the eastern gate, is an unprecedented commemorative feature.  The 
sanctification of survivors—of the living—is no less than a radical element within a 
commemorative genre traditionally dedicated to the dead.  The Survivors Wall 
enumerates more than 800 people who qualified as survivors by a designated 
Survivors’ Definition Subcommittee through a complicated process.  In order to 
create an applicable benchmark, the committee delineated a geographical “zone of 
danger” surrounding the Murrah Building, qualifying as “survivor” any person caught 
in that zone at the time of the bombing.  The subcommittee struggled with many 
borderline claims of survivorship made by people who were outside the “zone of 
danger” but experienced emotional distress, as well as people who entered the zone of 
danger immediately after the bombing, and even claims by property owners in the 






negotiation between two powerful concerns: first, to broaden the scope of victimhood 
in the spirit of inclusion, and the second, to avoid trivialization of the survivor title 











Figure 12: Survivors’ Wall, Oklahoma City Memorial 
  
As difficult and tension-fraught as Linenthal describes it, none of this process 
was reported by the Oklahoman neither by the Journal Record.  These local papers 
did not provide their constituencies the service of publishing the survivor 
qualifications, just as they did not report on the disappointment of any of those who 
had been disqualified.  If there was an attempt by any of the disqualified to put 
pressure on the committee through local press, the press did not cooperate. This lack 
of coverage reflects the complete commitment to the victim-led task force and to the 







Oklahoma: the Fifth Street problem 
 
Fifth Street, which ran by the Murrah Federal Building, was the subject of a 
particularly heated debate.  People walking on the Fifth Street sidewalk perished in 
the Oklahoma City bombing, and in the aftermath of the attack, Fifth Street was the 
place where rescue operations took place.  The memorial task force considered Fifth 
St. a “sacred ground” (Linenthal p. 190).  As such, it remained closed throughout the 
commemoration process, and became a formal component of the memorial grounds.  
The task force’s wish for the street to remain closed encountered the objections of 
local businesses who feared diminished commercial traffic.  The tension in this case 
was similar to that of the Israeli Maxim case, namely between memorialization and 
commercial interests, or between sanctification and rectification. 
 
The Journal Record followed this issue quite closely.  As a business-oriented 
publication, it was evidently torn between two local, powerful groups: terrorism 
victims and business owners.  The coverage, as the following analysis will show, 
reflected the Journal Record’s difficult position. 
 
The first Journal Record story dedicated to the Fifth Street question was a 
June 17, 1996 story titled “Plans to Reopen Part of 5th St. Criticized” 25— criticized, 
that is, by the victims.  As in the coverage of the Spreiregen dispute, the opening 
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paragraph accommodated the victims, letting their perspective set the tone for the rest 
of the piece: 
 
Claiming a block in front of the Oklahoma City bombing site as 
sacred ground, relatives of bombing victims say they will fight 
businesses and city officials who want to open the street. 
 
The story framed the victims as righteous dissenters, similarly to the Israeli 
press’s case in its coverage of the Maxim victims who demanded to locate the 
memorial close to the bombing site. The same moral position was taken here, that 
sympathies should go to the victims who demanded an appropriate memorial, rather 
than to those who complained that memorials hurt businesses.  In this story, three 
sources voiced the victims’ perspective, while only one source defended the 
reopening of the street. 
 
Had moral priorities been different, the Journal Record could have offered an 
inverse frame that would have emphasized the opposition to the victims.  In this 
hypothetical case, the story would have been titled “Plans to Keep 5th Street Closed 
Criticized.”  This could have been a perfectly sensible frame: After all, the task force 
had explicitly expressed its wish for a closed Fifth Street earlier in the process, the 
street was included in the memorial grounds outlined in the memorial’s mission 
statement, and it was in fact closed by the police on April 19, 1995 and remained 
closed since.  In other words, the closing of the street was the official stance to be 
criticized by ordinary folks, not the other way around. Even the Oklahoma Governor 







“not aware of a traffic artery running right beside the Wailing 
Wall in Jerusalem, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier… or 
George Washington’s tomb at Mt. Vernon.  This site is already a 
shrine… You do not run vehicles across sacred ground.” 
(Linenthal p.192) 
 
These circumstances suggest that the victims’ view could have been presented 
as the “main” view, to be criticized by others. The decisions and statements by the 
task force and the Mayor, combined with the reality of a closed street, could have 
served as pegs upon which to frame the story in a way that would center on those who 
may have been the true dissenters, namely the business owners.  But the frame that 
was ultimately chosen put the victims in the position of “righteous dissenters,” a 
position the lent them moral superiority. 
 
The task force, reported the Journal Record, was preparing for an upcoming 
decision on the matter by the Oklahoma City Traffic Management Division.  The 
paper followed up on that meeting with an August 20, 1996 story, “Panel Stalls on 5th 
St. Reopening,”26 in which Matt Driskill reported that the Traffic Management 
Division was deadlocked on the Fifth Street issue.  This institutional conflict within 
the Traffic Management Division, the bread and butter of political reporting, merited 
a traditional journalistic “pro vs. con” treatment.  Uncharacteristically for coverage of 
terrorism victims, Driskill brought forth a sober account of the various contending 
forces in the matter, victims included, and his account demonstrated typical markers 
of objectivity by describing both sides in a balanced way: 
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On one side of the street are business owners and residents in 
the area who want to see the street reopened, at least partially, 
to restore the flow of traffic interrupted more than a year ago.  
On the other side are victims and survivors of the blast who say 
to reopen the street would desecrate hallowed ground.  
 
A close examination of the story reveals, however, a slight advantage to the 
businesses’ arguments for opening the street.  While three sources favored a closed 
street, and only two favored opening it, the latter appeared first and their argument 
was detailed and persuasive. Again, the Journal Record, a business-oriented 
publication, appeared, in this story, to tilt to the businesses’ side. 
 
While Driskill took pains to project balance in his story, he gave a realistic 
assessment of the outcome of the Fifth Street dispute: 
 
City staff present at the meeting Monday said publicly they 
favored reopening two lanes of 5th Street but said privately 
they believe the council will vote to keep the street closed. 
 
Driskill knew that at the end of the day, the victims would prevail. In a 
subsequent September 11, 1996 story, “5th Street Issue Goes Before Panel,” which 








City officials say publicly they want both sides to be heard, but 
privately nod when asked if the street will remain closed and 
traffic rerouted. 
 
The Journal Record’s detailed accounts of the Fifth Street debate reflected the 
concerns of the Oklahoma business community.  By contrast, the Oklahoman’s 
coverage was meager, indicating an editorial assumption that the size of the memorial 
grounds and the future of the street were either uninteresting or not sufficiently 
important to the general Oklahoma population (perhaps the Oklahoman realized that it 
could not compete with the relatively intensive coverage of the Journal Record.)  In 
any case, The Oklahoman, a non-specialized daily, dedicated only one story to this 
matter, a July 17, 1996 piece that conveyed the task force’s willingness to address the 
worries of the business community.  The piece, titled “Closing of NW 5th Mulled 
Task Force Studying Issue Further,”27 began with a message of reconciliation issued 
by the task force’s spokesperson.  A count of the named sources in this piece reveals 
an advantage to the task force with three sources (the spokesperson, an Advisory 
Committee architect member and a relative) compared to only one source representing 
business owners.  And while the arguments for the closed street were dramatic and 
persuasive ("We could create the most wonderful, wonderful memorial in the nation, 
but if the environment around it isn't appropriate, then the memorial loses some, if not 
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Oklahoma and the national press 
 
The national press did not follow the Oklahoma memorialization process very 
closely.  Anniversaries provided opportunities for general updates on the memorial’s 
planning and construction status.  The events of September 11, 2001 also renewed 
interest in Oklahoma’s unique, victim-led memorialization effort,28 and generated 
deeper pieces that demonstrated attitudes that only distance allowed, such as criticism 
and even humor.
29
 Such attitudes were, and are to this day, completely absent from 
the local Oklahoma coverage of the memorial.  
 
Some of the pieces that appeared in the national press stood out in their candid 
and detailed assessments of the complicated work of the task force. The Spreiregen 
dispute, which – as pointed out beforehand – was never discussed in the Journal 
Record, appeared in these pieces as a crucial episode that cemented the victims’ 
control over the memorialization process.  
 
One such post-9/11 piece was a January 14, 2002 New Yorker commentary by 
Paul Goldberger, which described the Oklahoma memorialization process as an 
important education for New York as it began to grapple with the future of Ground 
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 It was only in a Chicago Sun piece that Bob Johnson, the chairman of the task force, described 
himself – alluding to the hardships of the memorialization process – as “53 going on 72.” (Lois 






Zero.  Goldberger’s astute assessment of the Spreiregen chapter of the Oklahoma 
memorial was that 
By almost every professional standard, Spreiregen was right. Victims' 
families can't be expected to make a knowing judgment about what 
constitutes the best public memorial. Giving them control would seem 
to be a concession to a kind of victims' culture, elevating sentiment 
over any other value. In the end, however, [task force chairman Bob] 
Johnson's gamble that he could trust the families proved to be right, in 
large part because the mission statement set forth a program for the 
memorial that made the kitsch that Spreiregen feared almost 
impossible [because] [..] the language of the mission statement was too 
sophisticated for angels and praying hands. 
 
Goldberger’s justification of Spreiregen’s view, and his labeling of 
Oklahoma’s memorialization strategy as a “gamble,” would have been considered 
offensive in the Oklahoma local context (so would have been his views on some of 
the elements of the finalized memorial, which he thought to be overly explicit and 
entertaining.)  
 
Goldberger was not the first journalist to doubt the victim-led strategy. One of 
the earliest and most notable accounts of Oklahoma’s memorialization effort was 
Jesse Katz’s April 19, 1997 Los Angeles Times piece, “Memorial: A Driving Need for 
Catharsis.”  In this lengthy and detailed piece, published on the occasion of the 
attack’s second anniversary, Katz addressed a question that the local Oklahoma press 
could not have acknowledged: Was the memorialization process progressing too 
quickly, and did it suffer from the overwhelming influence of victims’ emotions? 
Could a slower process produce a memorial that would present a clearer-sighted 






the underlying principles of the process – memorialization as therapy – Katz 
underscored the Oklahoma press’s ideological and professional shortcomings. A 
monument, he argued, had to begin with a long wait, "long enough for the painful act 
to be cast in a patriotic or heroic light." But the victims needed to act immediately and 
immerse themselves in memorialization, because, as a bereaved Oklahoma mother 
was quoted as saying in the piece, "we're desperately searching for some sense out of 
the senselessness, and this is one way we can find that." 
 
None of the professionals quoted in Katz’s piece had appeared in the 
Oklahoman or the Journal Record.  While this is predictable with respect to sources 
such as New York professors, it is less so with respect to the University of Oklahoma 
history professor, William W. Savage, who observed in Katz’s piece that the 
Oklahoma community was developing an unhealthy fetish for the tragedy in the form 
of an overly grand memorial.  Savage’s opinions never found their way to the pages 
of the local press. 
 
The fact that Katz was not a local reporter, but a distant critic at the Los 
Angeles Times, allowed him to write about the far-off events in Oklahoma with more 
than a hint of cynicism.  Describing the design competition entries, he noted that 
many 
 
took very literal note of the blast's numerology, proposing 
centerpieces with 168 pillars, 168 flags, 168 trees, 168 fallen 
logs, 168 fountains, 168 wishing wells, 168 garden plots and 






"the breath of the blowing wind." One offered a bell tower with 
168 different chimes, rising from an acrylic pool with broken 
children's toys molded into the plastic water. 
 
The Oklahoman and the Journal Record never itemized the numerically based 
proposals.  They would never risk the trivialization that might be associated with such 
enumeration. 
 
While the Oklahoma City bombing was and still is considered an eminent 
chapter in the history of American political mass-crime, second only to September 11, 
2001, the coverage of the Oklahoma memorialization effort reveals a difference in 
perspective between local and national coverage, with the national press 
demonstrating an approach less committed to the victims than the local press.  This 
distinction between local and national coverage did not characterize the coverage of 
the memorialization of September 11, 2001, hence the phrase “We are all New 
Yorkers.” But as 9/11 victims’ involvement in the planning of Ground Zero was 
becoming institutionalized, the New York press was the first to express unease with 




During the 10 years that passed between 9/11 and the inauguration of the 
National September 11 Memorial and Museum, the gaping hole at the place where the 






2001, has come to symbolize more than the horror and death that befell on New York 
City that day.  For years, that hole also represented paralysis.  The ongoing 
confrontations between landowners, government agencies and 9/11 victims created a 
continuous near-deadlock in the planning and construction process of Ground Zero. 
As Deborah Sontag wrote in a September 11
th
 New York Times 2006 anniversary 
piece, “The combination of big money, prime real estate, bottomless grief, artistic ego 
and dreams of legacy transformed ground zero into a mosh pit of stakeholders 
banging heads over billions in federal aid, tax breaks and insurance proceeds.”30 
 
Ground Zero was probably the most politically explosive memorialization 
project in modern United States history.  Unlike the Vietnam War Memorial in 
Washington, which similarly sanctified victims of an international conflict, the newly 
constructed Ground Zero site had to address the World Trade Center’s iconic past as 
the financial center of the world and a New York—albeit not necessarily celebrated—
architectural landmark.  The new complex was expected to revivify that past to the 
extent possible and to revitalize downtown Manhattan. At the same time, the 
memorial and the museum within it had to offer an interpretation of the consequences 
of September 11
th
, 2001.  To name one challenging aspect, the memorial complex had 
been oftentimes called to offer an honest assessment of the American antiterrorism 
and military responses to September 11, including such hotly-debated topics as the 
Patriot Act, the War in Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps even the CIA’s “black 
sites” and the torture at Abu Ghraib.  With time, as new chapters of anti-Western 
terrorism were being written, and as American troop deployment in the Middle East 
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continued, the interpretive burden on the September 11
th
 memorial—to those who 
held that expectation from memorialization—became ever heavier.  
 
The design competition to rebuild the site and the towers included 
opportunities for the public to participate in the various choices involved. The 
immensity and complexity of the task, combined with the general invitation for public 
participation, brought 9/11 family members to unite and form organizations that 
pursued specific purposes, large and small, within the site, such as a park or the 
separation of the firefighters’ names from those of the civilian victims on the name 
walls.  There can be no doubt as to the most important 9/11 families’ memorialization 
campaign, in that it had the most influence on the ideological framework of the site.  
This was the battle won by a families’ organization called Take Back the Memorial, 
when it succeeded in the summer of 2005 in irrevocably cancelling the construction of 
the planned International Freedom Center (IFC) within the memorial complex. The 
IFC battle will be contrasted in this chapter with another pivotal battle that involved 
9/11 families, the national dispute over Park51, the Islamic cultural complex to be 
built two blocks away from Ground Zero. The changes in the social attitudes toward 
9/11 victims in the past decade reflect the different roles that the victims have been 










The IFC dispute 
 
The idea for the IFC—the International Freedom Center—was conceived 
shortly after the attacks by the New York investor Tom A. Bernstein.  The IFC was 
meant to complement the memorial and the museum.  While both of the latter were to 
tell the story of September 11, the IFC’s focus would have been the larger theme of 
freedom.  Freedom, argued Bernstein, was the fundamental ideal of the United States; 
freedom, interpreted by hard-core Islamists as Western nihilism, was the ideological 
target of the perpetrators of the attacks.  The IFC would insist on America’s 
commitment to freedom through exhibitions that would illustrate pivotal chapters in 
the history of the ideal, such as the abolition of slavery, as well as current struggles 
for independence worldwide.  The Ground Zero site would further demonstrate the 
theme of freedom through its most central project, the Freedom Tower, designed by 
Daniel Libeskind. 
 
Initially, the IFC and the philosophy behind it were welcomed by the Bush 
administration and New York’s governing and political elites.  In June 2004, the IFC, 
together with the Joyce Theater, the Drawing Center and the Signature Theater 
Company, were selected from more than 100 competing cultural institutions to 
occupy the memorial complex.  The IFC continued to materialize through the 
selection of an architectural design.  But while the IFC seemed to be underway, 
victims’ opposition began to surface, both in meetings with the various government 








Figure 13: The chosen International Freedom Center design plan by Snohetta 
 
The IFC dispute was the most victim-dominated political battle over Ground 
Zero. There were other important battles, such as the insistence of 9/11 families that 
the footprints of the towers remain empty. Indeed, the reflecting pools in Michael 
Arad’s design conformed to this principle, powerfully combining the symbolic powers 
of Foote’s most dramatic memorialization responses, sanctification and obliteration. 
Nevertheless, 9/11 families took part in the IFC dispute much more than the New 
York public, and the struggle underscored the families’ claim of ideological 







As in my examination of other memorial projects in this chapter, here too, I 
was looking to assess the journalistic attitude toward the 9/11 family members 
involved in the IFC dispute within the framework of the Experience-Argument Scale.  
Specifically, I was looking to evaluate the tension between journalistic deference to 
the victims and adherence to the ideal of objectivity.  For this purpose, I examined the 
full coverage of the IFC dispute in the New York Post and the Daily News.  Being 
quintessential New York papers—long-established tabloids that compete fiercely for 
mainly working-class and ethnic readers in the outer boroughs—these publications 
were inclined to reflect the strongest sentiment toward the events of 9/11 and the 
victims, and to be in the most difficult position to criticize the victims.  As a contrast, 
I also surveyed the coverage in the more elite, nationally focused New York Times.  
 
The political partisanship that underlined the dispute made the New York 
papers’ job ever more difficult.  This was not only about family members who wished 
for a certain memorial design.  This was about family members who rejected a 




The planning of the IFC took place over a period of almost four years, from 
early 2002 until the summer of 2005.  Attacks by 9/11 family members over the IFC 
began very late in the process, in June 2005 (a year after it was selected), but 
nevertheless the ensuing war was brief, leading to the IFC’s demise within an 
astonishingly short period of two months.  The first 9/11 family member to publicly 
criticize the IFC was Debra Burlingame, sister of Charles "Chic" Burlingame, the 






11.  In June 2005, Burlingame, who served as member of the board of directors of the 
World Trade Center Memorial Foundation, contributed an op-ed piece to the Wall 
Street Journal, in which she claimed that the IFC was a far-left, anti-patriotic Trojan 
horse.
31
  She warned that  
 
rather than a respectful tribute to our individual and collective 
loss, they [visitors to Ground Zero] will get a slanted history 
lesson, a didactic lecture on the meaning of liberty in a post-
9/11 world. They will be served up a heaping foreign policy 
discussion over the greater meaning of Abu Ghraib and what it 
portends for the country and the rest of the world. 
 
All of that, argued Burlingame, would serve to obscure the real purpose of the 
site, that of commemorating the dead.  She ended her piece asking, "Ground Zero has 
been stolen, right from under our noses. How do we get it back?" Debra Burlingame’s 
piece, published by the prominent and well-respected Wall Street Journal, was 
immediately echoed by a group of 9/11 family members, expressly affiliated with a 
small families’ organization called Take Back the Memorial.  Although Take Back the 
Memorial comprised of a core of no more than two-dozen family member activists, it 
succeeded in portraying itself at that early point in the process as the voice of the 
victims, as no other victim family members tried to change that frame.  Seizing the 
momentum spurred by Burlingame’s piece, Take Back the Memorial held that same 
month an anti-IFC protest at Ground Zero. The morning of the demonstration, the 
New York Post announced that a “Rally will Hit ‘Blame U.S’ Exhibit.”32 
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In what seemed to be a direct result of this effort, then-New York Governor George 
Pataki and other government officials began expressing doubts over the IFC’s 
mission. New York Senator Dem. Hillary Rodham Clinton, reported the New York 
Post, stated unequivocally that as far as Ground Zero was concerned, the families had 
to be satisfied.
33
  Clinton, who as a Democrat would perhaps have been expected to 
support the IFC, chose to support the families’ objections. 
 
At a time when he was supposed to celebrate the materialization of his vision, 
Tom Bernstein was suddenly put in a position where he had to defend the 
fundamental idea of the project.  A mere month after Burlingame’s op-ed piece, the 
Daily News’ headline ran “WTC Museum Not Anti-U.S., Boss Vows.”34 Three weeks 
later, on July 31, 2005, a Daily News editorial, titled “Taking Back Ground Zero” – a 
headline clearly echoing “Take Back the Memorial” – asked: "Hallowed ground? Yes. 
Public Square? No.  The Freedom Center cannot entertain intellectual free-for-alls and 
guarantee the sanctity of the site."   
 
The strength of the anti-IFC victim-led message was such that it succeeded in 
leading the Daily News to object to the IFC’s capacity as a discussion forum.  
Paradoxically, the paper was in the odd position of advocating for limited freedom of 
speech in Ground Zero.  
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All the while, New York tabloids were not behaving as an adequate forum 
themselves as far as the future of the IFC was concerned.  The Daily News in its 
editorials repeatedly stood by Take Back the Memorial, pushing Tom Bernstein to 
desperate promises that the museum would never denigrate America.  Not only did 
the paper never give Bernstein an opportunity to convince New Yorkers that the 
museum was an ethical, non-political institution appropriate for the site, but it also 
avoided extending the forum beyond the predictable triangle of Take back the 
Memorial members, government officials and Tom Bernstein himself.   
 
The Post similarly celebrated the opposition to the IFC. It ran more than 20 
editorials against it, and many of its “hard news” pieces featured the family member-
activists’ side, and that side only,35 in the most provocative terms, such as “Let the 
‘Blame America’ crowd find another spot. Hey, what about somewhere in Iran?” said 
Church Parish of Oakhurst, Calif.” 
 
The generally acknowledged political differences between the left-leaning 
Daily News and the right-leaning New York Post did not play a role in this case, where 
both publications adamantly supported the anti-IFC line.  What was markedly missing 
from the IFC coverage by these publications were the independent voices of 
academics, human rights activists, plain New Yorkers or any other group who could 
have provided broader perspectives on the topic. To be sure, the press’s immediate 
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support for Take Back the Memorial also reflected the fact that the political 
establishment was not divided on this issue, as both New York Republican and 
Democratic leaders stated that the consent of 9/11 families in this matter was 
paramount. Eventually, the IFC was formally cancelled in August 2005.  
 
 Take Back the Memorial’s victory over the International Freedom Center took 
place at a time when the press were almost, although not yet, ready to examine claims 
of 9/11 families with criticism. Throughout 2006, as New Yorkers were beginning to 
lose their patience with the constant delays in the Ground Zero rebuilding process, 
9/11 family members were increasingly scrutinized for vetoing any design for the site 
that endowed it with broader meaning than the mass grave of their loved ones.  
 
Indeed, at the pivotal moment of the cancellation of the IFC, in August 2005, 
New York journalists had not been ready yet to evaluate the IFC dispute with the 
same notion of balance that characterized day-to-day political journalism.  And when 
that moment arrived, somewhere in 2006, when time had taken its toll on the victims’ 
authority and the local press was finally ready to question the victims’ claims with 
respect to the IFC, it was already too late for the IFC to achieve reconsideration.  This 
is not to say, that lessened deference to the victims in an earlier phase of the debate 
would have necessarily reversed the fate of the IFC.  Rather, the point here is that the 
delay in the restoration of professional norms meant that a meaningful, timely public 







While my examination centered on the Daily News and the New York Post, I 
surveyed the New York Times’ coverage as well to learn how this elite publication, 
which caters national readership and is widely considered the U.S.s’ “paper of 
record,” navigated the IFC dispute. The Times’ coverage was similar to that of the 
tabloids in one respect, in that the IFC saga was treated as a “dispute” between 
existing “sides.” The Times did not enrich the debate with views of potentially 
independent thinkers, such as directors of similar museums, historians or memorial 
design specialists. 
 
Despite this limitation, the Times’s coverage of the dispute was more balanced 
than the tabloids’, and provided Tom Bernstein with greater opportunities to express 
his vision and his hopes that the center would ultimately materialize.
36
 The New York 
Times also attributed the family members with a lesser role in the cancellation of the 
IFC, and chose to frame the debate in general, non-political terms, rather than the 
tabloids’ “victims vs. Bernstein” or “left vs. right” frames. In a typical September 29, 
2005 piece, the Times reported that 
 
A growing number of critics—whom Mr. Pataki was trying to 
mollify—contended that the center would take away space that 
could be used for a museum devoted solely to 9/11 and that it 
would detract from the solemnity of the memorial by focusing 
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This interpretation of Take Back the Memorial’s position was a generous one 
in the sense that it did not frame their opposition as “political”, but as “moral.” While 
Debra Burlingame and Take Back the Memorial were clearly and consistently 
expressing their concerns that the founders of the IFC would form it in their liberal 
image and that the resulting institution would come out as anti-patriotic, the Times’s 
coverage nevertheless distanced the entire debate from political partisanship.  In a 
way, by denying them their self-proclaimed political frame of reference, the New York 
Times was displaying a unique form of deference to the Take Back the Memorial’s 
family member-victims.   
 
The provisional nature of deference 
 
 The cancellation of the IFC in November of 2005 triggered, for the first time, 
open criticisms of the victims. The most accusatory of them was Robert Kolker’s New 
York Magazine piece “The Grief Police.”38 Like the Times, New York Magazine had a 
loyal hometown base and did a lot of “service” journalism, and similarly to the Times, 
it strived for a credible national presence with investigative and political pieces. The 
national dimensions of these publications allowed them, given the passage of the 
adequate time from September 11, to be the first to abandon the deferential 
perspective and to dare and criticize family members.  
 
 In “The Grief Police,” Kolker described Take Back the Memorial in 
                                                           






unprecedentedly harsh terms, as a "self-interested obstructionist force that could hold 
up Ground Zero's progress for years, banishing any sign of cultural life downtown – 
except, perhaps, for the culture of mourning." 
 
 Kolker’s piece signaled the end of the “grace,” protective period that the 
American press granted 9/11 victims. Deborah Sontag, for example, could comment 
in a 2006 anniversary piece dedicated to the continuing problems in Ground Zero, 
titled “The Hole in the City Heart,”39 that [family members] "have come to be seen by 
some community, business and redevelopment leaders as impediments to progress. 
Some view the advocates as self-appointed and unrepresentative; others, in private 
conversations, describe them heatedly as radical or loopy or desperate for attention." 
 
The victims’ diminishing visibility in the Ground Zero context underscored a 
shift from journalistic deference to level-headedness and even criticism, conveying an 
important lesson: nobody, not even victims of political violence, is invulnerable to the 
sobering effects of time.  
 
 Derailing the IFC, for example, was Take Back the Memorial’s most 
considerable and last success. The organization’s later public campaign, to call off 
Michael Arad’s belowground memorial in favor of a much larger street-level 
memorial center, did not meet the same spirit of deference and failed.  
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2010: The Park51 Muslim Community Center 
 
When the battle over the planned Muslim community center—known as 
“Park51” or the Cordoba House project—erupted in May 2010, it became clear that 
not only was the ideological war over Ground Zero far from over, its scope was also 
widening.  Geographically, remembrance was now seen as expanding beyond the 
Ground Zero site to the entire Lower Manhattan area. It also concerned a wider range 
of values: this was not the case of family members claiming a personalized, victim-
based memorial, nor was this a conflict along the lines of the IFC dispute, between a 
so-called “American” vs. a universal interpretation of September 11. Rather, Park51 
raised explosive questions about the legitimacy of and the tolerance to Islam in a post-
9/11 United States. 
 
The controversy began when Muslim-American leader and Imam Feisal Abdul 
Rauf presented before the Lower Manhattan Community Board his plan for a 13-story 
Muslim Community Center at 51 Park St., two blocks from Ground Zero. The idea of 
a Muslim institution in such close proximity to the Ground Zero site induced massive 
and fierce opposition, mostly from the political right. Opponents took particular 
offense at the fact that the proposed center included a mosque—they dubbed the entire 
project “the Ground Zero Mosque”—and expressed outrage at the idea that the 
Ground Zero area would host an institution celebrating Islam, the same religion in 







For a while, the Park51 project seemed to have weathered its opposition. It 
succeeded in obtaining all necessary official approvals, as well as explicit 
endorsements by New York mayor Michael Bloomberg and, on August 14
th
 2010, by 
President Obama. Nevertheless, the unrelenting opposition led the projects’ leaders to 
reconsider its location as well as its mission—to date, they have opened the center at 
the existing Park51 building but have not begun construction work on the new and 
bigger facility—and it is unclear whether the project, in its planned form, will 




The Park51 controversy, despite its much higher profile, shared important 
similarities with the IFC dispute.  Both involved a conflict between those who wanted 
to limit the 9/11 story to the brutal attack on the US by Islamic extremism (a vision of 
a monument that concentrated on the American experience of the attack; a downtown 
Manhattan that was free of any site celebrating Islam) and those who wished for a 
more expansive narrative that accommodated larger themes and constituencies (a 
museum that drew comparisons between 9/11 and international experiences; a 
downtown Manhattan that accommodated Islamic institutions of worship).  Both the 
IFC and the Park51 disputes were similarly delineated by partisan lines.  
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And, both conflicts, five years apart, involved the morally charged voices of 
9/11 family members and 9/11 families’ organizations. But while in 2005 the public 
was exposed only to those family members who fought the IFC in the name of so-
called patriotism, the coverage of the Park51 controversy offered a variety of victims’ 
opinions. In 2010, there was no single person, group or organization that could be 
taken as representative of the 9/11 families population. As Talking Points Memo 
(TPM) editor Josh Marshall explained in his August 15, 2010 Editor’s Blog: 41   
 
Since almost three thousand people died as a result of the 
attacks, many thousands count as family members of the dead. 
And given that the public at large is at best divided over the 
mosque question and likely on balance against it, it stands to 
figure that there's a similar spectrum of opinion among these 
families. Yet I have not seen any clear evidence that as a group 
these people are against the Cordoba House project. 
 
Although some victim-protagonists of the IFC dispute were also active here, 
this time they faced a more complicated environment that resisted domination by a 
single group or voice, and journalists—such as Josh Marshall— who were sensitive to 
the diversity of opinion within the family members’ population. Debra Burlingame, 
for example, the IFC’s most conspicuous opponent, assumed a leading, vocal role 
against the Park51 initiative.
42
  Most New York news publications granted her anti-
Park51 message considerable exposure, similar to that that characterized her anti-IFC 






 Ms. Burlingame posted a statement explaining her objections to Park51 in a website of the 
organization that she had co-founded, “9/11 families for Safe and Strong America.” This organization 
was part of the “Coalition to Honor Ground Zero,” “a coalition of American citizens who are deeply 








campaign.  Indeed, the Wall Street Journal did not publish a Burlingame op-ed piece 
this time, but when it reported on President’s Obama’s endorsement of Park51 it 
quoted Burlingame within that story as saying that “this president has abandoned the 
American people.”43  The New York Post, which repeatedly expressed unequivocal 
objection to Park51, presented Burlingame regularly as a source of angry opposition. 
When it reported on the Muslim Center’s bid for federal funds, Burlingame was 
quoted as arguing that "this [was] federal money, it was not intended to fund a 
propaganda issue."
44
 And she was also critical of Mayor Bloomberg in a Post 
investigation of what the paper termed “cozy” relationship between the Mayor’s staff 




Burlingame was similarly featured in the Daily News.  Like the Post, the Daily 
News objected Park51. In an unusual piece, the Daily News set out to find alternative 
Lower Manhattan locations for Park 51. Burlingame refused to approve any of the 
suggested sites, explaining that “you had destruction from river to river… People had 
body parts on their windowsills... The idea that you can just mark off an area and say, 
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But differently than in the IFC coverage, Burlingame’s message was now 
contrasted by the dissenting voices of fellow victims. One was former U.S Solicitor 
General Ted Olson, a 9/11 widower, who expressed support for the Park51 project on 
the basis of religious freedom. The Daily News reported on Olson’s position, 
describing him as an “unlikely source” of support for President Obama in the matter.47 
Olson may have been noted as an “unlikely” supporter of Park51 because of his 
conservative politics, but perhaps also because he was a victim, and as such, had been 
automatically assumed to belong to Park51’s opposition. 
 
Park51 also gained the public support of the 9/11 families’ organization 
September 11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows, which existed at the time of the IFC 
dispute but did not take an active role in it. Peaceful Tomorrows will be described in 
detail in Chapter 4, as it has been the leading 9/11 families-oriented anti-war group. 
The political leanings of the Daily News the New York Post may have prevented them 
from accommodating an organization that believed in the peace making power of the 
dialogue between 9/11 victims and civilian victims of violence worldwide, including 
victims of American military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Post did, 
however, publish a pro-Park51 opinion piece by Peaceful Tomorrows member Adele 
Welty.
48
 But even without the help of New York tabloids, Peaceful Tomorrow’s 
message found its way to the Huffington Post and Salon.com.  If 9/11 relatives had 
been assumed thus far to be associated with a view of Ground Zero as solely 
dedicated to the victims, and as particularly sensitive to patriotic notions, Ted Olson 
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and Peaceful Tomorrows proved it wrong. Dona Marsh O’Connor, the National 
Spokesperson for Peaceful Tomorrows explained in a Huffington Post column that 
when people justified their positions by the “sensitivities of the 9/11 families,” they 
should have asked themselves— 
what about the sensitivities of families like mine and hundreds of 
others who join me in supporting the Islamic Center? Are our loved 
ones somehow less worthy than those of family members who oppose 
its construction? I am sensitive to what I believe is a threat to religious 
freedom, to the First Amendment, to our hallowed Constitution. I am 
sensitive to the notion that, in the name of my daughter, an entire 





The left-leaning Huffington Post also brought forth another pro-Park51 novel 
perspective, and that of 9/11 Muslim family members, who expressed anger at their 




While the tabloids presented more varied perspectives of 9/11 victims than 
they had done previously, the New York Times’s Park51 coverage demonstrated a 
more dramatic change, as far as the victims were concerned. While in 2005 the Times 
reported extensively on Burlingame’s opposition to the IFC, it hardly mentioned her 
opposition to Park51. In fact, the Times coverage generally overlooked the victims. 
This suggests that almost ten years after 9/11, the power of the victims—as far as the 
New York Times was concerned—had eroded to a point where they were no longer 
seen as an indispensable feature of Ground Zero coverage. With time, their image had 
                                                           
49
 Donna Marsh O’Connor, The Sensitivities of 9/11 Families, The Huffington Post, September 9, 2010 
50
 Omar Sacirbey, Another Wound for 9/11 Muslims Who Lost Loved Ones on September 11, The 






been tainted by proclamations of political convictions, by overt alliances with political 
players, and perhaps by the suspicion that they had turned into “professional” victims.   
 
When the Times outlined the contending forces in the Park51 debate, family 
members were mostly absent and instead of possible incarnations of Take Back the 
Memorial, the most vociferous dissent seemed to have come from “conservative 
bloggers.” Indeed, in the years that passed since the domination of victims over the 
IFC dispute, the growing blogosphere allowed the cultivation of a new class of 
bloggers, whose private-persons-turned-activists role partially overlapped with the 
one formerly reserved to the victims.  
 
Like victims, bloggers were perceived as having no professional stake and no 
motive besides sheer public mindedness and an ambition to influence public 
policymaking.  But unlike victims, who spoke in personal terms and whose arguments 
assumed the validity of sacrifice and grief, bloggers had the privilege of speaking on 
behalf of an unequivocally identified and often celebrated political identity.  Bloggers 
saved journalists from the dilemmas that came with victims’ coverage: the temptation 
and reluctance to expose victims’ partisanship and the fear of unseemly journalistic 
criticism.  Indeed, as I will explore in detail in Chapter 4, victims typically employed 
a “mom discourse” (Eliasoph, 1998) in a conscious or unconscious effort to deflect 
dissent (e.g. “my late husband wouldn’t want this country to…”), while bloggers freed 







In its Park51 coverage, the Times paid particular attention—including an 
extensive profile piece
51—to Pamela Geller, a Manhattan conservative blogger who 
was becoming the face of the Park51 opposition. The Executive Director of “Stop 
Islamization of America,” Geller displayed a flamboyant public persona and became a 
constant news television commentator in a way that many compared to that of Ann 
Coulter.  She was, allegedly, responsible for branding Park51 “the Ground Zero 
Mega-Mosque.”  
 
Ultimately, the coverage of Ground Zero-related disputes until the 
inauguration of the memorial complex in September 11
th
, 2011, demonstrated the 
diminishing power of 9/11 victims.  The fact that the victims spoke in multiple voices 
exacerbated this process. Where they once used to produce a seemingly monolithic 
message that exerted commanding moral force, with time different victims expressed 
different positions and their press presence was mostly symbolic: they provided 
support and legitimacy to the more considerable forces in the final stages of the 
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Terrorism is a means to achieve visibility, win recognition, demonstrate the weakness 
of the attacked community, and in the case of hostage situations, to advance a specific 
tactical cause, most commonly ransom or a prisoner exchange deal. 
 
Hostage situations, violent political dramas as they are, are considered the 
epitome of newsworthiness. This is a carefully planned type of newsworthiness, as the 
perpetrators want—or rather, need—to effectively communicate their multi-layered 






and structure their acts in a way that aspires to accord with the prevalent news criteria 
of a targeted media system (in their best case, international media).  
 
The hostage crisis plays on the universal attraction to human drama. Nacos 
(2007) demonstrated this point using one particularly visible hostage crisis, the Abu 
Sayyaf kidnapping of 10 international tourists, some of them German nationals, and 
their confinement in the Philippine island of Jolo in the summer of 2000. "Providing 
much more drama, suspense, and human interest than Survivor or Big Brother," wrote 
Nacos, "this reality show was offered, in one version or another, on literally all of 
Germany’s television and radio channels and in the print media as well" (p. 86). 
 
The hostage drama is intensified because so few outcomes are possible.  The 
perpetrators may reach their frustration point, kill the hostages and disappear; a 
successful negotiation process may secure the hostages’ release; a heroic rescue 
operation may free the hostages, preferably with the perpetrators caught alive and 
brought to justice, and a failed rescue operation would end with a killing field. These 
typical, anticipated possible endings lend the hostage situation its brutal simplicity 
and make it a good, coherent story.  To augment the drama even further, perpetrators 
prefer locations that already have media presence or are easily accessible by the 
media, and they may also aim for a victim population (or an individual victim) whose 







The responsibility over the fate of the captured hostage lies with the 
government of his or her country, according to formal nationality criteria, or with the 
local government of the location in which he or she is being held. Usually, one of 
these states has the power to set the terms as of how to handle the situation, including 
the choice of whether to be in the forefront of the crisis, or whether to seem as a silent 
partner to the other. Whichever state is in charge of the situation, it must first decide 
its measure of overt and covert responsibility over the hostage, and devise its release 
strategy accordingly. The core dilemma that characterizes hostage situations is 
whether to negotiate with the terrorists or not. If negotiations succeed, the freedom of 
the hostage comes with a heavy price: 
 
The argument against negotiating with terrorists is simple: Democracies must 
never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. 
Negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermine 
actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Talks can 
destabilize the negotiating government’s political systems, undercut 
international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent 
(Neumann, 2007:128) 
 
Management of a hostage crisis is an improvised decision-making process, as 
there are no set rules, or prescribed scenarios, that help regulate the way in which a 
state should handle it.
1
 Even the “negotiation or no negotiation” dichotomy is not 
necessarily a dichotomy: while the Israeli government (through the Egyptian 
government) and the PLO were negotiating the release of the Jewish and Israeli 
hostages held in the Entebbe airport in July 1976, the Israeli government was already 
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planning the commando raid in which seven hostage-takers were eventually killed, 
102 hostages were released and four hostages died. The government’s freedom to 
manage the crisis as it deems fit, including the option to ignore the crisis and leave the 
hostages for their own devices, turns the public debate about the proper government 
strategy into a particularly contested field.  
 
Modern terrorism, namely political violence committed during the second half 
of the 20
th
 century, introduced an increase in high profile kidnappings, largely due to 
two technological advancements that were beneficial to the terrorist endeavor.  The 
first was the growth of commercial aviation, which allowed terrorists to coerce groups 
of victims, who bore the particular and desired national identity, into convenient 
locations, thus diminishing the control of the targeted nation over the situation. In 
addition, the growing sophistication and prevalence of communication equipment 
allowed for the visibility of the crises wherever they occurred. For example, hostage 
takers of the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics took advantage of the 
newly introduced television satellites that were designated to transmit the games to a 
world-wide audience; and in 1985, Hezbollah sent a videotaped recording of the 
captured CIA agent William Buckley to western news agencies, introducing a method 
that would soon become standard practice in hostage cases. 
 
Examining coverage of anti-American terrorism between 1980 and 1993, 
Nacos (1994) argued that terrorists operating abroad succeeded in circumventing the 
American-centered coverage that characterized domestic attacks. Perpetrators of 






a deeper contextual emphasis on the regional conflicts in which they were involved 
and on their political agenda. Clearly, the hostage taking of American citizens outside 
the U.S. (whether in Beirut, the Philippines, or through U.S. airline hijackings) was, 
from the perspective of terrorists, more viable than attacks on U.S. soil, and generated 
more global media coverage. 
 
The widespread fascination with hostage crises has been well explored and 
theorized by academia, which occasionally criticized news organizations for 
overplaying the drama and inadvertently serving the hostage takers. Indeed, the 
conflict and stress that are inherent in the situation, the complex psychology of the 
hostage-captor relationship, the ongoing agony and anger of the hostages’ families 
and the excruciating dilemmas that present themselves to the crisis managers present a 
mix of action-film, thriller and reality show drama that seems import itself from the 
realm of Hollywood entertainment into the realm of news. 
 
One strand of scholarship explored the mythical, theatrical qualities of the 
hostage crisis and provided dramaturgical analyses of the hostage scene. One of the 
first illustrations of terrorism as a case of media seduction was offered by John 
Bowyer Bell in his short 1978 essay “Terrorist Scripts and Live Action Spectaculars” 
in the Columbia Journalism Review, where he portrayed the dramatic elements of the 
spectacular terrorism of the 1970s.  The essay provided a vivid, almost cinematic 
account of the way that the media at the 1972 Munich hostage crisis were playing into 
the hands of the terrorists: The Olympic compound was fully equipped with up-to-






cameramen; the Olympic games provided an opportunity for the Black September 
terrorists to disrupt a peaceful multi-national event and bring worldwide attention to 
the plight of the Palestinian people; but most importantly, the hostage drama 
presented, for the first time, real, live violence with an uncertain outcome. In its final 
phase, it included a change of scenery, as the cameras followed the bus that drove the 
terrorists and the hostages to the Munich-Riem airport (Bell 1978: 48-50).  In his 
writing, Bell (1931-2003), an American terrorism expert who was also a painter and 
an art critic, drew on his artistic sensibilities to extract the most gripping elements of 
the Munich crisis and juxtapose them with descriptions of eager, rushing journalists.  
When describing the “terrorist script” of the 1976 Entebbe hostage crisis, Bell 
appreciated the fact that the Israeli raid provided an unexpected turn to the story.  
Terrorism gave the best quality news, but when the terrorists lost control over the 
situation, it became even better. Or in Bell's words, "what made the Israeli commando 
raid on Entebbe Airport doubly dramatic was that the terrorists had not written in that 
role; they were as stunned as would be a theater audience if Hamlet refused to die or 
Macbeth won out in the last act" (Bell 1978: 49). 
 
Studies that conducted a methodical comparison of the scope of media 
attention granted to various types of attacks were able to discern the elements that 
were particularly attractive.  Jenkins, in a somewhat cold-blooded study, argued that 
hostage situations elicited more coverage than bombings, despite the fact that they 
culminated in fewer casualties than bombings, because the hostage crisis was a 






bombing], even many deaths, are news for only a few days. They lack suspense and 
are soon forgotten” (Jenkins 1978: 119). 
 
Another strand of scholarship reviewed media coverage of hostage situations 
from a political science perspective that focused on public opinion and its political 
implications. Nacos (1994), for example, recognized the potentially deleterious effects 
of hostage situations on the stability of the government of the attacked community.  
The Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1980, for example, impaired President Carter’s 
leadership to the degree that he lost the 1980 reelections (Nacos, 1994: 28-29, 80).
2
 In 
retrospect, Nacos (2007) believes, President Carter was judged too harshly, and was 
not sufficiently appreciated for bringing the hostages home safely, as well as for the 
fact that no hostage was harmed during the almost 15 months of the crisis (except for 
one U.S. serviceman, killed in an accident during a failed rescue operation). 
 
The hostage drama involves three circles of victimhood: the direct victims are 
the captive individuals, the hostages, who are often hidden from view, their 
whereabouts unknown, and their voice rarely heard. Their victimization means the 
indirect yet brutal victimization of their families. Relatives of hostages are considered 
“secondary victims,” who fully qualify as “victims,” here and elsewhere in this 
dissertation, as they are the hostages’ extensions and representatives, emotionally and 
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also practically. Family members work with, or against, the relevant governments, and 
sometimes achieve dialogue with the hostage takers, in order to secure the release of 
their loved ones. Family members are situated in the eye of the media storm. The third 
circle of victimhood involves the national or otherwise defined group from which the 
hostages were selected.  
 
This dissertation focuses on the hostages’ families, and much less on the 
hostages themselves. This is because the journalistic treatment of the hostages is 
bound to be enthusiastic and compassionate, reflecting the collective concern over 
their well-being.  Any sign of life or communication from them achieves media 
dominance, a fact that is well known to the captors, who strategically release videos 
and photos of hostages to keep negotiations alive and increase their bargaining power. 
The families, however, are in a more vulnerable place. As the crisis prolongs, and as 
information about the hostages becomes scarce and chances for their safe return 
decrease, family members are susceptible to the gradual loss of public, and media, 
interest.  
 
Nevertheless, family members, along with the hostages themselves, occupy 
the highest-interest incidents in the news repertoire and as national symbols they are 
accorded with deferential journalistic treatment. As ordinary citizens who are 
suddenly, violently, and potentially indefinitely detained by a hostile organization, the 
hostages (and their families) are situated at the deference end of the Experience-
Argument Scale. Their ordeal—the Experience—is taking place in present time, 






convergence between the experience and the task of the victims—namely freedom—
puts them in the most favorable journalistic place. 
 









The 1985 TWA airliner hijacking illustrated this point well. This case may 
well have been the most coverage-intensive hostage crisis in American media, 
dominating the evening network news for the 17 consecutive days of the crisis.  
American network news flew their leading anchorpersons to the hostage scene in 
Beirut to interview the hostages and their families, and to participate in the press 
conference that the Shiite captors organized.   
 
The massive exposure of the crisis and the media’s compliance with the 
hostage takers’ plan became a source of vast criticism, culminating in the decision of 
the United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct Hearings 
on the Media, Diplomacy and Terrorism in the Middle East, which featured the 
testimonies of a variety of military experts, scholars and news professionals (such as 
Ben Bagdikian and Peter Jennings).  Most agreed that the hysterical coverage of the 
Experience 
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Beirut hostage scene pushed the Reagan administration to concede to the terrorists’ 
demands.  Democrat Representative Thomas Luken argued that American media 
"have yet to learn how to avoid serving as the ‘ransom’ that is now paid to terrorists 
who take hostages. Many of the members of the sub-committee are deeply concerned 
about the astonishing spectacle of TV news shows from the Middle East apparently 
co-produced by television and the terrorists." 
 
The TWA hostage crisis required a new conceptualization, within 
communication theory, of the role of the media in times of violent crises. It was this 
incident that led Gabriel Weimann (1987) to suggest that spectacular, live terrorism 
shared major attributes with Katz and Dayan’s media events3 frame, meriting the 
constitution of a fourth media events category that he termed Coercions.
4
  Unlike 
traditional media events, Coercions were pre-produced by terrorists rather than by 
news organizations or the state. As terrorism strove for the world’s attention, it needed 
to employ the most dramatic and commanding form of visual content, and to produce 
a live broadcast that would hijack the scheduled broadcast and coerce audiences into 
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 As in the traditional classifications of Media Events—Contests, Conquests and Coronations—this 
was history in the making; the broadcast created a “being there” impact on the viewing audience, which 
also felt obligated to watch and participate, and the high drama involved heroes and villains (Weimann, 
1987). The various adaptations of the Media Events framework to the 24/7 saturated media landscape 






watching. Hence, a new form of media events, of the pre-planned catastrophe type, 
was newly offered.  
 
The participation of the victims in the live hostage drama answers to an 
important characteristic of media events. The victims and their families strive for the 
return of social order, either by way of a victorious onslaught against the hostage-
takers, or by way of agreeing to their demands. Either way, the victims express the 
collective aspiration for the restoration of peace and normality.  These ambitions echo 
the roles that Katz and Dayan (1992) assigned to media events: 
 
Contests are a training ground for the construction of social institutions based 
on rules (p. 28) […] Like Contests, Coronations proceed according to strict 
rules, dictated by tradition rather than by negotiated agreement (p. 36). 
Coronations remind societies of their cultural heritage, provide reassurance of 
cultural and societal continuity, and invite the public to take stock. […] Unlike 
Contests and Coronations, Conquests tend to break rules. […] The message of 
Conquest is that great men and women still reside among us, and that history 
is in their hands. (p. 37)  
 
Among media events types, hostage situations mostly resemble Contests. 
Indeed, a hostage situation is a violent contest, whereas the victims are the subjects of 
the good vs. evil relationship of the state and the perpetrators. The hostages and their 
relatives typically and publicly express (at the outset of the crisis) trust in the 
government’s crisis management capabilities. In their vote of confidence in a morally 
superior and competent leadership, the victims are important norm-reaffirmation 







With the proliferation and dominance of live mass-mediated mass-violence in 
the past decade, particularly with respect to the game-changing Al-Qaeda attacks in 
New York, Washington, Pennsylvania and later London and Madrid, the scholarly 
need to conceptualize spectacular terrorism within the media events framework 
became ever more pressing. Chapter 1 described how during the 1990s, the media 
events framework was challenged, gradually accommodating the possibility of 
containing “negativity” (for example, James Carey’s Rituals of Excommunication as 
media events that displayed state-sanctioned, institutional humiliation of citizens 
whose actions were seen to challenge social norms), culminating in Katz and Liebes’s 
dramatic afterthought to Media Events in which they finally modified the concept to 
contain the frequently growing media dominance of disaster, war and terror (2007). 
These disruptive media events, however, did not necessarily entail consensus 
reaffirmation. Rather, they presented the state with a leadership challenge, and in 
extreme cases, had the potential of surfacing mass opposition that could lead to the 
overturning of a government.  
 
In a retrospective examination of this alteration of one of the most salient 
theoretical concepts of communication theory of the past 50 years, it is noteworthy 
that the first case that was initially offered as the basis for rethinking media events 
was the 1985 two-week long TWA hostage crisis, which indeed put the Reagan 
administration in an uncomfortable position, reminiscent of the Carter 
administration’s indecisive handling of the Iran hostage crisis. It is much in the hands 
of the hostages’ families to define the crisis, when it is finally resolved, as a 







Case analyses – soldier abductions in the U.S. and Israel 
 
The following discussion will survey two exemplary cases from a particular 
type of hostage situation, the phenomenon of abducted soldiers: Cpl. Gilad Shalit, an 
Israeli soldier who was captured by Hamas in 2006 and held for almost five and a half 
years, and Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, an American soldier abducted by the Afghan Taliban 
in 2009. The circumstances of these two abductions were quite similar, as both 
soldiers, who were in their early 20s when captured, were held for long periods of 
time as bargaining chips for a potential prisoner exchange deal.  Both were held in 
unknown locations controlled by their captor-organizations, with the occasional, and 
scarce, sign of life. In Gilad Shalit’s case, Israel and Hamas reached a deal that 
secured his eventual return in October 2011. As of this writing in 2014, Bowe 
Bergdahl is still held in captivity.   
 
The inclusion of the coverage of abducted soldiers within a dissertation about 
journalistic attitudes toward political activism of terrorism victims requires addressing 
the following definitional difficulty: How could hostile acts against soldiers fit within 
a discussion of terrorism victims? Organized violence, perpetrated by quasi-military 
organizations against soldiers in their active line of duty, is typically labeled as 
“insurgency,” “guerilla activity” or “war,” not “terrorism.” Once the victim, according 
to this traditional distinction, is a military individual rather than a civilian, the term 







This question would raise serious difficulty were this dissertation grounded in 
a legal or political science frame of reference and applying those disciplines’ 
terminology.  However, this is not the case here. This dissertation is grounded in the 
cultural study of communication, and explores the journalistic manifestations of 
certain features in the collective identity and in the accepted belief system. The 
premise of this dissertation is that communities hold victims of political violence in a 
heroic, cherished place, which the media reflect and validate. As the following 
sections will illustrate, in Israel, the victimhood that draws the most extreme 
manifestations of solidarity and angst is that of abducted soldiers. Abducted soldiers, 
as the Shalit case illustrates perfectly, are perceived as child-victims, first in the 
hierarchy of victims. So for all intents and purposes of this dissertation, cases of 
abducted soldiers apply, and should be similarly examined through the Experience-
Argument Scale, as they elicit the same journalistic behaviors and challenges as cases 




As the Israeli and American cultures differ in their collective attitudes toward 
the military and its soldiers, as well as in the relationships between the national press, 
the government and the military leadership, these differences account for the degree 
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of journalistic commitment to the abducted soldiers’ cause and provide insights into 
the different psychological and operational modes of the two news-media systems.  
 
Gilad Shalit—an extraordinary exchange deal 
 
October 18th 2011, the day of 26-year-old Gilad Shalit’s return from over five 
years in Hamas captivity, was an exhilarating day in Israel. All media outlets 
dedicated themselves to the continuing coverage of Shalit’s homecoming.  They 
followed the preparations in Shalit’s hometown, at the air force base where he was to 
meet his parents, and at the border crossing where he was to be handed to Israeli 
officers. All through the uninterrupted daylong broadcast, journalists and 
commentators rejoiced at the first sight of Shalit, endlessly replaying the short footage 
of him emerging from a car next to the Egyptian border, and later of his meeting with 
the Israeli Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the chief of staff, who waited 
for him on a runway as he disembarked from a helicopter. This was a true media event 
in its 21
st
 century form, where the event simultaneously took place in different 
locations – both in the real and the digital world – and the commentary was less 
scripted and more in tune with the non-formal, emotional presentation style of 
contemporary news.  
 
Although the Shalit deal involved the simultaneous release of 1027 Palestinian 
prisoners – among them some masterminds of the deadliest suicide bombings – news 






millions of Israelis who became so identified with it, calling Shalit “the son of all of 
us.” The coverage of the Palestinian prisoners’ homecoming was minimal, and Arab-
affairs correspondents occasionally apologized for acting on their duty to refer to the 
Palestinian homecoming on such a day.  
 
While coverage framed Shalit’s return as a happy ending, it was only 
momentarily trying to push aside the fact that Israelis were perplexed and worried that 
the price Israel had agreed to pay for Shalit’s return was too high. Some feared that 
the exchange deal could prove to be an irresponsible act, a surrender to the popular 
wish for Shalit’s reunion with his family. The opponents of the deal expressed 
concern for Israel’s safety and the limiting of Israel’s options when handling future 
abduction cases.  
 
These fears took two years of aggressive campaigning on the part of the Shalit 
family to overcome. Israelis' "leap of faith," from dreading a deal to eventually 
accepting it, reflected in the polls. In 2009, according to an Israel Hayom poll, only 
52% of Israelis approved of a theoretical exchange deal which included the release of 
prisoners who had "blood on their hands."
6
  By contrast, a survey conducted by 
Yedioth Aharonoth one day before the execution of the deal showed that 79% of 
Israelis favored the actual, final deal, which indeed included the release of prisoners 
who were considered to have had "blood on their hands".
7
 Another survey by Israel 
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Hayom, conducted one day before Shalit’s release, similarly found that 75.7% of the 




Before Shalit’s release Raviv Drucker, a leading journalist and commentator, 
had described his objections in his influential blog, expressing them as a series of 
questions (“as I am only a journalist”).9 Here are some of Drucker’s queries: 
 
Doesn’t the release of murderers convey a message for future murderers, that 
they will not have to pay the full price for their acts? 
Doesn’t the release of 1,000 prisoners, as a consequence of an abducted 
soldier, convey a message to the Palestinians and to the Middle East, that 
Israel responds only to aggression and that aggression is the only way to force 
Israel into action? 
What will we do if in the next time, they will abduct 3 or 10 soldiers?  
 
Up until the day of Shalit’s return, many Israelis feared to risk the safety of the 
general population for the freedom of one man, perceived by many Israelis as “the 
Boy,” but indeed, one man.  Notably, however, in the months that passed since the 
execution of the deal, the debate did not reemerge. To the time of this writing, there 
have not been any major attacks on Israeli citizens by released prisoners. Ultimately, 
the deal has seemed not to affect Israelis’ sense of personal safety. 
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The Shalit Campaign 
 
On June 25, 2006 Hamas attacked an Israeli tank that was positioned at a 
guarding post near the Gaza Strip, killing an officer and a soldier and abducting 
Shalit, alive, from the tank. The IDF immediately retaliated by raiding the Gaza Strip, 
for the first time since Israel’s 2005 “Disengagement” from Gaza. More than 300 
Palestinians were killed in the raid, but Shalit’s location was not discovered. Less than 
three weeks later, on July 12, 2006, the Israeli military suffered another abduction: 
two reserve soldiers—Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev—who served at the Israeli-
Lebanese border were abducted by Hezbollah. The incident led Israel to embark on its 
largest attack on Lebanese soil since the famously unsuccessful 1982 Second Lebanon 
War.  Nearly two years after the second abduction, Israeli intelligence determined that 
the two Lebanon abductees, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, had been killed on 
the day they were captured, and that the attackers, who had not provided any details 
on their condition, were in fact holding their dead bodies.  Throughout the time that 
their fate was unclear, until shortly before their bodies were returned in July 2008, the 
Goldwasser and Regev families united with the Shalit family in a joint campaign for 
the release of “the Boys.”  
 
In the five years and four months of Shalit’s absence, his family succeeded in 
keeping his plight high on the Israeli and international news agenda, exceeding all 
previous efforts by families of kidnapped soldiers. The public efforts of the Shalit 
family began after initial three years in which it kept quiet per the government’s 






fueled by a determination not to repeat previous failures of hostages’ families to bring 
their loved ones back. The Shalit family was an upper class family according to Israeli 
standards (Shalit’s father, Noam, was an executive at the Israeli metalworking 
company Iscar, owned by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway). Together with a 
devoted circle of supporters, the family managed to secure the necessary resources to 
mount a continuous media-savvy, large-scale, sophisticated and ultimately effective 
campaign.   
 
The campaign, funded by contributions that Noam Shalit raised in Israel and 
abroad, was planned and executed through the pro-bono work of Israel’s leading 
public relation firms, advertising agencies and media consultants. Gilad Shalit’s 
image was illustrated and iconized in blue and white, the colors of the Israeli flag.  It 
was disseminated on stickers and billboard signs, and offered as a profile photo for 
Facebook users on the anniversary days of Shalit’s kidnapping. Shalit’s parents and 
brother took a visible role in the campaign, holding meetings with dignitaries in Israel 
and abroad and securing the prominent coverage of their efforts through continuous 
and direct pressure on Israel’s news media executives.  
 






The campaign’s most sweeping operation took place in June 2010. The Shalit 
family, together with tens of thousands of supporters, marched from Shalit’s 
hometown of Mitzpe Hila, in the Western Galilee, to Jerusalem. The 12-day march, 
which a total estimate of 200,000 people had joined,
10
 dominated the news, 
culminating with a live broadcast of an Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra concert near 
the point of Shalit’s abduction, and ended at the residence of Prime Minister 
Netanyahu.  There the Shalit family set up a tent where it resided until the Shalit deal 
was finalized and approved in October 2011. Responding to the march, Netanyahu 
convened a press conference, clarifying the status of the negotiations between Israel 
and the Hamas, and in particular, the Israeli demands not yet met by Hamas. 
Netanyahu warned that a deal could backfire and compromise Israel’s national 
security, and mentioned specific, previous exchange deals that had proved that 
released prisoners were in the habit of returning to terrorist activity. He spoke of and 
to all relevant groups of victims: 
 
I look into the pained eyes of the Shalit family, and I ache with you – the 
Shalit family.  I also look into the pained eyes of hundreds of family members 
of terrorism victims, and I feel their pain.  In the same breath, I am also 
thinking about those families whose loved ones will be murdered in further 
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 Prime Minister Netanyahu’s July 1st 2010 speech appears at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website 








Another memorable campaign event took place on Israeli Independence Day, 
in May 2011, five years into Gilad Shalit’s captivity. Yoel Shalit, Gilad’s brother, and 
Yoel’s girlfriend interrupted the traditional torch lighting ceremony in Mount Herzl, 
Jerusalem, breaking through security, entering the stage crying “Gilad is still alive” 
and holding signs calling for his return. In other words, the torch lighting ceremony, 
which bears all the signs of a media event—a national celebration of Israel’s 
achievements and values, performed on broadcast television channels in unison—was 
almost hijacked by Yoel Shalit. Almost, because Yoel Shalit happened not to enter the 
pre-planned television camera frames in the event, and was therefore not visible to the 
viewers of the live broadcast. The interruption, however, was recorded and replayed 
numerous times on the following day and discussed extensively in the news and in the 
Internet social networks.  Yoel Shalit’s choice of venue to express his grievance 
served to convey multiple messages. Apart from the sheer visibility of the event, and 
its potential reach to almost every household in Israel, Yoel Shalit’s interruption of 
the ceremony undermined its ideological premises. Shalit defied Israel’s right to 
indulge in self-congratulatory activities while Gilad was in captivity, challenging the 
most basic point of the event – that the state of Israel was a commendable moral 
enterprise.  
 
The Shalit campaign, dubbed “the longest media campaign in recent Israeli 
history,”12 was the first hostage campaign that tried to achieve public support for a 
prisoner exchange deal. It was the first hostage campaign that took on an aggressive, 
adversarial approach against Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, attempting to 
                                                           
12






undermine its popularity and turn public opinion over the hostage affair into an 
electoral factor. 
 
The Arad lesson 
 
Israel experienced the captivity of Shalit and the abduction of Regev and 
Goldwasser as a repetition of a previous national trauma – Israel’s failure to bring 
home Air Force navigator Ron Arad. Arad was captured in 1986 by the Lebanese 
Amal organization, after he and the pilot of his fighter jet had to eject due to a 
technical failure during a military mission in Lebanon.  Israel immediately managed 
to bring home the pilot, who parachuted not far from Arad and hid until he was 
rescued, carried on the rails of a helicopter. But Arad, who parachuted into an 
inaccessible area, was left behind. Initially, Israel rejected Amal’s offer to release 
Arad in return for hundreds of prisoners, in hope that the passage of time would 
reduce his bargaining price. But in 1987 Amal sold Arad to another group or to Iran, 
and his tracks were lost. Despite years of efforts by various international mediators, 
Arad’s whereabouts were never discovered.  
 
The failure to successfully negotiate the return of Arad was rightfully 
attributed to Israel’s diplomatic and national security leadership. Israel retaliated for 
Arad’s kidnapping by kidnapping Sheikh Obeid and Mustafa Dirani, both potential 
bargaining chips. However, meaningful negotiations over the exchange of Arad never 






other prisoners, in exchange for a kidnapped Israeli civilian and the coffins of three 
Israeli soldiers who were kidnapped in the Har Dov incident. 
 
In 2008 Hezbollah announced that Arad was dead, prompting fears that Gilad Shalit, 
who at the time had been two years in captivity, was approaching a similar, bitter end. 
These fears, exacerbated by the tragic exchange  Golwasser's and Regev's coffins, 
drove the Shalit family toward a much more conspicuous and manifest anti-
government position than the Arad family had taken. Indeed, for many years, the 
Arads acquiesced with the government’s advice to maintain a low profile that would, 
arguably, allow covert negotiations for Arad’s release. A public campaign, the family 
was warned, would increase Arad’s price and compromise Israel’s bargaining power.   
 
Arad’s family later regretted its compliance with the government’s request. 
Tami Arad, Ron’s widow, acknowledged in an interview she gave four years into 
Shalit’s kidnapping, that she had been naïve: 
 
When I try to analyze the reason why I don't visit the Shalit family at their 
protest tent every week, I realize that I must be trying to distance myself from 
the missed opportunities, from the hopes which proved to be false, from the 
pangs of conscience over my failure to hold a hunger strike outside the Prime 
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Gilad’s father, Noam Shalit, drew the connection between Arad’s fate and his 
decision to take on an opposite strategy. Upon Gilad’s return, Noam Shalit said: 
 
There is no doubt in my mind that had we stayed home in Mitzpe Hila, the 
chances of having Gilad alive and at home would have been extremely low. 
We have learned the lesson from the Arad family tragedy, and I said that to 
Tami [Arad] before and apologized that we had used their tragedy in order to 




Before Shalit, Israeli scholars regarded the Arad case as a story that was being 
kept alive in the news successfully, despite the fact that there were hardly any external 
developments that qualified it as ”news.” Kaplan (2008) argued that the Arad story 
maintained its high-profile presence in the news for many years because the concept 
of missing soldiers, as socially and psychologically construed in Israel, elicited in the 
most potent way Israelis’ national sentiments of camaraderie and collective 
responsibility. But until Shalit, the potential power and willingness of the media to 
step further and push for an exchange deal – either explicitly or by way of closely 
following the Shalit family media initiatives – had not yet revealed itself. This is 
because, as previously noted, the Arad family cooperated with the government and 
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The maintenance work of hope for missing soldiers 
 
In her 2008 analysis of the Israeli press coverage of the Arad affair, 
Tenenboim Weinblatt, writing before the Shalit campaign’s most spectacular 
initiatives, concluded that the Arad story had achieved considerable news presence. 
Tenenboim Weinblatt attributed the maintenance of the Arad story to literary “non-
closure” strategies that kept the story alive despite its lack of factual hinges.  The 
coverage, she argued, employed mythologizing techniques that emphasized the 
mysterious, unresolved nature of Arad’s ordeal.  News of Arad was all about rumors, 
as reflected in the following typical headlines: “Jordanian Weekly: Ron Arad is 
Probably Being Held in Lebanon”; “A Syrian Journalist: in 1993 Arad was held in a 
Syrian Prison” (quoted in Tenenboim Weinblatt, p.39). The coverage discussed 
possible developments rather than reported facts, and was amassed with speculations 
by public figures regarding the whereabouts and prospects of Arad, who treated any 
meetings with foreign government officials as groundbreaking negotiations. 
Ultimately, Tenenboim Weinblatt argued, this open-ended approach helped sustain 
the belief in Arad’s impending return.  
 
The non-closure, mythologizing strategy adds a new dimension to the concept 
of journalistic deference, and it joins the journalistic behaviors characteristic of the 
left side of the Experience-Argument Scale.  Where the victims are so high on the 
journalistic agenda, the news is, to some extent, invented, even independently from 







The open-ended strategy expressed itself, once again, in the coverage of the 
Regev and Goldwasser July 2008 exchange deal, in which Hezbollah sent back the 
soldiers’ coffins in return for five Lebanese prisoners and the coffins of 194 more.  It 
was well known at the time that the two had been critically injured during the 
kidnapping incident. A month before the deal, Israeli intelligence had concluded that 
the two were dead. The press nevertheless downplayed this information and continued 
expressing hope that the soldiers would return alive, relying on Hezbollah’s 
announcement that it would not reveal whether the two were dead or alive until the 
day of their exchange. Hezbollah’s strategy of clouding the status of the two soldiers 
played on Israelis’ most delicate nerve – the recent and final announcement of Arad’s 
death and the guilt associated with it. Soon after the day of the exchange arrived and 
two coffins emerged from the Hezbollah vehicle, media critics, as well as 
commentators in the mainstream news media, accused the press for irresponsibly 





While Tenenboim Weinblatt concentrated on a description of the narrative 
strategies of the Arad coverage, Kaplan (2008) offered an explanation for the open-
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ended approach. Basing his explanation on the literature that associated national 
solidarity with notions of fraternity, male masculinity and self-sacrifice, Kaplan 
identified national solidarity as a form of “extended friendship” (Kaplan, 2007). 
National solidarity, he argued, required an emotional bond between citizens and fallen 
soldiers. This meant experiencing fallen soldiers as the loss of friends, grieving over 
their deaths in an intimate, personal way, as well as feeling close attachment to and 
great concern over missing and abducted soldiers.  
 
This special affinity between Israeli civilians and the fallen soldiers is rooted 
in the place of the Israeli army within Israeli civil society, and the fact that there are 
no clear boundaries between the two. The mandatory army service makes the military 
experience an integral part of Israeli life for most of every Jewish adult’s years (after 
the two or three year army service is completed, Israelis return to the army every year 
for their reserve service). There are relationships and resemblances between the army 
and other civilian organizations such as schools and boy scouts, so that the military 
culture is woven into Israeli life.  
 
While fallen soldiers are treated as lost relatives, missing soldiers evoke an 
even more heightened sense of solidarity because "the missing are situated at a unique 
juncture between the living and the dead. On the one hand, they represent a strong 
presence and the prospect of returning to everyday life. On the other hand, they 







Missing and abducted soldiers are simultaneously positioned at the “present 
time” that occupies the “news,” and at the “mythic” time, where timeless, heroic tales 
reside.  The open-ended approach, with its continuous hope for the soldiers’ return, 
mythologizes them and secures their defining role in Israeli nationhood. In its 
convergence of “present time” and “mythic time,” the coverage of missing soldiers 
exemplifies the cultural role of journalism as James Carey conceptualized it, that is 
the constant reinforcement of shared cultural narratives. The moral principle 
associated with missing and abducted soldiers is “leave no man behind” – an absolute, 
collective responsibility over the safety of each and every individual of society, let 
alone an individual who meets danger while in the service of society. 
 
Weinblatt-Tenenboim and Kaplan’s discussions of the open-ended approach 
considered the special cultural role of missing and abducted soldiers in Israeli society. 
To them, the press only reflected the strong common sentiment toward these special 
victims. Noam Yuran’s discussion of the press’s open-ended coverage of the 
Goldwasser and Regev exchange deal (2008)
16
, however, took on a more critical 
approach toward Israeli journalistic culture. Yuran argued that as much as the press 
was emotionally engulfed in the general, “natural,” sentiment toward the soldiers, it 
was also making a calculated choice to side with the families, even at the price of 
inflaming their unrealistic hopes. "The media," he wrote, "were carried away in the 
wave of false hopes because they wanted to lose themselves to emotional 
                                                           








identification. They wanted to shift the news work away from the realm of reportage 
and into the realm of identification and emotion."  
 
Indeed, the false suspense in the news leading to the execution of the Regev 
and Goldwasser deal touches on the central argument of this chapter, the deliberate 
choice by journalists to adopt the point of view of the hostages’ families. Indeed, as 
the Regev and Goldwasser families refused to give up hope, the Israeli press also 
avoided a sober, true-to-the-fact assessment of the soldiers’ prospects. Yuran’s 
criticism, in this respect, was directed at what he perceived as journalists’ intentional 
decision to identify with the families. This was a not a case of a press spontaneously 
surrendering to emotionalism. This was a conscious choice – or as journalists saw it, a 
professional choice fit for special circumstances – to set aside the usual reporting 
standards in favor of “submerging” themselves in the emotional moment. The result, 
however, was that the press was suppressing well known,
17
 official information in 
favor of the families’ unrealistic expectations (Yuran 2008). 
 
The tendency of the Israeli press to succumb to the families’ perspective, 
apparent in the coverage of the Hezbollah deals, suggests an explanation for its 
readiness to embrace the Shalit campaign.  
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Like the failure to bring back Ron Arad, the return of Regev and Goldwasser’s 
coffins emboldened Shalit family’s decision to embark in 2008 on a very public, 
desperate and occasionally theatrical campaign, assisted by a public relations 
apparatus. At the time, officials responsible for the negotiations with the Hezbollah 
blamed the Regev and Goldwasser families – as in the Arad case beforehand – for 
interfering with the clandestine negotiation process. The families, they argued, 
inadvertently served Hezbollah by increasing pressure on the Israeli negotiators.
18
 But 
this approach was losing ground, and particularly in the coverage of the Regev and 
Goldwasser deal, the press had already proved its loyalty to the cause of the families, 
and cooperated with the pressure that the families attempted to generate. The success 
of the Shalit campaign can be partially attributed to the growing frustration over the 
repeated failures to bring abducted soldiers back when they were still alive, and the 
growing general legitimacy of the idea of a prisoner exchange deal.  
 
Some of the Shalit campaign initiatives had direct mass appeal, without much 
need for journalists’ good will: Yoel Shalit’s interruption of the Independence Day 
televised ceremony coerced the nation into attention; similarly, the popular march 
from the north of Israel to Jerusalem, together with the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra 
concert near the Gaza border, attracted inevitable news attention because of its 
massive scale. Other initiatives, however, took place in smaller settings but were 
theatrical and media-tailored.  A notable media-dependent initiative of this kind was 
the “Gilad Shalit chamber.” The organizers built a mock solitary confinement 
chamber inside a television studio outside Tel Aviv, meant to replicate Shalit’s 
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presumed living conditions in Gaza. Journalists, politicians and celebrities – such as 
actors and soccer players – were invited to spend an hour alone in the small, dark and 
dirty chamber. Internet news sites aired continuously a live stream from the chamber, 
and the prominent participants later shared, in news columns and blogs, the horror and 
boredom that they had experienced while in “captivity.” 
 
Hostage situations and the Experience-Argument Scale 
 
The media embrace of the abducted soldiers’ families, as manifested in the 
coverage of the Hezbollah prisoner exchange deals, as well as in the continuous 
coverage of the Shalit campaign efforts, positions the coverage of hostage situations 
in the Deference extreme of the Experience-Argument Scale. Deference meant that in 
the conflict between the government and the families, with the government warning 
that exchange deals were detrimental to Israel’s safety and the families speaking of 
the sacredness of human life and the obligation to save it at all costs, journalists were 
siding with the latter. 
 
The situation of missing and abducted soldiers, as well as civilian hostages, as 
Kaplan observed, combines two dimensions of time – the “here and now” of the 
concrete story of a particular missing victim, and the mythic time associated with the 
heroic narrative of national sacrifice. As the Experience-Argument Scale suggests, 
victims fare better with the media if their experience of victimhood has greater 






and hostages’ families, are situated in the present, sometimes for long periods of time. 
Other, more “typical” victims of attacks are usually situated in the “present” for a 
brief violent moment, and as they work toward policy solutions, they must, at the 
same time, work also to preserve the memory of the experience that lent them 
legitimacy as political advocates. These victims must maintain the collective memory 
of the violence that was inflicted upon them in order to secure their place in mythical 
time. Hostages and their families, however, simultaneously occupy present time and 
mythical time, and by that they answer to journalism’s “dual duty” (see Chapter 1) to 
supply timely information about current affairs and to reaffirm prevalent cultural 
narratives and myths. 
 
While this chapter has concentrated thus far on the Gilad Shalit case, the 
Israeli phenomenon of journalistic deference to hostages’ families applies to both 
soldier and civilian hostages. So far, I have explained the media success of the Shalit 
campaign through an analysis of the place of fallen soldiers in Israeli nationhood, 
augmented through the unprecedented scale and the professional navigation of the 
Shalit campaign.  But we can also trace broader, deeper reasons for the unconditional 
love that the media bestowed on the families.  
 
The growing legitimacy of personal grief                                                                                                  
 
The Shalit campaign could not have been as imposing and effective as it was, 






terrorism, either soldiers or civilians. Israeli society, increasingly embracing 
individualism, has been gradually turning its back on one of the fundamental values of 
early-days Israel, the Masadaic idea of personal sacrifice for the public cause. This 
was one of the implications of the shift towards post-Zionism
19
 in the 1980s, along 
with the ascent of the political Right which was not rooted in socialist culture, the 
growing influence of American culture and the rise of capitalist values, privatization 
and commercial television industry.  
 
During the first decades of Israel’s foundation, social norms mandated the 
suppression of personal grief, especially with respect to casualties of terrorism and 
war. Israelis were expected to accept the fact that life in an independent Jewish state 
sometimes demanded sacrifice. Israel’s “national religion” was characterized in those 
early years by trust of government, frugality and participation in the Zionist effort. 
That set of norms, however, was replaced in the 1980s by a new “secular religion,” 
that emphasized individual rights, self-fulfillment, and legitimized criticism of 
government and the national narratives (Almog, 2001).
20
  Uri Ram (2005) tied the 
ascent of these individualistic, bourgeois values to the fact that the period of the 1970s 
and early 1980s was a relatively peaceful chapter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
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 Looking for the embodiment of the Israeli Secular Religion, Oz Almog found. Stef Wertheimer as a 
representation of its ideals. Stef Werthemimer is an esteemed Israeli industrialist who committed 
himself to developing new communal villages in Galilee. His vision is to develop the Galilee through 
world class high-tech industrial facilities and to provide modern high-quality living communities. The 
villages that Wertheimer supports aspire to self-sufficiency and independence from state resources. 
Noam Shalit is a senior employee of the Wertheimer industry, and Wertheimer was personally 
committed to the Shalit campaign, financially and otherwise. The Shalit campaign reflected 






The 1980s were also characterized by prosperity and liberal economic policies, most 
notably, massive privatization. As economic prosperity led to “post materialistic” 
aspirations that centered on self-fulfillment and individual rights, so did Israeli society 
“reject the modern, bureaucratic authority and replaced it with the empowerment of 
personal autonomy. […] Israel shifted from a collectivistic, state-oriented, labor-
federation type culture, into an individualistic business and marketing oriented 
culture” (Ram, 2005:47). These cultural shifts were exacerbated by the erosion of 
Israel’s ongoing control over the occupied territories and the two Intifadas. But most 
importantly, the event that may have caused Israelis to abandon the ideal of self-
sacrifice more than any other event in Israel’s history was the 1982 Lebanon War, the 
first war which mainstream media viewed as a war of choice, and whose casualties 
were perceived, for the first time, to have died in vain, rather than to have fallen in the 
protection of their country.  
 
As the social climate was changing, at that time, in favor of an individualistic 
(and materialistic) approach, victims were gradually gaining personhood. The 
mourning of the victims as people who did not achieve the full life that they deserved, 




Gilad Shalit’s personality fitted into this individual approach to victimhood.  
His image, as seen in pre-captivity photos and home videos as a shy teen-ager, was 
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irresistibly endearing. He was not the hero of early-day wars, who was expected to 
withstand the horrors of imprisonment (as in the 1970s when Israeli soldiers were held 
as prisoners of war in Egypt for over three and a half years). Rather, questions loomed 
large regarding his ability to endure his situation and remain sane and capable. A year 
into his captivity, his family published a story he wrote as an 11-year old, “When the 
Fish and the Shark First Met,” about a fish who befriended a shark. The story was 
published as a children’s book, with each page illustrated by a different Israeli artist, 
and was later produced for theater.  The analogy between Gilad Shalit and the 
innocent fish, which tried to convince the shark not to eat him, reinforced Shalit’s 
gentle, peace-loving image.  In March 2009, the campaign concentrated on another 
heartfelt aspect of Shalit’s personhood, when it offered for public use a new Hebrew 
font, the Gilad Shalit font, in which each letter’s design was copied from a 
handwritten note that Shalit had written to his family while in captivity in 2008. The 
font was free and available for download.  
 
The fact that the campaign emphasized Shalit the person was crucial to its 
success. It had to tap into the notions that Kaplan associated with “extended 











Israel's no-negotiation policy vs. a reality of ongoing deals 
 
The history of the Israeli policies regarding the problem of POWs and 
abducted soldiers (by non-state organizations) reflected this societal shift from 
“national religion” to “secular religion.” In the 1950-1960, POWs were not regarded 
as heroes, but rather as embodiments of military or personal failure.
22
 When the early-
day Israeli POWs returned, they did not receive a heroes’ welcome, and their 
identities were unknown to the general public (Haber 2008). Moreover, they were 
often suspected of treason, and even if not, they sometimes chose to conceal their 
POW past. The 1974 Yom Kippur War marked a change in the attitude toward POWs. 
Perhaps following the U.S “Operation Homecoming” of Vietnam POWs in February 
1973, the Yom Kippur POWs were the firsts to be regarded as returning heroes.  
 
The decades of the 1960s and ’70s introduced terrorist hostage takings, and in 
particular, attacks on civilian targets after the 1967 War by non-state Palestinian and 
Lebanese organizations. In an attempt to deny legitimacy to these organizations, Israel 
held an official “no negotiations with terrorists” policy, and whenever possible, it 
attempted a military onslaught on the hostage takers (as in Entebbe.) However, the 
pressure for the return of the hostages led the Israeli government to circumvent its 
own no-negotiation rule and conduct indirect negotiations through international 
mediators. Ultimately, when Israel came to tend to the Shalit problem, it had no clear 
rule-of-thumb or policy for the proper approach to the matter, including the undecided 
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question about the appropriate price for Shalit. The involvement of international 
mediators long ago became a well-known fact that rendered the “no-negotiation” 
policy meaningless and even ridiculous. The broadly accepted post-factum assessment 
of the Shalit deal has been that Israel could have reached the deal years earlier, and 
paid a much smaller price, had it pursued it with a definite idea of its goals and limits 
and with the same determination that it demonstrated in 2011. 
 
Because of the overlap between civil society and the military system in Israel, 
civil associations have typically been deeply involved in the POW and soldier-
hostages problem. Such involvement of non-state agencies has been remarkable given 
the great sensitivity of the subject, the secrecy that surrounds it, and the fact that it 
involved foreign policies and international operations. The most notable and 
controversial of these non-state agents was “Born to Freedom,” a not-for-profit 
organization that existed between 2001 and 2012. Born to Freedom was established 
by Israeli lawyer Eliad Shraga, formerly the Arad family’s attorney. Its initial mission 
was to succeed where the government failed, and obtain information about Ron Arad. 
The association’s aim later broadened to collect all possible intelligence regarding the 
fate of Israel’s POWs by offering a 10 million dollar prize to any person who 
provided meaningful information on their whereabouts. The funding for the 
organization and for the prize came entirely from the Israeli government.  
 
Born to Freedom advertised the prize worldwide, including in states 
considered hostile to Israel (such as Iran.) Throughout its years of existence, Born to 






government’s prerogative.  Even Israel’s Attorney General expressed unease in the 
face of a private organization that was privy to sensitive intelligence.
23
 The 
association, to which the Israeli government granted 100 million Shekels 
(approximately 28 million U.S. Dollars) during its years of operation, ceased 
operations in 2012 after a Ministry of Defense committee asserted that it had 
ultimately failed to collect any meaningful information (no one received the 10 
million dollar prize) and that the government could itself manage the reward system. 
The case of Born to Freedom serves to illustrate the blurring of the lines between 
government, military and civil society in the context of Israeli POWs, where the 
central mission of finding them has been essentially outsourced to a semi-voluntary 
not-for-profit organization.  
 
Shalit: an a-political campaign 
 
It took almost five and a half years, and two Israeli prime ministers (at the 
beginning of the negotiations, Ehud Olmert presided as prime minister) to reach the 
Shalit deal. When Netanyahu attended to the Shalit issue as prime minister, he was 
already known as a vocal opponent of previous exchange deals.
24
 Given his clear 
predisposition, the Shalit deal was a particularly tough call for him. It also raised the 
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bar for the Shalit campaign, which needed to coerce the prime minister, a well-
respected terrorism expert, into changing his well-known course, putting him in the 
risk of seeming weak and inconsistent.  
 
Looking at the media’s growing—to the point of frenzied—support for the 
campaign over the years, and given Netanyahu’s initial and known objection to the 
idea of the exchange, it is tempting to argue that this was a case of the media acting in 
direct, fearless opposition to government. However, this notion of a contrarian media, 
taking the popular position in a political issue and forcing the government to act upon 
the collective will, is over-romantic and only partly true.  In essence, the Shalit issue 
has been de-politicized by the press, and taken outside the realm of the well-known 
left vs. right, post-Zionist vs. neo-Zionist
25
 adversity, or for that matter, any other 
political debate that could have alienated the public.  
 
How was the Shalit issue depoliticized? Through the press’s emotional pleas 
for Shalit’s return and for his reunion with his family, devoid of specific discussions 
of consequences and possible scenarios (the danger of freeing convicted felons to 
resume activity, the toll in terms of future abductions and the rising price within future 
exchange deals); by framing the issue as a personal-interest story and not as a 
complicated policy dilemma; and by refraining from tying the Shalit issue to Israel’s 
historic, existential problem, that is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The hope for 
Shalit’s return was shared by all Israelis, regardless of their political affiliation, and it 
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was this hope alone that the press advocated. Indeed, public opinion in the “deal or no 
deal” question did not necessarily correlate with left or right tendencies, which were 
defined in Israel in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian question. But rather, support was 
shared by the entire political spectrum.  And so, while the Israeli right has been 
traditionally “hawkish” in its reluctance to make any concessions to the Palestinians, 
in this case the “no concessions” principle was played down, and did not diminish 
much of the support for the deal. And while leftist commentators expressed hope that 
the deal would carry the seed for future peace negotiations between Israel and Hamas, 
support for the deal was never widely perceived, by the public or by media 
commentators, as an exclusively “leftist” position. 
 
The last-minute public opinion polls that showed more than 75% approval rate 
for the deal
26
 proved the success of the campaign’s main objective, which had been to 
steer the debate away from the meaning of the Shalit deal in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and instead, concentrate on Shalit the person, the boy. Indeed, the 
campaign occasionally addressed the deal’s security concerns: once, in the billboard 
campaign in which former senior security officials expressed their belief that the deal 
had not entailed serious security risks; and again, in June 2011, four months before 
Shalit’s return, when the Shalit family needed to ensure Netanyahu’s commitment to 
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the ongoing negotiations. At that time, Noam Shalit came forth to publicly attack 
Netanyahu, calling him “weak” and “insensitive,” and asked Israelis to text message 
“I Support” (the deal) to the campaign’s phone number so that these votes would 
accumulate and prove that the Israeli public believed in the deal and was not afraid. 
Nevertheless, these two examples were quite exceptional, as the vast majority of the 
Shalit campaign initiatives—the Shalit march, the Shalit typeface, the Shalit mock 
chamber, the interruption of the Independence Day torch lighting ceremony, the 
constant reminders of the loss of Ron Arad—all framed the Shalit case as a personal 
tragedy. In its summary of the five-year long Shalit campaign, Ha’aretz’s Gili Cohen 
noted that campaign leaders had "tried to find out whether there was a way to avoid 
having the future prisoner exchange known as the "Shalit deal," in an attempt to 




The press, this chapter argues, mostly took a similar, and arguably—politically 
evasive, approach. The willing cooperation with the campaign sometimes blurred the 
distinction between reporting and advocating, especially in the case of independent 
campaign-like initiatives taken by the press. Ma’ariv newspaper, for example, did not 
only cover the Shalit march, it also distributed—together with its printed edition—a 
yellow ribbon, as the yellow color has become “the official color of the Shalit 
campaign,”28 symbolizing the hope that Shalit would see the sun again. 
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These de-politicization efforts sometimes came from additional, unexpected 
sources, such as the regulatory agencies that supervised the media. In June 2011 the 
Shalit campaign submitted a television ad, commemorating five years of Shalit’s 
captivity, for the approval of the commercial television franchisees, which in turn 
passed it over for review by the Second Authority for Television and Radio. The ad 
surveyed the history of the Ron Arad tragedy through overlapping newspaper 
headlines from the time of his captivity. The ad began with hopeful headlines about 
the existence of signs of life and about ongoing negotiations, gradually turning into 
headlines of his presumed, and then confirmed, death. The ad concluded with the 
following phrase: “Gilad Shalit has been in captivity for five years. We can and we 
must bring Gilad home today.” The Second Authority refused to approve the ad, 
claiming that it violated a rule that prohibited advertising from conveying political 
messages referring to public controversies.
29
 The Second Authority required two 
deletions: the first was the removal of two headlines that mentioned prime-minister 
Netanyahu (“Netanyahu: I am convinced that Ron Arad is alive and that we can bring 
him home,” and “the negotiation for the release of Ron Arad blew up because of 
Netanyahu’s stubbornness”). The second was the deletion of the words “we can” and 
“today” from the concluding phrase, to have its shorter version say “we must bring 
Gilad home.”30 In the Second Authority’s view, it was debatable to argue that a deal 
was viable, and that it was viable at that time. The so called legitimate, apolitical 
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statement, on the other hand, expressed as a mere urge to bring Gilad home, was the 
exact message that the mainstream media conveyed. 
 
Love of country as a de-politicization strategy 
 
The media’s general evasion of the controversial aspects of the Shalit deal, and 
the reduction of the Shalit issue into the ordeal of one Israeli family, were, as this 
chapter argues, part of a de-politicization mechanism of the Shalit issue—from the 
political to the personal.  Another de-politicization mechanism involved framing the 
issue as one that involved “military values,” particularly the idea of “leaving no man 
behind”.31 This chapter previously spoke of Gilad Shalit as the soldier-boy. This was 
an important feature in his captivity image, as crafted by the public relations 
campaign, and it was based on an already existing notion, that Israeli soldiers evoked 
the same sentiments as children did. The child-like image of Shalit lent the “leave no 
man behind” principle horrifying urgency. 
 
The overlap between childhood and soldiery requires some elaboration. The 
mandatory military service in Israel, for 18-year-old men (who serve for three years) 
and women (who serve for two years), makes army duty a collective experience, 
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shared by almost every Jewish household. The army serves— proudly—as a 
mechanism for cohesion, whereby, for example, immigrant Jews assimilate and 
become Sabras.  While non-Jewish minorities and the ultra-orthodox are exempt from 
service, those minorities who have chosen to enlist—such as the Druze—were 
rewarded with economic allocations to their communities as well as increased 
openness for their participation in the highest governing institutions (Krebs, 2006). 
 
As a relatively young nation, which won its independence through victory in 
war, Israel still views the military as one of its pillars. Older Israelis still remember 
the days where the nation was under existential threat, and the military was seen as its 
only protection from a second Holocaust. Israel is no longer the militaristic nation that 
it was in the 1950’s and 1960’s, but some rituals from this era stayed with it through 
the current era of individualism: Memorial Day is still a national mourning day, where 
restaurants and movie theaters shut down by law and the entire country stops at 11:00 
A.M. for two minutes of silence.  Evasion of mandatory military service is still 
considered by many Israelis as a sin. 
 
The deep presence of the military in Israeli life, including the shared 
experience of Israeli parents “sending their kids to the army,” thereby unwillingly 
exposing them to new dangers, is the basis for the child-soldier concept. For example, 
the theme of the worried mother, of the Jewish mother type, who directly and 
insistently contacts army commanders on behalf or her son only to embarrass him in 
her over-involvement, has been a well-known Israeli stereotype. A much more 






Organization, established in 1997 by four mothers of Israeli soldiers who had served 
in Lebanon. Four Mothers advocated an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on the basis 
of concern for the soldiers’ lives. The organization is known to have been one of the 
major forces influencing the Israeli government into the final withdrawal from 
Lebanon in 2000. The Four Mothers’ emphasis on the child-soldier concept was a 
genuine, and at the same time shrewd, politically disarming de-politicization strategy. 
More broadly than the emotional bond with its child-soldiers, the Israeli army is an 
object of deep reverence as an embodiment of Israeli nationality, so that any issue that 
can be framed using army values (such as “leave no man behind”) has the power to 
generate consensus and mute public criticism. 
 
The stronghold of the Israeli army in the heart of the consensus is inexorably 
related to the breakdown of other traditional national establishments and markers.  
Israelis have been increasingly frustrated with the decrease in the quality of state 
services: the education system has been famously deteriorating as well as the state-run 
health system. Israel has been slowly deserting the welfare state model and practicing 
neo-liberal economic policies, which are responsible for growing economic gaps. In 
terms of trust in government, religious parties joined a Likud government and 
strengthened the ethno-centric Jewish-religious agenda, thereby alienating Israel’s 
economic backbone, the secular middle class. The laissez-faire policies of the self-
proclaimed business-friendly Likud government resulted in a disastrous increase in 
the cost of living, and led to mass protests, including street demonstrations, from the 
middle-class in the summer of 2011 and to a deep change in the makeup of the 






Minister, the newly appointed 2013 Knesset reflected a deep ambition for social and 
economic change.  
 
The long arc of Israelis’ relationship with the idea of Israeli collectivity was 
succinctly articulated by Israeli songwriter Meir Goldberg in a Ha’aret’z interview: 
 
Along the decades the Hebrew language has changed, and these changes are 
reflected in my writing. The use of grammatical persons is an example. When 
I was young, there were many “we” songs—we, the pioneers. With time, “we” 
became “I.” For instance, “what will become of me, I am not getting along 
with myself.” 32 During the 90’s the “we” voice returned, but this time “we” 
were speaking of the screwed up elements of Israeli collectivity, such as in 
Aviv’s [singer Aviv Geffen’s] “We Are a Fucked Up Generation.”33 
 
With the gradual loss of trust in—and lack of identification with—traditional 
government institutions, the army remained as a stronghold of old-fashioned values of 
solidarity. The army, with its moralistic, “pure,” value system, has been traditionally 
perceived as separate from the “dirty,” interest-driven political system. Note, for 
example, the title 'Israeli Defense Force,' which implies that the army could never be 
on the “attacking” side, because it resorts to violence only if it has to. The notion of an 
army that would rather not fight is encapsulated in the concept “shooting and crying.” 
This expression, created following the 1967 war, began as a derisive phrase to 
describe the hypocrisy of the Israeli army (namely, a trigger-happy army that 
disguised itself with pacifist lingo) but later changed to mean the last-resort approach 
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to war. “Shooting and crying” demonstrates an attitude that can be termed “emotional 
militarism,” where the military tries to essentially disguise itself as a peace 
organization. For example, when Israeli military bands sing peace songs, they exhort 
military emotionalism, which beyond an aspiration for peace also includes 
brotherhood and solidarity. And when the entire country prays for the return of a 




Besides the moralistic, “feel good” value system associated with the army, the 
strong hold maintained by the army within the disintegrating Israeli society has other, 
more fundamental causes. An obvious one is Israel’s constant “survival mode,” which 
makes the military a first national priority. Shalem (2008) offers another explanation: 
 
The IDF has been influenced from the shift of the Israeli society from 
collective values to universal values. […] While according to the army data 
the motivation for combat service has not declined, it seems—albeit the lack 
of studies to support this—that the volunteers for combat service relate to it as 
an opportunity for social standing and personal fulfillment rather than as a 
national mission or as a way to advance collective values.  
 
The army, according to this thesis, is no longer a strictly ideological apparatus, 
operating on patriotism alone. It also offers itself as an opportunity for personal 
benefits, particularly as a first successful step in young peoples’ careers. The army’s 
adjustment to the materialistic, competitive Israeli culture helps maintain, at least for 
the time being, its popularity and relevance, although Ram (2005) suggests a 
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broadening gap between Israel’s “militarized state” and Israeli civil society. Since the 
1980s, he argues, the Jewish secular elite have been gradually distancing themselves 
from all collectivistic ideas and institutions, and passing over the military career 
option (namely, extending service beyond the mandatory period) in favor of the 
private sector. Ram makes an interesting connection between the decline in the level 
of militarism of the middle and upper classes, and the 1993 Oslo accords, which he 
claims were the product of the new individualistic and less militarized generation 
(p.50). 
 
“I am an Israeli first, and only then a journalist” 
 
Media critics have consistently criticized the Israeli press for conducting the 
“maintenance work of hope” for POWs and abducted soldiers, occasionally at the 
expense of a full and sober account of the POWs’ prospects. Journalists themselves, 
speaking of their motives, defend their approach as patriotic. In a 2008 Tel Aviv 
University conference panel on the media coverage of the POW issue, military 
correspondents from Ma’ariv and Yedioth Aharonoth were asked if their predominant 
self-definition was that of Israelis or of journalists.  Both answered unequivocally that 
they were “Israelis first,” and explained that they were acutely aware of the possible 
negative effects that their writing could have on the release efforts. Yedioth Aharonoth 
military correspondent Amir Rapaport, explained that "being an Israeli did not imply 
compliance with whatever it was that the security establishment expected from us 






piece that carried the risk of diminishing the chances of a soldier’s return." (Rapaport 
2008) 
 
The reporters were further asked how they handled the conflict between the 
expectations of the government and the families, with the government hoping for the 
media silence that would release negotiations from external pressures, and the 
families working to keep the POW issue high on the public agenda. Rapaport (2008) 
replied in a way that revealed the Israeli distinction between patriotism and love of 
government. "Had I known," he said, "that there was a system, and that there was 
somebody within that system who considered the interests of the abducted soldier 
above all, I would have perhaps acted upon that system’s requests. But I have no trust 
in the system."  
 
Rapaport expressed the general frustration of the Israeli public with the 
continuing failure of successive Israeli governments to achieve the safe return of 
abducted soldiers. He also expressed the conceptual distinction between the love of 
Israel and the love of government. Patriotism, indeed by definition, did not require 
any devotion to Israel’s formal governing institutions, but only the love for an 









Criticism of the Shalit campaign 
 
The limited scope of the public debate over the various approaches to the 
Shalit affair was a constant cause of criticism by media critics and journalists alike 
during the five years of Shalit’s absence. When the question of the quality of the 
coverage arose in the 2008 Tel Aviv conference on POWs and MIAs, Rapaport’s 
position as a military correspondent for Yedioth Aharonoth did not prevent him from 
arguing that  
 
The problem is not that Gilad Shalit is not on peoples’ minds. The problem is 
that there is no quality debate. We are going through an awful process, which 
increasingly targets the “emotion glands.” The government should put forth 
the deal and analyze it, and stimulate the minds and not just the emotions. The 
media are not encouraging a public debate and it is here where we are failing 
(Rapaport 2008.) 
 
Rapaport’s seemingly contradictory statements revealed a genuine challenge 
that the Israeli press faced.  On the one hand, he identified himself as a “patriot first,” 
who would not publish any information he suspected might be perilous to Shalit. In 
other words, he would minimize discussion of the Shalit negotiation details. On the 
other hand, he acknowledged his, and his peers’, regrettable tendency to keep the 
Shalit debate on a shallow, emotional level of discourse while their obligation was to 
develop it into a full-blown policy debate. Paradoxically, reporting on the possibility 
of a deal was bad for Shalit, but good for democracy, and this paradox complicated 






withhold. This is perhaps another reason why the Israeli media chose the easier way 
of framing the Shalit coverage as “we want Shalit back, period.” 
 
Among those who maintained their opposition to the deal on a rational, 
security-interest driven argument was Yedioth Aharonoth’s national affairs columnist 
Shimon Shiffer.
35
 However, the well-reasoned journalistic objections to the deal – 
which were never disrespectful of the Shalit family – could not compete with those 
journalistic voices that called for Shalit’s return and implied that any scope of deal 
would deem necessary and legitimate. As early as 2007, both Yedioth Aharonoth and 
Ma’ariv endorsed a deal in the form of prominent front-page editorials. 
 
There were other instances of direct criticism of the Shalit campaign. In 
August 2009 the Shalit campaign initiated demonstrations outside three local prisons, 
calling to stop visitations by family members and members of the International Red 
Cross to Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons, until Hamas granted Gilad Shalit 
similar privileges in Gaza. The news website Walla, which is the most visited news 
website in Israel, criticized the campaign for advocating inhumane measures that 
would violate the ethical standards, set in international treaties that mandate the 
treatment of prisoners. This criticism was expressed, however, in an unusually 
apologetic way, with the lede stating: 
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Do yourselves a favor and read this piece thoroughly before you tear Udi 
Hirsch [Deputy Editor and the writer of the piece] apart in your talkbacks only 




In this and other instances, criticism of the Shalit campaign self-consciously 
emphasized, at the same time, the utter legitimacy of the campaign, its motives and 
causes. Also, critics were directing their negative opinions at campaign decisions and 
strategies, and rarely at the Shalit family. 
 
Victims vs. victims 
 
In light of the personification of the cause for the release of Shalit, it is not 
surprising that the most vocal opponents of the prisoners swap deal were the families 
of those who had been killed by the Palestinians who were to be freed in the exchange 
deal. A clash between two victim groups comes in sharp contrast to the background 
assumption that victimization is proxy for unity. Victims symbolize a unified category 
of an ethnic, national or religious community. When victims are revealed to be 
divided, they attest to a fundamental schism within the community and therefore inter-
victim conflicts are of symbolic and political significance. 
 
The organization representing the victims of the prisoners was the Almagor 
Terror Victims Association, a right-leaning organization whose main objective, as 
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reflected in its mission statement, was to prevent prisoner swap deals.
37
 Shortly after 
the Shalit family relocated to its tent outside the Jerusalem residence of Prime 
Minister Netanyahu, in 2010, Almgaor pitched its own tent across the street. Almagor 
was contrasting the Shalit family’s message with the “security argument” message, 
namely that freed Palestinian prisoners will resume attacks on a massive scale, 
generating new cycles of violence and victimhood. Almagor’s cause was also 
personified through photos of slain family members, their victimhood symbolizing the 
outcome of past, failed, policies.  
 
While one would expect that the two tents – victims vs. victims – would carry 
similar weight, Almagor’s tent hardly received any coverage, and was evacuated after 
several days.  Almagor could not compete, that late in the game, with the already 
iconic image of Gilad Shalit. It could not compete with the overwhelming impetus of 
the campaign and the widespread legitimacy that it succeeded to acquire for a prisoner 
swap deal. In terms of the Experience-Argument Scale, the argument of the Shalit 
family, speaking of immediate measures to end a stressful situation that was taking 
place here and now, was much more appealing than an argument made by victims of 
past attacks that were over and gone. The Shalit family was advocating for the urgent, 
pertinent solution of an ongoing hostage crisis; Almagor, on the other hand, was 
advocating for the abstract, general anti-terrorism policy of retaining prisoners who 
were convicted for terrorism- related offenses for their full sentence. The fact that 
Almagor as well as other victims’ families were repeating a predictable security-over-
deal argument, and behaving as “professional,” organized victims, may have 
contributed to the general media “desensitization” to these victims. 
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The following diagram illustrates the position of each “victim” – Shalit (and 
the Shalit family) vs. Almagor (representing families of victims of past attacks) – 
within the Scale, and the corresponding consequences in terms of media treatment. 
The relevant issue for the Shalit family is the hostage situation. The relevant issue for 
Almagor is the anti-terrorism measure of retaining terrorism-related convicts for their 
full sentence: 
 










While the Shalit campaign focused on raising awareness of the life conditions 
and humanity of Gilad Shalit, it went further in an attempt to directly address the 
larger policy questions involved and defeat the “security argument,” by recruiting 
public figures who would dismiss the fears raised, among other people, by the 
victims’ families. The Shalit campaign produced television commercials and billboard 
ads presenting five high-ranking military and Mossad veterans, who had the 
Experience 






















experience and authority to assert that the deal did not pose a serious threat to Israel’s 
security. The ads included quotes such as the following: 
 
My experience allows me to assert that the release of terrorists, even the most 
murderous ones, does not pose a danger that the Israeli intelligence and 
security forces cannot overcome (Ya’akov Peri, former Head of the Israeli 
Internal Security Forces.)  
 
 
Figure 15: Former security officials in a Shalit campaign ad 
 
As the Shalit campaign was gaining energy and public prominence, the 
hostility between the Shalit family and the victims’ families grew worse.  In October 
2011, as Israel and Hamas finalized the Shalit deal and it was about to take effect, this 
opposition between present victimhood and past victimhood crystallized into a 
showdown at the Israeli High Court of Justice.  In this battle, Almagor was joined by 
victims’ family members, and these individuals provided identifiable faces and 






this group were the Schijveschuurder brothers, whose parents and three siblings had 
been killed in the 2001 suicide bombing at a Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem.   
 
As in previous cases, Almagor and the families petitioned to abort the prisoner 
swap deal on the grounds that the government did not exercise due care in considering 
the security risk that the collective prisoner release entailed, and that the outcome of a 
deal would encourage future kidnappings. They further claimed that the government 
should have considered the families’ pain upon witnessing the early release of the 
people convicted for killing their loved ones. And they brought another issue before 
the court, and that was the timing of the government announcement of the list of the 
soon-to-be released prisoners.  
 
The announcement of the identities of the prisoners was mandated by the 
Court, which had held in an earlier ruling that the government must allow victims’ 
families sufficient time to apply for an injunction when the perpetrator involved in 
their experience was up for early release.  Conscious of the potential political damage 
of this confrontation, the Israeli government withheld, as long as it could, the prisoner 
list of the Shalit deal. Only three days before the execution of the deal did the 
government publish the prisoners’ names.  The petitioners argued in this respect that 
the list should have been disclosed earlier in order to allow them to raise their 
objections properly.  Indeed, the government’s conduct in this matter could be 
interpreted as indifference to the families, but it might also have reflected a sober 
assessment of the powerful potential of these families to ignite a public campaign that 






of the list of up-for-release prisoners granted any family of a relevant victim the status 
of a legitimate speaker in the dispute for and against the deal. By postponing the 
release of the names until the very last moment, the government managed to keep 
those families outside the public debate and minimize their influence.  
 
The court dismissed the petition against the Shalit deal, as it did in all 
previous, similar cases. It dismissed the claim regarding the timing of the publication 
of the prisoners’ list, reasoning that the Israel-Hamas negotiations had been known to 
be going on for several years, and that the families could have raised their objections 
to the release of particular prisoners throughout that time. In its decision about the 
dismissal of the claim regarding the security risk that the deal posed and the pain that 
it inflicted upon the families, the Supreme Court explained that these claims involved 
questions of morality and national security, rather than legal questions, and that 
therefore their resolution was under the exclusive authority of the executive branch, 
and that they were immune from judicial scrutiny.
38
  Moreover, the court made it 
repeatedly clear that future cases would be decided similarly, and left no room for 
foreseeable exceptions.   
 
Nonetheless, for the victims’ families, the petitions – despite their predictable, 
unsuccessful outcome – served multiple purposes. First, the fact that the Supreme 
Court granted the families legal standing in challenging a national decision of such 
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magnitude meant that the Court had formally but implicitly granted the families 
official confirmation as valid players in the anti-terrorism policy field.  Second, the 
petitions might have been futile in terms of the merits of the families’ case, but they 
nevertheless served as a formal outlet for the families’ grief and political discontent, 
for the ultimate purpose of media coverage and public exposure. The court 
proceedings created a newsworthy occasion, utilized as a journalistic beat.  
 
Looking at these Court rulings from a cultural point of view suggests that they 
occasionally reaffirmed the families’ status explicitly and canonized it into Israel’s 
legal records. In 2000, for example, the Supreme Court prohibited Israeli authorities 
from keeping prisoners who had been convicted for attacks of Israeli citizens in Israeli 
jails after they finished their prison sentence. The court held that Israel could not use 
former prisoners as bargaining chips in the negotiations for the release of Ron Arad 
and others. In the obiter dictum of the ruling, Chief Justice Aharon Barak addressed 
the families’ feelings and clarified what he perceived as the legal inevitability of the 
final outcome of the case: 
 
 I am aware of the pain that the families are experiencing. It is hard as a rock. 
The years that go by in constant uncertainty wound a man’s soul. The hostage, 
locked away in unknown confines, is in a worse state, torn from his homeland. 
This pain, as well as Israel’s highest interest in returning its sons home, was 
before me at all times… Each day, we carry with us the national and personal 
tragedies of the missing and the hostages. But as much as their release is of 
utmost importance, it cannot be done at all costs. Considering the legal 
framework before us, we cannot correct one wrong by committing another. 
(7048/97 Plonim vs. Minister of Defense, p. 743)
39
 
                                                           
39
 Soon after this ruling, the Knesset resumed legislation of the Incarceration of Illegal Combatants 







Such court rulings, apart from granting the families formal legal standing, 
acknowledged the emotional motivations behind the petitions and were empathetic 
toward the petitioners. While families’ petitions against swap deals have been 
routinely dismissed, the judges moved beyond legal reasoning into the realm of 
persuasion, noting the difficulties in reaching a decision contrary to the hopes of the 
petitioners, and employing a relatively unsophisticated, non-legal language intended 
for the ears and hearts of the petitioners and the general public. The fact that the 
petitions were anticipated to fail underscored the importance of those judicial holdings 
as a venue for dialogue between the court and the petitioners (Scharia, 2008:165), or 
rather, between the State of Israel and the families.  
 
The October 2011 Shalit judicial holding, which dismissed Almagor's petition, 
similarly spoke to the victims’ families. The holding cited Prime Minister 
Netanyahu’s cabinet speech, where he had requested the approval of the deal. In the 
speech, Netanyahu evoked his own victim status: Netanyahu’s brother, Yoni 
Netanyahu, was killed in the famous Entebbe operation in 1976. Yoni Netanyahu was 
the commander of the special army unit that flew to Uganda and released the 
passengers of a hijacked Air France Tel-Aviv–Paris flight.  
 
Today I bring to the cabinet a resolution that reflects the proper balance 
between all the considerations. I would not wish to withhold the fact that it is a 
difficult decision. My heart goes to the families of terrorism victims. I 







Netanyahu, in his attempt to convey the moral conflict involved in the swap 
deal, needed to use his own victimhood as a mean to disarm and mollify the victims’ 
families.  Their personal experience and pain could not be answered to effectively 
with the Prime Minister’s policy argument; only the Prime Minister’s personal 




Comparing coverage of abducted soldiers 
 
The Experience-Argument Scale purports to offer a universal tool, to assess 
the presence of the personal trauma component in news coverage. In hostage 
situations, dramatic and anxious as they are, the victims receive the fullest press 
attention and compassion, in line with the attitudes of other establishments such as the 
court system, the government and even popular culture.  As this chapter has 
demonstrated thus far, the hostage crisis, in its archetypical version, signifies, for the 
purpose of the Scale, complete integration between the victims’ experience and their 
argument. The hostages themselves—particularly in moments of visibility (of them 
and their families) to their home constituencies—gain importance and “press 
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desirability” equal to that of the usual cadre of news sources: criminals (here, the 
terrorists) and officials (here, army officers, intelligence and security senior personnel, 
etc.). 
 
While this is the basic premise of this chapter, the discussion has focused thus 
far on the recent history of soldier abductions in Israel. The abducted soldiers 
phenomenon presented an extreme case of public and press deference, which was 
rooted, as elaborated in the previous sections, in the place of the Israeli military within 
Israel’s nationhood, as well as the Israeli press’s penchant for apolitical campaigns 
that tapped into the emotional heart of the consensus. These forces came to play in the 
Shalit case, generating intense pressure to bring to his release at almost any price.  
 
This universal, human phenomenon, of extreme care in the face of victimhood, 
has of course manifested itself in the coverage of the American press of the various 
hostage crises that involved American citizens. The TWA hostage crisis, described in 
the outset of this chapter, demonstrated this well. Yet we need to look beyond the 
obviousness of press deference to terrorism victims, and contrast the behavior of 
American news organizations to that of their Israeli peers in a specific context that 
merits comparison. If, for argument’s sake, the hypothesis were that women occupy a 
meaningfully different place in Israeli and American societies, it would have been 
helpful to compare press treatment of female terrorism victims in these two countries. 
But that is not case, whereas soldier-victims do serve this purpose well, among other 






volunteerism vs. conscription—that affect the value systems associated with each 
military organization. 
 
This focus allows us to move beyond the universal theme of terrorism 
victimhood into the more complex concept of soldier-victim.  While the strong public 
identification with terrorism victims is tied to the notion that the arbitrary violence 
inflicted upon them “could have happened to us,” soldiers are one step removed from 
civilian society. Soldiers belong to a designated group which has voluntarily chosen—
to a certain degree—to bear the human risks involved in national conflicts. But while 
the soldier status can potentially account for some emotional distance from the 
soldier-victim, Israelis, as elaborated earlier in this chapter, exhibited the opposite—
high degree of identification with soldier-victims, felt by Israelis to be victimized 
children. 
 
Unlike Israeli POW/MIAs, who became household names, American MIAs 
were never personalized into an individual, symbolic “face,” mainly because of the 
huge numbers of POWs and MIAs involved, particularly in the Vietnam War—and in 
every war, in fact.  There were some aspects of personalization, such as the MIA 
bracelets that bore the names of individual missing soldiers, and whose bearers swore 
not to remove them until they were back or at least accounted for. And there was a 
substantial core of MIA activists, whom the administration had to placate through 
Congressional hearings that would bring official closure to the question of the 
Vietnam POW/MIAs. Nevertheless, there was no single person through whom or for 






personalization, the MIA problem was mainly discussed as a strict policy issue, 
involving questions such as the appropriate pressure the U.S. should put on Asian 
governments in order to achieve access to their war related archives. With time, as 
these governments were no longer hostile to the U.S., there was no moral dilemma 
involved whether to hold a dialogue or not, no prisoner exchange to consider, but 
simply a demand to devote national resources and efforts.  
 
The only case that did seem to merit direct comparison with the Shalit case 
was the Taliban’s kidnapping of U.S soldier Bowe Bergdahl in Afghanistan. Although 
singular in its long duration (to the date of this writing, Bergdahl has been in captivity 
for almost 5 years), Bergdahl’s name has been, and is yet, unfamiliar to most 
Americans. But what seemed as a Taliban version of the Hamas kidnapping to Shalit, 
was later complicated by revelations that Bergdahl, during his Afghanistan service, 
became gradually hostile to U.S policies and conduct in Afghanistan. The next 
paragraphs will attempt an explanation for the vast differences in the media visibility 
of Shalit and Bergdahl in their respective countries, not only because of the different 
circumstances or their captivity, but also because of underlying, systemic reasons that 
have to do with the media’s different relationship with government. 
 
The kidnapping of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl 
 
Every nation experiences war and every war involves the capture and 






capture, was seized by the Taliban in Afghanistan in June 2009.  Soon after his 
disappearance, his captors demanded a deal in which Bergdahl would be exchanged 
for 1 million U.S.D., 21 Afghan prisoners, mostly held at Guantanamo Bay, and the 
female Pakistani scientist Aafia Siddiqui, held in Fort Worth, Texas. To date, no deal 
has been struck, and Sgt. Bergdahl remains the only known soldier to be held today by 
anti-American forces.
41
 Since his capture, the Taliban has released five videos of him, 
with the latest released in May 2011. In No Easy Day, a controversial book written by 
former Navy SEAL Mat Bissonnette under the pen name Mark Owen, Bissonnette 
maintained that the same SEAL unit that killed Osama Bin Laden also raided Taliban 
posts in an attempt to find and rescue Bergdahl (Owen and Maurer, 2012). 
 
In the first three years following the kidnapping, it seemed that the United 
States was refusing to pursue a deal, in keeping with its stated “no-negotiation” 
policy. But in May 2012, Bergdahl’s parents, Robert and Jani, made public the fact 
that secret negotiations between the Obama administration and the Taliban regarding 
a prisoner exchange deal had been taking place for a year, and that they involved the 
release of five Taliban prisoners. Moreover, the talks were part of a U.S effort to work 
toward a peace agreement that would stabilize Afghanistan in the volatile time 
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In the interviews in which Robert Bergdahl revealed the negotiations, he also 
expressed, for the first time, frustration with the Obama administration. To the New 
York Times, Robert Bergdahl said that  
 
he was frustrated by the lack of progress on the talks, which he believes are 
stalled because the Obama administration is reacting to pressure from 
Congress in an election year not to negotiate with terrorists.  “We don’t have 
faith in the U.S. government being able to reconcile this,” Mr. Bergdahl said.42 
 
Up to that point, the Bergdahls kept silent per the request of the 
administration. The shift from the initial quiet cooperation with the well-intended 
government, to frustration and public accusations of government incompetence, has 
been the pattern of behavior of Israeli families of abducted soldiers. It took the Shalit 
family a similar period of time of approximately three years, to shift from 
acquiescence to public, angry pressure.  
 
The May 9, 2012 New York Times story that broke the news on the U.S.-
Taliban negotiations was also the first to raise the dilemma of whether to “negotiate 
with terrorists” or not. But it did so only indirectly, through Robert Bergdahl’s 
accusation that the Obama administration was stalling the talks as a political offering 
to a negotiations-averse Congress. The Times did not elaborate on the view that 
opposed negotiations, neither did it provide a source to clarify that position. By that, 
the Times gave the upper hand to the pro-negotiation position, and particularly to the 
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voice of the Bergdahl family, whom New York Times’ reporter Elisabeth Bumiller 
interviewed in its home in Idaho.  
 
The Times also reported on Robert Bergdahl’s independent initiatives vis-à-vis the 
Taliban: 
 
Mr. Bergdahl said that he had started to deal directly with the Taliban by e-
mail in recent months, initially through a “contact us” tab on a Taliban Web 
site, but then through a member of the Taliban he believes has knowledge of 
his son’s circumstances. Mr. Bergdahl said […] that he had told them [the 
Taliban] that their videos of his son have had little impact on the American 
public and that it would be more effective to direct their appeals to Mr. 
Obama. “I told them I am doing what I can to see that the president 
understands this issue,” Mr. Bergdahl said.  
 
The disclosure of the U.S.-Taliban negotiations came with another disclosure:  
that the New York Times had actually known for some months about the talks but 
withheld the information by request of the administration and the Bergdahl family. 
The press’s cooperation in monitoring the release of information for the sake of the 
abducted soldier has been characteristic of the American press. To name the most 
highly debated U.S. example of recent times, the U.S. and the foreign media had all 
cooperated with a request by the New York Times for a complete media blackout with 
respect to the Taliban’s 2008 abduction of New York Times reporter David Rohde. As 
for Israel, as elaborated earlier in this chapter, reporters withheld potentially damaging 
information (so long as they believed it to be damaging and as long as it was not 
published in the foreign press). But while the Israeli government wished that Gilad 






recognize his “importance” and raise their demands, Israeli reporters did not meet that 
expectation at all, and the coverage virtually screamed for Shalit’s release.  
 
Bergdahl family’s short-lived media blitz 
 
That same May of 2012, the Bergdahl family went for a media offensive. 
Launching their campaign seven months after the internationally acclaimed Shalit 
campaign culminated in Gilad Shalit’s release, they were undoubtedly encouraged by 
that campaign’s sweeping success. Moreover, once the U.S. was holding negotiations 
with the Taliban, the family’s campaign had a concrete purpose, which was to put 
pressure on Washington to bring the negotiations to fruition. In Israel, the point of the 
Shalit campaign was exactly that. The campaign came to life because the Israeli-
Hamas indirect negotiations were not sufficiently robust in the family’s view, and it 
needed to press the Netanyahu government into making more concessions and 
finalizing the deal. 
 
The Bergdahl family's media strategy was similar to that of Shalit's family, 
and it was no doubt inspired by it. Aside from their public revelation of the fact that 
negotiations with the kidnappers were taking place, the parents, who were described 
as intensely private, began to make themselves familiar to the American public. They 






home-schooled childhood, his athleticism and his gentle nature.
43
 The emphasis on his 
good spirit and naiveté echoed Gilad Shalit’s similarly endearing public persona. In 
May 17, 2012, Time Magazine featured a story about the Bergdahl family, 
accompanied with beautiful, melancholic photos, taken by renowned was 
photojournalist Christopher Morris, of Jani and Robert Bergdahl in the bucolic Idaho 
landscape.
44
 But the Bergdahl’s campaign was short lived, as only a few weeks 
following its initiation, major publications were suddenly retelling Bowe’s abduction 
story, adding details that tainted his reputation, and in particular, his patriotism. 
 
Questioning Bergdahl’s loyalty 
 
In June 2012, less than a month after the Bergdahls began their high-profile 
campaign, Rolling Stone magazine published an investigative piece by Michael 
Hastings, which shed a new light on Bowe Bergdahl in a way that for some people 
reduced the U.S. motivation for negotiation. Hastings claimed that Bowe Bergdahl 
had left his army post voluntarily because he was appalled by U.S behavior in 
Afghanistan. As evidence, Hastings cited an email that Bergdahl sent to his parents 
the night before his disappearance, and in which he described his unit’s indifference 
to Afghan suffering, concluding that ‘the horror that is America is disgusting.’45 In 
light of Hasting’s account, the attempts by Bergdahl’s father to initiate a direct 
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dialogue with the Taliban could easily be interpreted as excessively amenable to the 
Taliban. 
 
The Rolling Stone piece was not the first to raise these suspicions against 
Bergdahl. Fox News had previously questioned the circumstances of Bergdahl’s 
disappearance, including the claim that he was a deserter.  Fox went even further to 
report that it learned that Bergdhal had converted to Islam and joined the Taliban 
cause. Fox based the report on interviews with one of Bergdhal’s captors, an 
unidentified Taliban commander.  
 
The Rolling Stone scoop was immediately picked up by news agencies and the 
majority of print and digital news media. The New York Times not only reported 
Hastings’ version on the events, but also repeated his assessment of the diminished 
chances for a prisoner exchange deal. There were people in Congress and the 
Pentagon, Hastings said, for whom Bergdahl was a deserter and even a traitor, and 
who objected any effort to release him.
46
  Six months later, in October 2012, the 
Obama administration announced that the negotiations—which were a part of a larger 
attempt to conclude a peace accord between the Taliban and the Afghan 
government—failed, and that the parties were not expected to resume them before the 
completion of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. 
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In this respect, the Bergdahl case bears similarities to the hostage taking of 
Jeffrey Schilling by the Muslim Philippine-based guerilla group Abu-Sayyaf in 2000. 
Schilling was an American citizen, but the circumstances of his kidnapping were odd, 
as he was in fact visiting the Abu Sayyaf camp with his Philippine wife, who was a 
cousin of an Abu Sayyaf member. During the eight months of Schilling’s captivity, 
the U.S. media coverage of his plight was modest compared to the other hostage 
situations that Abu Sayyaf was constantly and consistently orchestrating. First, Abu 
Sayyaf’s habit of kidnapping foreigners for the ransom that would finance their 
operations had eventually scared the foreign media away and prevented close 
coverage of the situation and proper investigation of the circumstances of Schilling’s 
captivity.  Second, Washington kept a very low profile and hardly made any 
statements on Schilling, partly because it was uncertain about his victim status.  The 
media followed suit, and in the absence of any Administration-generated items, or the 
ability to verify or disprove Schilling’s collaboration with Abu-Sayyaf, it hardly 
covered the story (Nacos 2007). 
 
This turn of events in the Bergdahl case in mid-2012 obviously affects the 
validity of the comparison between the Bergdahl and the Shalit cases. Bergdahl’s 
questionable loyalty denied him the victim status and with it, any chances of a 
massive Shalit-like public campaign. It is yet helpful to use the Bergdahl case for 
comparative purposes if we limit it to the time period beginning in his disappearance 
in 2009 until the Rolling Stone story in mid-2012. Indeed, it is possible that the 
relatively low-key coverage during those three years was partly related to the already 






captivity. But while the validity of the comparison to Shalit may be limited, this is 
still case of an American soldier held by a hostile organization who disseminates 
videos of the hostage pleading to get out. 
 
Coverage of the non-controversial period of Bergdahl’s captivity 
 
A search of the New York Times archive
47
 reveals that during the relevant three 
years period, the Bergdahl story generated a total of 28 stories, including coverage of 
the videos that the Taliban released featuring Bergdahl.  Given this modest figure, it is 
tempting to draw immediate conclusions from Israel’s national hysteria over the fate 
of Shalit and the American media’s relative disregard of the continuing suffering of 
Bergdahl and his family, and there were some commentators who did just that, 
claiming that Americans did not “care” as much about their soldiers.48 But that is 
definitely not the point.  The Shalit family, after its initial three years of silence, ran a 
formidable public campaign, employing Israel’s top publicists and organizers.  The 
Bergdahls, on the other hand, similarly kept a very low profile for three years, but just 
as they were initiating their media offensive, the story broke that Bowe Bergdahl was 
somewhat accountable for his own captivity, and again the Bergdahls resumed their 
silence. So one plausible answer to the claim about the American “indifference” is 
that Shalit was backed by an organized, massive campaign, while Bergdahl was not. 
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The interest, however, lies in the similar dynamics of the families’ activism, 
from three years of silence to heated pressure.  It is here that we are faced with an 
important distinction between U.S and Israel foreign policies, one that has had a 
tremendous effect on the media coverage and the public discourse, which in the Israeli 
case brought the issues back to policy making level.  Until the Bergdahl case, the U.S. 
held onto its policy of no negotiations with captors over captured soldiers, and no 
compliance with demands of either ransom or prisoner exchange deals. If negotiations 
were held, they were kept confidential in order to appear consistent with the stated 
policy. As long as negotiations were not a formal, viable option, there was no point in 
massive coverage of abducted soldiers, because in terms of the basic characteristics of 
news, nothing was going on—the captors were making demands, and the U.S. refused 
to consider them. And it was not only that journalists had no developing story to 
report—government too had all its reasons to keep stories of abducted soldiers far 
from the media radar. If there were any indirect negotiations, the U.S. government 
would not want to publicize them for the same reasons that were cited by the very few 
opponents of the Shalit campaign, namely the wish to prevent the captors from 
realizing that the deal was a high priority worthy of considerable sacrifice.  Moreover, 
the U.S. government was generally not eager to publicize the ongoing, grinding nature 
of the Afghanistan war in any way.  Promoting news about immoral enemy conduct 
only inflamed the public (to some degree), and hastened the war opposition.  From the 
administration's point of view, less news about Afghanistan was better. 
 
The Shalit campaign and the massive Israeli coverage came about because 






had refused to negotiate for Shalit at all, it would have still made perfect sense to 
mount the Shalit campaign because it was a well-known fact that the Israeli 
government did conventionally negotiate, so that when it didn’t (or at least said it 
didn’t), it was worthwhile to try to force it to. As described earlier in this chapter, 
throughout history Israeli leaders time and again waived the “no-negotiation” 
principle. Since the Jibril Deal in 1985, and with the exception of the Arad incident, 
every abduction crisis began with the government’s total rejection of the captors’ 
demands, and ended several years later with the acceptance of most of them. A 
campaign like the one led by the Shalit family would not have been as forceful, and 
perhaps would not have any point at all, had it faced an administration with a 
consistent no-negotiation-over-soldiers policy.  
 
Israeli journalist and commentator Raviv Drucker, who wrote about Bowe 
Bergdahl in his blog as an illustration of the different policies of Israel and the U.S., 
rightfully noted that in Bergdahl’s case, the Taliban demands were relatively 
modest—the release of 21 detainees, ultimately reduced to five Taliban leaders—
compared to Hamas’s achievement in the Shalit deal, which was the release of 1027 
prisoners. The Taliban’s bargaining position, he argued, took under consideration the 
U.S. no-deal policy.
 49
 Moreover, Bergdahl’s family published on May 6, 2011 a taped 
YouTube appeal directed at the Taliban
50
 precisely because the rules of the game—no 
bargaining—were, at the time, very clear, and the Bergdahls had no option but to act 
independently. 
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The U.S. no-negotiation-over-soldiers principle 
 
While it is too soon to assess the Bergdahl case historically, it may as well be 
the first case in which the U.S would be known to have conducted negotiations with a 
militant group for the release of a soldier-hostage. For its part, the administration has 
put the Bergdahl negotiations in a larger context, claiming them to be a component in 
an attempt for a peace agreement between the Taliban and Hamid Karzai’s Afghan 
government. The release of Afghan prisoners from Guantanamo, had it taken place, 
could thus be construed, from Washington’s desired perspective, as a “peace building 
measure” rather as a fulfillment of the U.S. part within a prisoner exchange deal. This 
way, the “no-negotiation” principle would not be deemed broken.  
 
The “no-negotiation” principle, to which the U.S. government generally 
adhered (if it did negotiate, it was a tough negotiator, offering very little in exchange 
for captured Americans) and to which the Israeli government did not, is key to 
understanding the different coverage that the issue of abducted soldiers received in the 
U.S. and Israel. In the U.S., the government’s long silence translated into meager 
coverage by a cooperative press, while in Israel, the much higher prospects of 
negotiations and release flamed hopes and provided a sense of purpose for both 








A short survey of hostage crises involving U.S. citizens from the past 15 years 
demonstrates that they all adhere, at least publicly, to the formal U.S. “no negotiation” 
policy. Historically, the U.S. “no-negotiation” doctrine became even more rigid 
following Israel’s successful Entebbe operation in 1976, as well as West Germany’s 
release of the passengers of Lufthansa Flight 181 in October 1977, inspiring President 
Carter to order the creation of the Delta Force (McAlister 2002).  
 
A typical example for the “no-negotiation” policy was the Dos Palmas 
kidnapping of 2001, in which Abu Sayyaf raided the Philippines Dos Palmas resort 
and kidnapped 20 people, among them three American tourists. Four months later 
Abu Sayyaf beheaded one of the American hostages, Guillermo Sobero. Although 
U.S. citizens were involved, it was the Philippine government that negotiated with 
Abu Sayyaf and paid ransom, although the hostages were eventually freed through a 
Philippine army raid (except for the hostage Martin Burnham, who was killed during 
the rescue operation).  
 
Another case, from another part of the world and a different context, was the 
kidnapping of Christian Science Monitor reporter Jill Carroll by an unidentified Iraqi 
group in Baghdad in January 2006. Her captors demanded the release of all Iraqi 
female prisoners from U.S. custody, but the U.S. refused.  Carroll was held for two 
and a half months, until she was freed without explanation. During the time of her 
custody, the U.S. freed five Iraqi female prisoners, but the U.S maintained that the 







When New York Times Pulitzer Prize winning reporter David Rohde and his 
Afghan fixer Tahir Ludin were kidnapped by the Taliban and held near the Afghan-
Pakistani border in November 2008, their kidnappers demanded the release of 15 
Taliban prisoners being held in Guantanamo and Afghanistan, as well as a ransom of 
$25 million. According to the New York Times, it did not pay any ransom,
51
 and 
Rhodes and Ludin eventually and famously escaped after seven months in captivity, 
but New York Magazine, in an investigative piece intended to shed light on a 
remarkable hostage drama that the New York Times succeeded in keeping largely 
secret, argued that while the Times indeed did not pay any ransom, it had offered to 
pay $1 million. Eventually, according to one source (cited by New York Magazine), 
money was paid as a bribe—although it is unclear who paid it, and it was not 
necessarily the Times— to Rohde’s guards, in order for them to enable a rescue 
operation. The operation never took place, but it is possible that the bribes eased 
Rohde’s and Ludin’s escape.52 The U.S government has so far not been associated 
with any ransom or bribe in this case. 
 
And only recently, in January 2013, the U.S. “no negotiation” policy was 
again put to the test as a group associated with Al-Qaeda took over the more than 800 
Algerian and foreign personnel of the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria, including seven 
American citizens. The hostage crisis, dubbed the Sahara hostage crisis, lasted four 
days, and ended with an Algerian military raid in which all 32 terrorists were killed 
and most of the hostages were freed. Approximately 40 hostages died during the crisis 
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and the rescue operation, and while it is unclear how many died in the hands of the 
terrorists and how many were killed by Algerian forces, the price of the aggressive 
rescue operation—Algeria was criticized for not using available surveillance 
technologies that could have decreased the death toll
53—was undoubtedly very high. 
Algeria refused to negotiate with the terrorists, as did the U.S, which stated 




The popular argument ties the U.S. “no-negotiation” policy with regard to 
abducted soldiers to the fact that service in the U.S military is characterized as 
voluntary and professional. In terms of the Shalit vs. Bergdahl comparison, Shalit was 
the child who had been drafted as all 18-year old Israeli teenagers are, while Bergdahl 
chose a professional, military-job path, which involved the taking of a calculated risk.  
The argument that Israelis engage in exchange deals because the Israeli army is 
deeply intertwined with Israeli life while the U.S. army is not, requires some 
elaboration and re-assessment.   
 
Volunteer vs. conscription army 
 
In order to understand the value system that is associated with the U.S. army, 
and how it affects the general perception of soldiers and soldier-victims, we need to 
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acquaint ourselves with the various arguments surrounding the question of civic 
participation in state-mandated public service. At one extreme is the current all-
volunteer army model, which has existed in the US since 1973, and at the other the 
conscription model (as in Israel), while various types of mandatory, non-military, 
national service duties fall in between. 
 
Proponents of the conscription and national service models come mostly from 
a communitarian point of view. They argue that collective mandatory service 
contributes to social cohesion, enhances public mindedness and fosters greater 
acceptance of minorities’ rights. “’It’s hard to imagine,’ said Robert Putnam in a 2008 
interview for The American Interest, ‘the civil rights revolution without it having been 
preceded by World War II [fought by draftees], even though I recognize that the U.S. 
armed forces were segregated during the war. It wasn’t a direct consequence, but the 
pervasive notion that we’re all in this together’ was a contributing factor in the 
background to the civil rights revolution.”55  
 
Proponents of the mandatory service model have argued that having an army 
of draftees would make national leaders less likely to rush into ill-advised wars 
because their own children could be swept into them—the generally lower-income 
and lower-status soldiers of an all-volunteer army have less political clout and may be 
seen as more expendable. Another common criticism of the all-volunteer army has 
been its contribution to the perpetuation of inequalities. Michael Sandel (1998) argued 
that  
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the difference between conscription and the volunteer army is not that one is 
compulsory, whereas the other is not; it is rather that each employs a different 
form of compulsion—the state in the first case, economic necessity in the 
second. […] If military service is just another job, why should the employer 
discriminate in hiring on the basis of nationality? Why shouldn’t the U.S. 
military be open to citizens of any country who want the work and possess the 
relevant qualifications?  
 
On the other hand, as the case of the Vietnam War proved, a draft could also 
be conducted on an unequal basis. The anger of the anti-war movement was also 
directed at the discriminatory draft, cultivating the persistent myth that only the lives 
of the socially and economically inferior were put at risk, and that the soldiers 
returning home were “spat upon” because they were of “low class.” 
 
Richard Posner defended the all-volunteer army, which he preferred to call “a 
professional army.” Posner (2003) was concerned with the deprivation of liberties that 
the conscription model entailed. Answering Sandel, he argued that “the state that 
asserts an unlimited right to the enforced labor of its people is not participatory, it is 
despotic.” He dismissed Sandel’s argument, that army personnel are economically 
“coerced into service,” as “far-fetched.”  
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. military has been becoming increasingly “professional” 
by adopting corporate standards and practices.  It continues a trend that Charles 
Moskos, a military sociologist, identified more than twenty years ago, when he argued 






“occupational” model (Moskos, 1988).  As an “institution,” the army derived its 
legitimacy from “national” norms such as “honor” and “duty,” and the collective 
interest of the institution surpassed that of the individual soldier. The transition into 
the “occupational” model meant that the army derived its legitimacy from the non-
normative rules of the free market, namely supply and demand, and that the self-




Christopher Dandeker (1994) explained the “corporatization” of Western 
armies in broader terms than the practical free-market efficiency. Armies of Western, 
developed states had to respond to the changing priorities of civil society. These 
priorities were increasingly fluid, as national interests were no longer as clear as in the 
old “us vs. them” Cold War dichotomy.   
 
In this uncertain and turbulent world it is more difficult than ever before to 
identify where one’s international interests lie and thus what appropriate mix 
of military and non-military (economic, diplomatic) security instruments 
should be developed, what missions should be allocated to armed forces and 
what force structure is most appropriate (pp. 639-640).  
 
Dandeker suggested a re-consideration of the role of the army in a globalized 
world. He predicted that Western armies would increasingly engage in internal 
conflicts of other, less developed nations worldwide.  As the Balkan wars have 
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tragically shown, regional, sub-national movements could challenge nation states, 
triggering a spiral of genocides and humanitarian crises. This dangerous breakdown of 
nation states (Syria is a current example) required Western armies to engage in 
international policing and peacekeeping missions, and resolve situations where the 
U.S. and the other Western powers’ interests were not easy to discern. This uncertain 
reality meant that Western armies would be increasingly "smaller, busier and more 
flexible and a critical force multiplier will be effective intelligence about security 
risks as well as superiority in command, control, communications and intelligence 




Does the corporatization of the army bear on the distance between soldiers and 
civilian society? Going back to the popular question of whether the U.S “cared less” 
about its captured soldiers in a way that made it more prone to a “no-negotiation” 
policy, Posner dismissed any negative effect a volunteer army might have had on the 
status of the soldiers:  
 
No American was heard to say that since our soldiers are paid to risk their 
lives, we should regard the death, the wounding, or the capture of them with 
the same equanimity with which we regard the occasional death and maiming 
of race car drivers, lion tamers, and mountain climbers. 
 
Indeed, American soldiers’ public esteem remains intact and is not reduced by 
pay. The concern for “our troops” in times of armed conflict has been and remains 
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genuine and intense. This chapter’s argument has more to do with the extreme Israeli 
experience, exacerbated by populist journalism, than with an alleged moral American 
weakness.  Indeed, some would say, as Israeli journalists Raviv Drucker and Shimon 
Schiffer have, that the moral weakness here lies with Israel. This chapter argues that 
the universal army service in Israel is an important part of the explanation of the 
overwhelming power of the Shalit phenomenon (as well as the less-successful 
campaigns that preceded it, such as the Arad campaign). The shared army experience, 
and the nation-wide identification that it engenders with families of abducted soldiers, 
is the social imperative for the government’s compulsion to negotiate for the release 
of abducted soldiers. The compulsion may be benevolent, portraying the government 
as responsive to popular wish, but it should be also perceived as purely political. 
Indeed, the Shalit issue may have become an electoral issue for Benjamin Netanyahu, 
who already knew that in the subsequent elections he would be seeking to win—as 
indeed, in 2013 he won—a second term as prime minister. 
 
A conscription army is fully immersed in society in a way that makes it an 
integral component of the Israeli life cycle, for better and worse. The army is a not a 
mere symbol of solidarity and nationhood, it does not “represent” Israel the way the 
U.S army “represents” it, but it is a mechanism that exercises national solidarity and 
social cohesion on a tangible, day-to-day basis. This is indeed a fundamental, 
systemic cultural difference between these two societies, as heterogeneous as they 
both are.  The shared army experience, which transforms every civilian into a soldier 
and later a veteran, creates deep identification with soldiers, and particularly, those in 






Americans “don’t care”) is not the argument presented here. Posner is right in saying 
that no one can seriously argue that U.S. soldiers suffer from public indifference 
because they are paid to do their job. The U.S army does not suffer from a lack of 
respect from the American public. The point here is, however, that by comparison, a 
conscription army can elicit an overwhelming public reaction to situations of soldiers 
at risk that can be, and have been regarded as, disproportional or hysterical.  A 
substantial part of the international press coverage of the Shalit deal was the attempt 
to explain the oddity of the imbalance of the exchange. The curiosity and awe were 
reflected in headlines such as CNN’s “Why Israelis Believe One Soldier is Worth 
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Victims and the Overarching Conflict 
 
The complex trauma of losing a family member to an act of political violence can 
bring about a fundamental shift in the personal and professional lives of these 
secondary victims.  Apart from the tremendous challenge of dealing with their own 
grief, these victims’ predicament is the result of a political situation, which violently 
permeated their life and which they cannot ignore or separate from their tragedy. 
Their need to understand and give meaning to their loss often compels bereaved 
family members to become familiar with the details of the conflict and develop 
coherent opinions on the geo- or ethno-political crisis that so profoundly affected their 
lives. They are further compelled to consider ways to prevent future attacks, whether 
by means of promoting peace or by retaliation or even annihilation of the perpetrators.  
At times, the public expects them to become involved.  
 
This chapter examines the interaction of the news media with family members 
and families’ organizations that actively promote regional or world peace and the 






whoever and wherever they are, from a similar fate. It examines the news reaction to 
these ambitious groups and individuals, who risk being labeled “unpatriotic” or 
“naïve” as they reach out to people and communities often deemed by their own 
communities to be “the enemy.” Specifically, the groups that this chapter illustrates 
form personal and working relations with civilian victims of “the other side,” their 
message being: If we, who paid the heaviest price of the conflict, are able to connect 
with “the other side” and work to protect the basic rights of the “other,” then 
everybody else can. 
 
Of course, not all victims groups who form on the basis of shared terrorism 
victimhood are necessarily “peacenik” organizations. In Israel, as this chapter will 
later illustrate, terrorism victim organizations were traditionally “hard liners” until the 
late 1990s. And in the U.S., 9/11 family members, including Debra Burlingame—who 
was also the moving force behind “Take Back the Memorial,” discussed in Chapter 
2—formed “9/11 Families for a Safe and Strong America,” an organization that 
promoted neo-conservative approach to anti-terrorism, and in particular, the pre-
emption doctrine. However, I decided to focus on those organizations that strive for 
peaceful measures in violent times, because their coverage is hard-won compared to 
the coverage of the hawkish family members. Peace and human rights family 
organizations struggle on the right end of the Experience-Argument Scale, where their 
tragedy provides limited validity to their claims. Hawkish families, on the other hand, 
operate in the more “concrete” anti- and counter-terrorism “middle” area of the Scale, 
as they oppose the early release of perpetrators or a prisoner exchange deal, or call or 






the right end of the Scale, where family members are not always deemed newsworthy 
and where their moral authority is sometimes questioned. 
 
Terrorism victims’ peace organizations 
 
Jim Potorti worked on the 95
th
 floor of the World Trade Center North Tower, 
and perished on September 11
th
, 2001. His brother, David Potorti, co-founded 
September Eleventh Families for Peaceful Tomorrows, an advocacy group seeking 
peaceful alternatives to war and terrorism. In the book that he wrote about Peaceful 
Tomorrows’ formative years, September 11th Families for peaceful Tomorrows: 
Turning Our Grief into Action for Peace (2003), David Potorti described his own 
reasons to work for a cause which was not too popular in the revengeful climate 
following the events of 9/11:   
 
I frequently ask myself about the work of Peaceful Tomorrows: Does it 
matter? Does an act of solidarity with a Muslim group, a gesture of kindness to 
a kid in Afghanistan, or a show of unity with Japanese atomic bomb survivors 
really mean anything? Who benefits from those connections? And what 
changes? 
The answer is, in most cases, is me. I change. And in doing so, I begin to 
achieve the change I want to see in the world. This is a concept I can wrap my 
brain around, even as I struggle to imagine how I can possibly make a 
difference in a world where force so thoroughly dominates our lives and our 
imaginations. 
 
The personal motivation to establish and join victim-based human rights 






fill the emptiness, the lack of sense of purpose that bereavement entails. This is how 
Ben, an Israeli bereaved father, described his joining the Israeli-Palestinian 
organization The Parents’ Circle: 
 
I was told [by a Parents’ Circle member] that at the end of the month there was 
a weekend seminar and she invited me to come. I told her: you don’t know me 
and I don’t know you. What peace are you talking about? With whom? With 
those who murdered my daughter two months ago?  I gave in and went to 
Neve-Shalom [the Parents’ Circle meeting place near Jerusalem] on a 
Thursday. I met a group of bereaved parents, Israelis and Palestinians. 
Meeting them gave my life meaning and working together with them gives me 
a reason to get out of bed every morning. 
 
The current victim-based peace organizations worldwide work independently 
in their respective countries, and are also united through international networks, which 
provide them opportunities to meet and collaborate.  In the UK, Building Bridges for 
Peace
59
 promotes the relationship between a daughter of a British MP and the IRA 
member who killed her father. The two make joint appearances in conferences and in 
the media worldwide as personal examples of reconciliation. In Algeria, Djazairouna 
is an organization of victims of the 1990s civil war that took the lives of more than 
200,000 civilians.  In Italy, Memoria Condivisa was established by family members of 
victims of neo-fascist terrorism (such as the 1980 Bologna Massacre), concentrating 
on remembrance of the victims as well as peace education. And in Japan, Nihon 
Hidankyo represents survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atom bombings, 
advocating for a global ban on nuclear weapons. 
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Broadly speaking, victims’ organizations are a relatively new sociological and 
political phenomenon. Victims’ organizations have developed together with and as a 
result of the development of the concept of victims’ rights, and in particular, 
secondary victims’ rights. These rights included, for example, family members’ 
participation in the sentencing phase of the criminal trial and monetary compensation. 
In her study about the depiction of victims in crime reporting, Rentschler (2011) 
argued that victims’ personhood began to appear as a component in crime reporting 
only three decades ago, as victims’ organizations raised awareness of the meaning of 
victimhood, its expansion to the victim’s close family circle, and the needs that 
victimhood entailed, such as protection from the potential re-victimization effect of 
criminal proceedings. Victimhood has elevated as a legitimation for “standing” not 
only in the legal but also in the moral sense.
60
 
   
Victims’ organizations have been also responsible for major advances in the 
U.S. criminal justice system. For example, they have succeeded in criminalizing 
specific behaviors such as child abuse and drunk driving.  The history of crime 
reporting has been parallel to the history of victim activism. In the past, reporting was 
focused on the criminal act and the perpetrator, and the habit of depicting the victims’ 
life or including the victims’ family in the story did not exist. The acknowledgement 
of families as secondary victims and their high visibility within crime stories are a late 
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development that is commensurate with, as well as a contributor to, the ascent of 
victims’ organizations.  
 
Rentschler also explained the developments that allowed victims’ family 
members to become legitimately recognized co-victims of crime, for which terrorism 
certainly qualified. During the 1980s, psychiatric definitions of victimization changed 
to focus on the subjective experience of psychological distress, rather than on the 
occurrence and circumstances of the victimizing act of violence.  Co-victims, 
Rentchler wrote, “experience the traumatic, grief-ridden dimensions of crime as the 
caregivers of wounded primary victims, as the bearers of primary victims’ 
testimonials to their experiences of crime, as witnesses to crime’s aftereffects, and as 
dependents of or providers to the primary victims” (p.9). As we examine the 
pertinence of family members’ claims through the Experience-Argument Scale, we 
relate to these same capacities of family members because they serve as factors of 
proximity. As the primary victims have died, the survivors and the victims’ families 
remain closest to the terror experience.  
 
When journalists encounter family-members-turned-human-rights-
activists/pacifists, they need to strategize their reporting in a way that addresses a 
variety of social factors and assumptions. Conflicting elements include the revered 
place of the victims within society and the moral weight they carry, the fact that these 
are ordinary folks with no relevant education or professional credentials pertaining to 
the critical foreign policy issues that they advocate, the seeming loftiness of their 






climate of fear, and finally, the generally deep sense of conviction held by the victims, 
a conviction reserved for people who have found in their political mission a renewed 
sense of purpose.  Clearly, there is also a certain man-bites-dog element at play:  
"Although they lost relatives, they don’t believe in war." 
 
This chapter studies two victim-based peace organizations, one in the U.S. and 
one in Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In the U.S, it is September Eleventh 
Families for Peaceful Tomorrows,
61
 and in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, it is 
the joint Israeli-Palestinian Parents Circle Family Forum.
62
 These organizations are 
similar in that they both believe in the advancement of reconciliation and peace 
through their members’ direct, intimate interaction with the civilian victims of the 
“other side,” and by making these personal connections publicly known as inspiring 
evidence for the possibility of peace.  These organizations are also similar in the 
challenges that they face, particularly the accusations of treason. The Parents Circle, 
to give a particularly extreme example, once faced criticism for bringing a bereaved 
Palestinian man, whose brothers were killed by the Israeli army, to speak with Israeli 
students—the accusation being that as the brother of Palestinians who were suspected 
of terrorism, this bereaved member, and therefore the entirety of the Parents Circle, 
was “related to terrorism.” 
 
Advocacy groups need a continued and critical mass of member motivation. In 
order to survive, they also need a long-term vision and confidence in their ability to 
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create change. These are all hard to sustain. Many of the families’ groups that formed 
after 9/11 for various causes disappeared after several years, whether because they 
had specific short-term goals that they either achieved or not (such as a particular 
design of the 9/11 memorial) or because the organization’s internal energy waned. 
The Parents Circle and Peaceful Tomorrows have been quite successful in 
overcoming these challenges, and they have both been around for a remarkably long 
time. Their endurance is particularly notable given their ambitious, and occasionally 
Sisyphean, mission of promoting peace through personal encounters with civilian 
victims of their own nation’s acts of violence. The Parents Circle has been active for 
18 years, and Peaceful Tomorrows has been active for 11 years, allowing for an 
examination of the effects of time on their work and their influence, as well as on the 
values and moral judgments that the press assigned to their complex image of 
terrorism victims and political activists. 
 
 September Eleventh Families for Peaceful Tomorrows 
 
The beginnings of peaceful Tomorrows were rooted in the disparately 
experienced and yet shared feeling of 9/11 family members, in the days and months 
that followed the attacks, that they disagreed with the official U.S response to the 
attacks. They resented, individually, the militaristic, retaliatory and pre-emptive 
approach, and particularly the fact that it was waged in the name of their loved ones.  
For them, the 9/11 attacks were a heinous criminal act, and as such called for a joint, 
multi-national intelligence effort to capture the remaining perpetrators and their 






family members, who were initially voicing their opinions disparately in newspaper 
op-eds, human rights websites, open letters to President G.W. Bush or simply in 
private communications with their friends, were fully aware that they were swimming 
against the tide of public enthusiasm for a war, but gradually connected with like-
minded family members to ultimately form Peaceful Tomorrows. 
 
Phyllis and Orlando Rodriguez, who lost their son Greg, a Cantor Fitzgerald 
employee, sent President Bush on September 17
th
, 2001—merely a week following 
the attacks—a letter. It said in part: 
 
Your response to this attack does not make us feel better about our son’s 
death. It makes us feel worse. It makes us feel that our government is using 
our son’s memory as a justification to cause suffering for other sons and 
parents in other lands. It is not the first time that a person in your position has 
been given unlimited power and came to regret it (Potorti 2003, p.24). 
 
Another family member who was immediately moved to action was Rita 
Lasar. Lasar’s brother, Avrame Zelmanowitz, famously and heroically refused to 
leave behind his paraplegic co-worker, and perished with him in the collapse of the 
North Tower of the World Trade Center. On September 17
th
 2001, the New York 
Times published her letter to the editor: 
 
It is in my brother’s name and mine that I pray that we, this country that has 
been so deeply hurt, not do something that will unleash forces we will not 







Amber Amundson, the widow of Spc. Craig Amundson, who perished at the 
Pentagon, published in September 25, 2001 an op-ed piece in the Chicago Tribune: 
 
Craig would not have wanted a violent response to avenge his death. And I 
cannot see how good can come out of it. We cannot solve violence with 
violence. Mohandas Gandhi said, "An eye for an eye only makes the whole 
world blind." We will no longer be able to see that we hold the light of liberty 
if we are blinded by vengeance, anger and fear. I ask our nation's leaders not 
to take the path that leads to more widespread hatreds--that make my 




And Colleen Kelly, a devout Irish Catholic whose brother Billy died in the 
World Trade Center, wrote to Thomas Gumbleton, a Detroit bishop committed to 
non-violence: 
 
One stumbling block seems to be the lack of choices given the American 
public concerning our response to 9/11. Our country sees no other way 
because we have been presented with no other way. This is my urgent request 
of the bishops: Can you begin a discussion of the other way, Christ’s way? 
(Potorti 2003, p.49) 
 
The first occasion on which the soon-to-be founding members of Peaceful 
Tomorrows met was the November 2001 “Walk for Healing and Peace” from the 
Pentagon to the World Trade Center. The organizer of the Walk was Voices in the 
Wilderness, an organization committed to ending the economic sanctions on Iraq. 
When Voices in the Wilderness members came across 9/11 family members’ online 
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anti-war statements, they invited them to join the Walk. David Potorti was there, as 
well as Craig Amundson’s brothers Barry and Ryan, and Colleen Kelly. 
 
Their first project, as a group, although not formally yet as Peaceful 
Tomorrows, was a collaboration with the San Francisco-based organization Global 
Exchange, for the purpose of visiting Afghanistan and connecting with civilian 
Afghan victims. Global Exchange initiated programs that served as “reality tours,” 
facilitating personal interactions between people from different countries and cultures, 
and the U.S.-Afghan victim connection seemed particularly unusual and politically 
significant. In January 2002, merely three months after the launch of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, four core soon-to-be-members of Peaceful 
Tomorrows visited Afghanistan: Barry Amundson’s partner Kelly Campbell; Rita 
Lasar; Derrill Bodley, a college music professor who lost his daughter Deora on 9/11 
in the United Airlines 93 crash in Pennsylvania; and Bodley’s stepdaughter, Eva 
Rupp. 
 
In their week-long visit to Afghanistan, the group visited civilian victims of 
U.S bombings in their villages and homes, creating intimate encounters that were 
nevertheless accompanied by heavy press presence. The purpose of these personal 
connections, based on a shared loss, was to raise awareness of the human toll of the 
war and the immediate need for a U.S. federal fund that would compensate the 







Soon after their return from Afghanistan, on February 2002, the family 
members officially launched September Eleventh Families for Peaceful Tomorrows. 
Together with Global Exchange, they published Afghan Portraits of Grief: The 
Civilian/Innocent Victims of U.S. Bombing in Afghanistan—a reference to the New 
York Times’ special 9/11 obituaries section “Portraits of Grief”—which was aimed at 
humanizing the individuals who were killed or maimed or who lost family members 
in the U.S air attacks. The report laid out the casualty rates and the circumstances of 
the deaths of hundreds of Afghans, and told the individual stories of a selected sample 
of victims and survivors, in brief, informal, human-interest-focused items similar to 




With time, Peaceful Tomorrows’ agenda broadened. While the organization’s 
members never took a leading role in the antiwar movement, they nevertheless 
attended all major mass demonstrations and some even committed acts of civil 
disobedience in Washington D.C.  And as the legal saga concerning the appropriate 
framework in which to adjudicate the alleged Al Qaeda detainees was unfolding, 
Peaceful Tomorrows members advocated for the protection of the detainees’ basic 
rights. They supported the framework of federal—rather than military—trials, because 
military trials, they argued, imposed limitations on the accused’s legal defense, and 
particularly given the unprecedented, first-of-its-kind military commission framework 
which was established to facilitate the 9/11 murder and terrorism trials. Peaceful 
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Tomorrows also joined the call for the closing down of the Guantanamo Bay 
detention camp. 
 
Peaceful Tomorrows and the press: the de-politicized language of victim advocates 
 
The beginnings of Peaceful Tomorrows were accompanied by an enthusiastic 
press.  When the joint Global Exchange and soon-to-be Peaceful Tomorrows 
delegation arrived in Afghanistan in January 2001, hordes of journalists, from the 
U.S. and the international media, waited for them in the airport and continued to 
follow their visit. This was how Potorti, who has had a professional background as a 
print journalist and a television marketing producer, perceived the great interest in the 
group and its potential public influence: 
 
There was no denying it: This was a unique story, one that went against the 
grain of conventional wisdom and, some might suggest, common sense—
people whose families had been ripped apart in the worst act of terrorism on 
U.S. soil had just arrived in the alleged back yard of the terrorists. They were 
here, in person, to break bread with their counterparts—civilians who had lost 
family members in the crossfire. If the U.S was reluctant to question the 
efficacy of the bombing campaign, or the public’s support of it, the arrival of 
the delegation created an opportunity to examine those issues from a variety of 
new angles.  (2003:61) 
 
Indeed, this could have been an apt opportunity for the press and the U.S. 
public to witness the consequences of the heavy bombings and weigh the war’s 






opportunity? Were the portrayals of grief and devastation accompanied by any 
meaningful policy debate? Not at all.  
 
As we come to analyze the press coverage of Peaceful Tomorrows and the 
messages that the organization conveyed, or that were associated with it, in the news 
media, we must first lay out the two most basic goals of the organization at its outset. 
The first was a clear and unequivocal objection to U.S. military involvement in the 
countries that were assumed to harbor terrorism.  This was the common theme of the 
founding members’ individual public statements, which brought them together. When 
Peaceful Tomorrows announced its establishment in February 14, 2002, this 
conviction was stated loud and clear: 
 
We believe that our country’s single-minded rush to war has been made 
without proper consideration of the long-term consequences of our safety, 
security, and freedom of ourselves, our children, our grandchildren and our 
counterparts around the world. (Potorti 2003:83) 
 
The second early goal of the organization was a more realistic and practical 
one. With the U.S. already involved in Afghanistan, the damage to the civilian 
population there was a reality to contend with, and Peaceful Tomorrows sought to 
establish a U.S. victims’ fund that would help the Afghan victims recuperate and 







But it was this early on in the game that Peaceful Tomorrows members 
realized that the media would be interested in them only as long as their arguments 
were limited to a seemingly “moral” rather than “political” line of opinion, and that in 
order for them to remain relevant, they would have to tone down their criticism of 
U.S. foreign policies.  
 
Their strictly anti-war message, in the U.S. political climate of 2002, was soon 
found to be out of line for most mainstream media as well as mainstream public 
opinion. And the Afghanistan trip proved that for some news organizations even a 
story about Americans meeting Afghans was by itself too “political” in the first place. 
A People magazine reporter in Afghanistan told the delegates that the magazine’s 
editor decided against the story: 
 
So they ended up doing a story on the Lion at the Kabul Zoo—which seemed a 
little bit ironic, because it’s supposed to be ‘People’ magazine. Here we are, a 
people-to-people delegation, and they do a story on a cuddly lion, which 
actually died several days later (Kelly Campbell in Potorti, 2003:68) 
 
Those U.S. news organizations that did cover the visit concentrated on the 
human aspects of the meetings and remained there. The stories described many tears 
and mutual declarations of empathy and camaraderie between the victims of the two 
warring sides. Surely, the victim-to-victim bond was, of course, a conscious and a 
somewhat planned mise en scène, intended to stir the emotions and by that, ignite the 







Of the two issues that Peaceful Tomorrows cared about, only one could be sometimes 
understood in “moral,” media-friendly terms, and that was the plea to compensate the 
Afghan victims of the U.S bombing campaigns. Indeed, it was also a political issue, 
and the Bush administration rejected it fearing that it would set an expensive 
precedent that would later apply on the victims of the much bloodier battles in Iraq. 
Nevertheless, it was an argument that could be construed in “moral” terms—we 
unintentionally harmed civilian and therefore must compensate them—so the media 
were able to accommodate it. 
 
The New York Times coverage of the Afghanistan visit, for example, followed 
these lines. It took the form of an emotional portrayal by Mark Landler of a meeting 
between Rita Lasar and an Afghan victim, Amin Said.
65
  Said had lost his newly wed 
brother and sister-in-law in an air raid that had destroyed their home in November 
2001. The encounter of Lasar and Said was described as somber, as the two told each 
other their personal stories, acknowledged the friendship that their shared fate created 
and expressed mutual respect for each other. But when their discussion—according 
the Landler’s piece—developed to touch upon the circumstances of the conflict, Said 
happened to actually agree with the American cause, and Lasar, who was later to be 
arrested for acts of civil disobedience protesting the war, was described as opposing 
the war but not making a reasoned argument for her position.  It seemed that Lasar 
intuitively realized that it would be odd of her to express harsher criticism of U.S 
policies than the Afghan host who was the victims of those policies, and so she chose 
to speak only of the need to help her fellow victims in Afghanistan: 
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When the story-telling was finished, Mrs. Lasar and her hosts talked about the 
violence that had brought them together. Amin Said said he understood why 
the United States had bombed his country.  ''This action was taken to destroy a 
very cruel terrorist force based in Afghanistan,'' he said. ''It was not just to 
compensate for the death of people with more people.''  
Mr. Said said he forgave the pilot who dropped the errant bomb. He said he 
suspected the military was trying to hit a nearby house where a senior Taliban 
official was known to be hiding.  
For her part, Mrs. Lasar has deep misgivings about the continued American 
bombing of Afghanistan. She said she would like to meet Secretary of State 
Colin L. Powell, who plans a stop in Kabul, to express those doubts.  ''In my 
brother's name, I would respectfully request he make a real effort to help 
individual Afghan people,'' Mrs. Lasar said.  
 
This story exemplified what Eliasoph (1998) termed “political evaporation,” 
namely the process by which “grassroots” advocates choose to avoid political 
language that pertains to contested government policies, and instead, construct their 
arguments as coming from a strictly personal point of view.  Political talk is 
considered in the U.S. to be a kind of “dirty” talk. It puts the speaker at risk of being 
rejected as “partisan” by those who identify themselves with the political opposition. 
It is strategically better, as well as morally superior, to speak from pure self-interest. 
There is a noteworthy oddity in Eliasoph’s thesis: while selfishness is generally 
considered a negative trait, it is better to speak in terms of one’s concern for her health 
or property, than to express “big ideals” or criticize U.S institutions, whether 
government or corporations. In other words, selfishness, in the sense of protecting 
oneself, is more appreciated than public mindedness. Selfishness, which proclaims 







Eliasoph identified the phenomenon of “political evaporation” when she 
researched advocacy groups such as anti-drug and environmental organizations. She 
found a profound gap between the terminology that the activists used “backstage,” 
namely among themselves or in intimate settings, and the terminology they employed 
in public, either in large settings or in the media. “Backstage” they were criticizing 
corporations and political institutions and speaking of the root causes for problems. 
But publicly, none of that criticism appeared, and instead, they were expressing 
concern for the safety and well-being of their families and close communities, a 
narrative strategy that Eliasoph termed “mommism.” 
 
At each step in the broadening of the audience, the ideas shrank. In a strange 
process of political evaporation, every group fell into this strictly patterned 
shift in discourse: what was announced aloud was less open to debate, less 
aimed at expressing connection to the wider world, less public-spirited, more 
insistently selfish, than what was whispered. 
 
Peaceful Tomorrows’ arguments were also personal, when they described their 
mission as a way to honor the memories of their loved ones. At first glance, Peaceful 
Tomorrows may seem different from the groups that Eliasoph examined, because 
Peaceful Tomorrows did speak in a public-spirited way, calling for American 
responsibility for the civilian victims of the conflicts that the U.S was involved in. 
And yet, under the media spotlight, they were careful not to harshly criticize the 
administration. Peaceful Tomorrows members were very consistent in explaining their 
motives as personal, and arguing that they wanted to associate the memory of the 






Explaining her commitment to help the Afghan victims, Peaceful Tomorrows member 
Kelly Campbell wrote: 
 
It is only when we recognize and begin to act on the knowledge that we are 
truly one human family, that we can bring honor to those who died while the 
human family was still learning this lesson (Potorti 2003:123) 
 
Another Peaceful Tomorrows member, Kristina Olsen, was a musician who 
gradually assumed the role of performing musical numbers in the various gatherings 
and events that the organization initiated. This is how Olsen, who lost her sister 
Laurie on 9/11, explained her motivation: 
 
It became clear to me while singing in an outdoor festival on September 15
th
 
that I would need to commit myself to the music that I have been given in 
order to send the message of love, understanding and hope to the world, to 
help bring healing and peace to other people’s hearts as well as my own. I 
remember how this knowing had washed over me that day, that I was being 
called to do this in Laurie’s memory because she had embodied all of these 
elements of love and understanding in her own life. She had lived them, and 
now I was reflecting them back to the world through music sung in her 
memory. (Potorti 2003:206) 
 
In essence, the protection of the “memory” of the victims, and the concern that 
this memory would be imbued with their chosen set of morals, is no different than the 
concern of the groups Eliasoph describes for their families and their close 
environment. In both of these advocacy strategies, there was a physical or virtual 






legacy of the deceased, the home.  David Potorti acknowledged his choice to “de-
politicize” his message in an email interview he gave me in October 13, 2006: 
 
I think we have been least effective when our work is viewed as being 
about “politics” or “partisanship.” [...]  And we have been most 
effective when our campaigns have focused on more generic human 
issues, such as the “unknown civilians killed in war,” or “circles of 
hope” that honor the dead without resorting to slogans or partisan 
banners.  When giving speeches, the best way to lose an audience is to 
give the appearance of being partisan, so that’s something I’ve always 
avoided studiously. 
 
As it happened, the first New York Times story that mentioned Peaceful 
Tomorrows by name was not a story about the war. Dean E. Murphy’s May 26th 2002 
story, “Beyond Justice: The Eternal Struggle to Forgive” was a think-piece about the 
place of forgiveness in the personal, religious and political realities of contemporary 
times. Discussing the seemingly extreme option of forgiveness of the perpetrators of 
9/11, Murphy interviewed Peaceful Tomorrows’ member Rev. Myrna Bethke, a 
Methodist minister, who said that forgiving her brother’s killers freed her to live 
again. The context here was the victims’ moral range, and the question of the personal 
motivation for, and the consequences of, granting forgiveness to perpetrators. To be 
sure, Peaceful Tomorrows would later reappear in the New York Times in its capacity 
as part of the anti-war movement. But that would only happen in 2003, following 
President’s Bush’s famous “Mission Accomplished” declaration, and the admission of 







In the media climate before and during the military deployment in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, Peaceful Tomorrows’ de-politicized campaigns were commensurate with the 
news media’s own reluctance to question the necessity and efficacy of war (an attitude 
which brought to mind the warm media reception of relatives of murdered victims 
who supported parole or opposed the killers' death sentences). In a way, the family 
members and the media shared a bond of “political evaporation.” In the example of 
the Afghanistan visit, the experiences and arguments of the U.S. family members 
were accommodated within the U.S. media because they were mutually devised—by 
Peaceful Tomorrows members as well as by the press itself—in a way that would not 
put them in too stark of a conflict with the government view of the war.  
 
Peaceful Tomorrow’s occasional self-censorship could also be theorized using 
Noelle-Neumann’s “spiral of silence” (1984). People who held minority views, 
posited Noelle-Neumann, were reluctant to share them with people they didn’t know, 
mostly out of fear of being ridiculed or ostracized. And once when they experienced a 
negative response, those holders of unpopular views became even more hesitant, 
culminating in the potential disappearance of certain opinions from view. While 
Peaceful Tomorrows’ members were never completely silenced, their persistent 
tension with mainstream media led them to focus their efforts in face-to-face talks in 
venues such as community halls and churches, where the audience was prepared to 
listen and much more sympathetic. Potorti recognized that shift: 
 
At the very beginning, the media sought out family members of 9/11 victims 
quite simply to learn what their experiences had been, who they had lost, and 






about the morality of the war in Afghanistan, or about other things being done 
in our names as a result of the attacks. We were invited to speak in literally 
hundreds of places, including schools, places of worship, and larger peace and 
justice gatherings, to such an extent that we couldn't fill all of the requests. 
These venues tended to be more receptive to our personal views.  
 
When the press fails to offer alternative policy options 
 
In their book When the Press Fails, Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2007) 
suggested that the U.S. press behavior during the run up to the Iraq war, and during 
the war as well, was one of “groupthink,” where there was one, uncontested, dominant 
view of the necessity of war and later, of its presumably well intended execution. The 
press, they argued, became too close to power, too reliant on government sources. 
Having no official sources to challenge the “weapons of mass destruction” hypothesis, 
the press, which lost its investigative impulse, accepted it as true.  The press’s 
passivity also reflected the “groupthink” mentality of the political system as a whole, 
and in particular, the dysfunctionality of the Democrats as an opposition party.  It is 
no wonder, then, that when the press accommodated Peaceful Tomorrows it was in 
their capacity as bereaved family members who in the name of compassion, reached 
out to those affected by the “collateral damage” of the “just wars” that the US was 
conducting. 
 
The press’s reluctance to accommodate the policy option of a non-militaristic 
response to 9/11 was strongest in the first days and weeks following 9/11, as it was 
demonstrating an emotional range that ran between the grief of survivors, family 






White House. Those family members whose instinctive response to 9/11 was a 
rejection of the retaliatory response found their opinion to be unpopular to the point of 
sometimes being censored. Of course, they weren’t the only ones.  In the post-9/11 
public atmosphere that Chapter 1 described, and which was typical of a nation 
mentally preparing for war, many commentators were criticized, and occasionally 
fired, for making anti-patriotic statements. The most memorable incidents were Bill 
Maher’s suggestion that the U.S, unlike the terrorists, was cowardly because they 
were in the planes while the U.S was firing missiles from afar, and Susan Sontag’s 




In this respect, Peaceful Tomorrows was swimming against the tide, and the 
tide included not only a government-compliant press, but also the American public, 
which was swept by sorrow and anger and wanted to believe that a strong U.S. could 
eliminate the brutal regimes that were, as one tended to believe, associated with Al-
Qaeda or at least equipping themselves with weapons of mass destruction. These 
beliefs persisted long after the 9/11 Commission and the Senate Intelligence 
Committee reports had refuted these claims. For example, an April 2004 survey found 
that 80% of Americans believed that Iraq had, at the outset of the war, weapons of 
mass destruction, and 70% associated Iraq either with Al-Qaeda or with operational 
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In November 2001, a group of future core members of Peaceful Tomorrows 
participated in the Washington D.C. to NYC Walk for Healing and Peace, mentioned 
earlier in this chapter as the occasion in which they have first took action and met. 
The Walk’s final destination was Union Square, where the group held a vigil. The 
following morning, the New York Times published a photo of the group, but the photo 
was cropped in a way that left out the signs that they were holding, such as “Our Grief 
is Not a Cry for War,” “Break the Cycle of Violence,” and “Justice, Not a Just War.” 
The photo was located within the Portraits of Grief section of the paper rather than 
within the news section, framing the vigil as an act of pure remembrance, and not as a 
political event.  
 
Ultimately, as within a “bond of political evaporation,” the family members’ 
Afghanistan message was often times conveyed, by all parties involved, in a way that 
was not in disagreement with the establishment view on the Afghan victims as 
collateral damage.  It was acceptable for 9/11 family members to say they were sorry 
for the Afghans’ losses, as it was okay to suggest that the Afghan victims deserved 
compensation. Both these messages did not conflict with the collateral damage 
concept and even lent it the moral, compassionate stamp of 9/11 victims. But it was 
unacceptable—from the press’s point of view—to imply that the U.S was carelessly 
attacking civilians or to call for a cease-fire, as it was unacceptable for a story to 
include a reasoned explanation by a family member why the bombings were unlikely 







As this chapter will further illustrate, there were times when Peaceful 
Tomorrows’ members did find the courage to attempt and convey their detailed anti-
war perspective. But in these instances as well, not only that an intolerant press was 
practicing the government line, it was also expecting from them, as victims, to remain 
in the more simplistic human level, rather than the complex, expert-only, policy level. 
Elaborating on the “political evaporation” of the public activist discourse, Eliasoph 
described how “instead of portraying activists as politically concerned citizens with 
possibly useful policy suggestions, reporters presented local activists as simply 
worried about their own health, children, and finances.” (p. 213). The same trend 
applied here, where the press presented Peaceful Tomorrows members as sensitive, 
perhaps somewhat weak individuals who could not accept the idea of the inevitable 
human toll of a just war, rather than sophisticated commentators on the issue of U.S. 
security interests. 
 
This approach characterized the New York Daily News coverage of Peaceful 
Tomorrows 2002 Afghanistan visit. The piece, “Victims’ Kin Share Grief in Kabul,” 
described the U.S. visitors’ purpose as strictly humanitarian.68 The group’s members’ 
ideas shrunk in this piece to polite, almost childish, gestures toward the Afghan 
victims. And, as elsewhere, the question of whether so much “collateral damage” was 
justified remained unasked.  Rita Lasar was quoted saying that she wanted the 
Afghans “to know that Americans care about them and that we’re sorry,” “And if they 
don't believe us, I'm going to convince them,” without mention of this opinionated 
woman’s opposition to the bombings or the war.  Derill Bodley was quoted as saying 
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that he was there “to heal—and to be healed,” and that it was “a privilege to be here 
and share our experiences.” Eva Rupp received the last quote: “We want to show 
respect for a community that has also suffered.”  
 
Interestingly, despite being filled with expressions of empathy and kindness to 
the Afghan people, the Daily News piece itself did not provide a single example or 
name of an Afghan person that the U.S. delegation met. Similarly, the facts and 
circumstances of the Afghan victims—such as the collateral damage statistics—were 
completely absent. And finally, there was no mention of the delegations’ immediate 
cause, which was the federal fund for the Afghan victims. 
 
To be sure, this was not necessarily an act of press censorship, but most likely 
a demonstration of the “bond of political evaporation.” The delegates themselves 
knew that their newsworthiness lay in their unexpected empathy toward the victims of 
the nation that bred their relatives’ murderers. They were perhaps practicing what 
Tamar Liebes described in her comments to Avoiding Politics (2000), which was the 
possibility that the media were demanding, and receiving, “mommism.” “In that 
case,” she wrote, “talking as mom externally can be labeled as successful strategy 
rather than as reluctance to talk politics… down-sizing may by functional.” (pp.97-98) 
Indeed, political evaporation was not only shared by journalists and their activist-








And indeed, Peaceful Tomorrows occasionally compromised their message, 
acknowledging the ideological limitations of the news organizations that they were 
dealing with, or just hoping that their political convictions would somehow emerge, 
even if surreptitiously. When the Peaceful Tomorrows delegates to Afghanistan were 
invited to a special Oprah Winfrey show dedicated to Afghan women, they were not 
surprised that the producer of this entertainment show called and said that 
 
this was not going to be a show where we talk about whether we should have 
bombed Afghanistan or not. […] She assured me that we could talk about 
Afghan civilian casualties, and so it seemed like it was worth it. (Kelly 
Campbell in Potorti 2003, p. 117) 
 
They were surprised later, on June 27, 2002, when they arrived at the studio and 
 
got this really odd speech from a woman telling us they didn’t want to get 
political. […] They really tried to stop us from saying anything that would be 
too controversial. So I think all of us were tongue-tied when we got on the 
show, because we were so afraid that we were going to be saying the wrong 
thing. Mentally, they’d kind of intimidated us to the point where I was afraid 
to say anything. (Eva Rupp in Potorti 2003, pp. 117-118)  
 
Rita Lasar decided not to cooperate and announced, a few minutes before 
taping, that she was not going to go on the show. During the Oprah interview, the 
remaining three Peaceful Tomorrows members noticed that the footage from their 
Afghanistan visit, shown simultaneously, seemed to be edited in a way that could be 
understood as portraying Afghan suffering caused by Taliban violence, rather than by 







Peaceful Tomorrows members got it right when they said that Oprah was en 
entertainment show and therefore they should have expected the sort of censorship 
that they faced.  In his essay “Why Conversation is Not the Soul of Democracy” 
(1997), Michael Schudson characterized “democratic” conversation as an 
uncomfortable circumstance, where conflicting opinions compete and speakers risk 
their reputations as they debate publicly. Conversation draws its topics from the 
published, public materials that define the pertinent political issues of the day, namely 
and mostly the output of the press. Given these criteria, the Oprah Show about the 
American involvement in Afghanistan could have been an apt opportunity for a 
“democratic conversation” between concerned citizens to develop.  Indeed, 
democratic conversations, which Schudson termed “problem solving conversations,” 
did not necessarily have to take place where policy was actually being shaped, but 
their norms could inhabit any public-minded conversation, in any setting, between 
concerned citizens who shared a commitment to liberal, democratic norms. 
 
But the Oprah Show failed to meet these standards. The alleged attempt, or 
rather successful attempt, to conceal Peaceful Tomorrows’ critical viewpoint from 
Oprah’s viewers, and instead, tailor the conversation to the show’s narrow political 
framework, was in essence an attempt to bury the “uncomfortable” component of the 
conversation, and turn it from a daring “heterogeneous conversation” to the more 
convenient “homogenous conversation” between like-minded people (Schudson 
1997:301). And that meant that while the Oprah Show presented itself as a serious 
participant in the national debate about important foreign policy issues at crucial 






democratic freedom to disagree and to give one’s reasons. “Democracy creates 
democratic conversation more than conversation naturally creates democracy,” argues 
Schudson (1997:306). Here, democracy remained at the studio’s doorstep, and the 
conversation lost its merit.  
 
The Oprah Show incident could also be theorized through the more generous, 
or less critical, prism of Hallin’s “spheres” (Hallin 1986). It was not that democracy 
was absent from the show, but that the show’s commitment to its viewers was that it 
would never steer away from the “sphere of consensus”. In the sphere of consensus, 
U.S. soldiers were the “good guys.” They were conducting a just war, contending with 
the Evil Axis and replacing dictatorships with democracies, to the cheers of liberated 
citizens. In the sphere of consensus, the U.S was lauded for conducting a “clean” 
operation, using “precise bombs” that hit only evil-doers and did not involve collateral 
damage.  
 
As the enlarged sphere of consensus covered almost everything that had to do 
with the war, the sphere of legitimate controversy shrank. The minimized sphere of 
legitimate controversy, reflecting the absence of dissenting voices in government, 
focused on war tactics rather than on questions of justification. The limited scope of 
debate also defined the exchange between Peaceful Tomorrows and the news media, 
hiding from light the full depth of the organization’s convictions. And occasionally, 
the idea that there could be 9/11 victims who were opposing the war positioned them 






particularly true with respect to conservative news organizations, as this chapter will 
further demonstrate. 
 
While an analysis of the relative pervasiveness of political talk in the Israeli 
media culture will follow later in this chapter, it is worthwhile to examine Liebes’s 
suggestion that political talk in the U.S. is limited compared to Israel because the U.S. 
media do not offer truly different ideological or policy positions for the citizenry to 
choose from, consequently making the political debate redundant (Liebes 2000:101). 
At first glance, this is an appealing argument, especially when a case like the Iraq war 
comes to mind, or other cases where the government has not been meaningfully 
challenged from within. This argument does not apply, however, on issues such as 
gun control, abortion rights, the death penalty or gay marriage, where a full and 
nuanced set of options does indeed exist and finds its reflection in the news media 
discourse. Moreover, the gradual splintering of the Republican Party exposes the 




When victims try to talk politics 
 
Since war is a paramount political issue, probably the paramount political 
issue, one would expect that the debate for and against the war would fall into the 
press’s “sphere of legitimate controversy,” and be treated accordingly, using the 
journalistic mechanisms of fairness and balance (Hallin, 1986:117). But in late 2001 
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and until 2003, anti-war talk was marginalized and pushed to the sphere of deviance. 
At that time, some Peaceful Tomorrows members refused to cooperate with the 
process of “political evaporation” and decided to take a public stand against the war, 
despite the risks involved in expressing such an unpopular view.  When David Potorti 
prepared to appear in The O’Reilly Factor in December 19th, 2001, he knew that he 
was entering an enthusiastic stronghold of the Bush administration’s War on Terror, 
and his state of mind was that of “having nothing left to lose.” 
  
His brother was dead. His family would never be the same again. Why not 
take a stand against the war, even if he wound up looking stupid and got phone 
calls from crazy people? The tragedy had given him, and the others, a kind of 
freedom. (Potorti 2003:56) 
 
The show aired merely three months following 9/11.  The nerves were still 
raw, the memory too fresh, and family members were at the protective heart of a 
loving consensus. O’Reilly, facing a 9/11 victim whose views, coming from someone 
else, would have been brutally written off as blasphemous, was relatively courteous to 
Potorti. Potorti, for his part, had an opportunity to express a minority viewpoint that 
otherwise would have been missing altogether.  But O’Reilly courtesy went only so 
far; he refuted Potorti’s objections to U.S. violence with a comparison of the Taliban 
to Hitler, arguing that just as the Germans allowed for the rise of Hitler, so did the 
Afghans allow for the rise of the Taliban and therefore deserved punishment. “You 
need to rethink this,” O’Reilly said, positioning Potorti outside the limits of the 







The news media’s marginalization of the opposition to the war was not 
reserved to right-leaning cable news channels. At that time, during the run-up to the 
Iraq war, there was no substantial dissent within U.S. policymaking elite, and 
therefore no establishment-led dissent to occupy the sphere of legitimate controversy. 
And while Peaceful Tomorrows members were granted media access because of their 
special victim status, they fared no better in news venues outside Fox News, and 
experienced harsh criticism almost everywhere. When Peaceful Tomorrows’ Kelly 
Campbell appeared on CNN on September 29
th
, 2002, Wolf Blitzer resisted her ideas 
in a manner not far from that of Bill O’Reilly: 
 
Blitzer: I am trying to find out if you’re just a pacifist or if there’s a serious 
issue here that you’re trying to consider. 
Campbell: We believe that war is not the answer… 
Blitzer: So it’s basically a pacifistic position: You don’t see any justification 
for war under any circumstances. 
Campbell: I think particularly under these circumstances, a war resolution is 
not justified right now. I think we need to start with the UN, I think we need to 
start sending in weapons inspectors, seeing what happens. If they’re not in 
compliance, come back, move it to another level. We’re very concerned right 
now that this is being used for political ends, and that they’re pushing through 
these votes before the election, but this is not something that needs to happen 
right now, this needs to be carefully considered… 
Blitzer: Three thousand people were killed on September 11, and there are 
thousands and thousands of family members who have suffered. You have, 
what, thirty to fifty people so far who have come out and supported you, 
which is a tiny, tiny percentage of the family members. So basically you’re 
only representing a minute fraction of all the victims’ family members… 
(Potorti 2003:182). 
 
Peaceful Tomorrows’ challenges became ever harder in early 2003, as the U.S. 
was mentally and otherwise gearing up towards the approaching Iraq invasion. On 
January 5
th






Tomorrows delegation visited Iraq in order to highlight the humanity if the Iraqi 
people and to personally demonstrate the possibility of a non-violent dialogue. During 
this highly controversial trip, which was accompanied by a Saddam Hussein 
government minder, the delegation was presented with the consequences of the 
economic sanctions, such as the lack of medical supplies, and met with civilian 
victims of the Gulf War.  Soon after their return, on January 15
th
, delegation members 
appeared as guests on CNN’s Connie Chung Tonight.  In this interview, the delegates 
got an opportunity to send their message across quite extensively. They explained that 
they were concerned about U.S violence leading to increased extremism, that the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq needed to be verified, and that the 
U.S should have no interest in a regime change per se. Chung, in her typical style, 
asked them pointed, accusatory questions: 
Kristina, some people would think what you have done is not only bold, but 
they might even call it unpatriotic. Can you explain your mission? [..] 
Couldn’t this be perceived as aiding the enemy? 
…But you weren’t allowed to go just anywhere you wanted to go, right? I 
think that, by having handlers or guides or escorts, that people would say, 




When I asked David Potorti how he felt about speaking against the war in public and 
whether he was censored, he said: 
I can speak to a couple of my own experiences, which were less about being 
“censored” per se as being “used” as props in people's narratives. I was 
interviewed by a conservative radio station in San Diego which seemed to be 
sympathetic, but ultimately turned my mike off while the host talked about 
how commerce and business connections were the answer to dealing with 
these Muslims who live in tents and would just as soon cut his throat as have a 
conversation with him.  I was interviewed at Ground Zero by an NPR reporter, 
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but the resulting interview seemed to have no point of view, which I think is a 
requirement for them.[…] I felt treated more like a prop than a person. 
 
The marginalization of Peaceful Tomorrow’s anti-war messages between 2001 
and early 2003 positioned them at the right-end side of the Experience-Argument 
Scale, where victims had relative difficulty gaining media access or having their 
message received by journalists as socially acceptable, important or true.  I termed 
that end “Media Disregard,” because there was a component of ignorance there, 
which was either directed at the victims, who were ignored in the sense of being 
denied media access, or in the case where they did achieve access, ignorance was 
directed at their message, which was then dismissed as irrelevant, out-of-touch or 
unsubstantiated. 
 









Peaceful Tomorrows suffered from the confluence of two factors that played 
against its anti-war endeavors: the first was the general reluctance of the press to 
accommodate an anti-war perspective while the country was “rallying behind the 
troops”; the second, which was well reflected in the aforementioned television 
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interviews, was the press’s difficulty making a conceptual connection between the 
victims’ experience and their war opposition.  The 9/11 victims’ identification with 
the pain of unknown populations in the third world who were perceived as haters of 
the U.S, did not necessarily hit a nerve.  Furthermore, Peaceful Tomorrows’ concern 
over the war’s human toll did not register as a reason to avoid war, but as a reason to 
insist on the cautious employment of weaponry. Despite the fact that Peaceful 
Tomorrows members spoke intelligently about the war’s core issues such as the risks 
involved in Saddam Hussein’s rule, they lacked the aura of military or academic 
expertise that characterized the mainstream, heady policy debates.   
 
When I asked David Potorti, in an April 2013 email interview—this was after 
he had already left Peaceful Tomorrows for personal reasons—to reflect on the 
group’s achievements, he wrote: 
 
What the group did, in my opinion, was poke a few holes in the darkness and 
let a little light in, briefly. We forced the media to go “off message” and 
acknowledge, with great resentment and anger, that there were people with 
alternative views beyond what the government was dictating. But we didn't, 
again in my opinion, accomplish anything in terms of changing how the 
government operates or how the media operates. 
 
Peaceful Tomorrows' anti-war message seemed too far removed from their 
own victimhood to establish an immediate, persuasive message. And when it became 
apparent that there were no ties between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda, and 
when the other stated cause of the war—the alleged existence of weapons of mass 






administration, then the only U.S motive left to justify its deployment was the will to 
free Iraq from Saddam Hussein’s rule and to democratize it. The context thus shifted 
to Iraq’s geo-political Middle East status and to the future of internal Iraqi politics vis-
à-vis the interests of the U.S.  Given these dominant, new perspectives on the war, the 
U.S involvement in Iraq no longer had any meaningful connection to the events of 
9/11, and 9/11 victims were pushed even farther away from these critical foreign and 
military policy media debates. 
 
It was this lack of immediate connection between their personal tragedy and 
the war in Iraq that caused the media to discount, to various degrees, the family 
members, together with the general reluctance to let any dissent interfere with the 
news media’s self-proclaimed patriotic support of the war. By contrast, however, 
when Peaceful Tomorrows was involved in issues that were conceptually closer to the 
events of 9/11, it was much more successful in gaining media access and influence. 
When President G.W. Bush used Ground Zero footage in his March 2004 republican 
nomination TV ad campaign, Peaceful Tomorrows (as well as the International 
Association of Fire Fighters) attacked him for exploiting the memory of the victims 
for political gains. Speaking of Ground Zero, which was—as detailed in Chapter 2— 
“their” territory, and of the memory of the victims, which was also “theirs,” and doing 
that in the news-hyped context of Presidential elections, Peaceful Tomorrows 
members ignited a media storm. This was an important illustration of the fact that 
Peaceful Tomorrows, as such, was a capable organization, with the necessary human 
talent and resources to command media attention on relevant issues, and to make a 







The Bush Ground Zero ad debate 
 
When G. W. Bush launched his 2004 re-election campaign, the campaign's 
first television ad included a photo of the Ground Zero site on the day of 9/11, with 
firefighters carrying a flag draped coffin. Peaceful Tomorrows responded with a sharp 
rebuke. “Our message to all politicians is ’Keep your hands off Ground Zero’“ was 
David Potorti’s quote in U.S.A Today.71  Potorti directed his message to “all 
politicians,” asking them to collectively de-politicize Ground Zero. Peaceful 
Tomorrow’s New York Coordinator Colleen Kelly emphasized the violation of her 
place of grief in an Associated Press dispatch: “It makes me sick. Would you ever go 
to someone's grave site and use that as an instrument of politics? That truly is what 
Ground Zero represents to me. ”72 And to the Boston Globe she said, “I don’t think 
there is any understanding of how much pain those images cause.”73 David Potorti 
used the media’s interest as an opportunity to demand, within that Boston Globe story, 
that President Bush fully cooperate with the 9/11 Commission: “It almost feels like 
they're messing with my head. […] We're not ready to move on and think about 
everything wonderful that's happened since 9/11. I want to know what happened on 
that day.“  Both Kelly’s and Potorti’s statements were personal, employing 
“mommism” strategies as their topics allowed.  
                                                           
71
 Mark Memmott and Judy Keen, “Bush Accused of Exploiting 9/11,” USA Today, March 4, 2004. 
 
72
 See for example: Associated Press, Bush Ads Anger Some 9/11 Victims’ Relatives; Firefighters 
Union Calls for Ads to be Pulled; White House Defends Use of Images,” Telegraph-Herald, Dubuque, 
Iowa, March 5 2004. 
 
73
 Wayne Washington and Anne E. Kornblut, “9/11 Images in Bush Ads Hit Firefighters, Kin of 







While some news stories about the Bush-Cheney ad were careful to “balance” 
Peaceful Tomorrows with statements of other 9/11 relatives who did not find it 
offensive (this chapter will soon look closer into these responses), Paul Farhi of the 
Washington Post seemed to have done the best job when he had Peaceful Tomorrows’ 
Kelly Campbell debate the subjective reactions to the issue: 
 
Kelly Campbell, co-director of a nonpartisan group called Sept. 11 Families 
for Peaceful Tomorrows, acknowledged that some victims' relatives found the 
ads appropriate. “There's no consensus around this, but for the most part 9/11 
families are very sensitive to someone using images of our loved one's death 
for their own ends,” she said. “And that's what's pretty blatantly happening 
here.”74 
 
Campbell, as her Peaceful Tomorrows peers did, focused her message on the 
offensiveness embedded in the politicization of 9/11. In their call to separate Ground 
Zero from politics, Peaceful Tomorrows members were reclaiming their ownership 
over the choice of values associated with the site, and defining remembrance in a-
political terms. They objected to the ad not so much because the flag draped coffin 
created a disconcerting image that forced them to relive the trauma, but more on the 
basis of their insistence that Ground Zero remain a “clean,” “politics-free” concept. 
For them, “politics” had the negative context of cynical, self-interest driven 
politicians, and it needed to be kept out of Ground Zero and never involve 9/11 
imagery.  
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This was not an obvious point of view, of course. One could argue that true 
democracy relies on a free exchange of ideas and images, and that ideas about and 
images of 9/11 and Ground Zero had to be included, cited and referred to in any 
possible way in the name of the cherished right of political expression, particularly 
given 9/11’s momentous political significance. According to this line of argument, not 
only was the Bush campaign entitled to use that footage, Peaceful Tomorrows also 
had a similar right to practice its own freedom of speech and argue against that use. In 
other words, this was the democratic open exchange of ideas at play. 
 
One could also argue that politicization was exactly what Peaceful Tomorrows 
was doing here, namely using 9/11 as a platform against a political candidate. 
Paradoxically, Peaceful Tomorrows always feared that it would be criticized for 
politicizing 9/11, and here it was, directing the same allegation of politicizing 9/11 at 
the Bush campaign. It is as if Peaceful Tomorrows had an intuitive understanding of 
the Experience-Argument Scale – they knew that when the discussion was about war 
and peace, their position would not be welcome, but when they saw an opportunity to 
attack on their own turf—Ground Zero and remembrance—they used it to orchestrate 
a political attack (against politicization.) 
 
Aside from their objection to the Bush ad, Peaceful Tomorrows were also 
advocating de-politicization on anotherfront: they were working on their own a-








 In their intense, multi-faceted effort at de-politicization (of both 9/11 and of 
themselves) Peaceful Tomorrows were playing on a very profound notion in U.S 
culture, and that was that institutional politics was a “pollutant” to be cordoned off 
from issues that could be otherwise be regarded as morally “pure.”  
 
When the Bush-Cheney ad debate broke, the administration, together with 
Republican advisors and Bush supporters, defended the use of the Ground Zero 
image, but they did so mildly, without invoking a particularly principled rhetoric. 
When asked about the issue, White House Press Secretary Scot McClellan meant to 
say that there was nothing immoral in using images of the most important event in 
recent world history within the world’s most significant political contest, but in his 
attempt to avoid the word “politics,” he responded opaquely: "September 11 changed 
the equation in our public policy. It changed forever our world. And the president's 




The notion of “dirty politics” is indeed pervasive, even axiomatic, in the U.S. 
culture. As this chapter will further argue, the question of one’s legitimacy and 
confidence in engaging in political talk represents a fundamental difference between 
U.S. and Israeli cultures, with Israelis accepting political talk everywhere and about 
everything and not perceiving it as a threat to any purportedly “pure” area of the 
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public sphere, especially not one that is associated with terrorism, also known as 
political violence.   
 
Why do Americans prefer the talk of self-interest over the public spirited talk 
of rights and policies? Why do they prefer the talk of “local community” over the talk 
of “society”? Eliasoph argues that “mommism” is more persuasive than political talk, 
and that the workings of state/corporations/media hegemony make citizens believe 
that volunteerism offers a more practical contribution to society than activism, and 
that citizens should leave politics to experts.
77
 While volunteerism has its limits, for 
some observers, it is a defining element of the American community. While Eliaspoh 
sees “volunteerism” as a poor substitute for more meaningful, adversarial forms of 
grassroots political activism, Robert Putnam, in his important Bowling Alone (2000), 
laments the shrinking level of that same “volunteerism,” which he does see as the 
healthy foundation of a functioning democracy. While Eliasoph laments the politically 
limited “mommyist” jargon, Putnam deals with a larger concern, the steady decline in 
Americans’ “social capital”—namely, their connections with people whom then knew 
and did not know—as well as a decline in their civic engagement from the 1980s and 
on.  
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Schudson (1999), in his historical review of the ideal of American citizenship, 
refuses to be alarmed by Putnam’s diagnosis because, says Schudson, the argument 
that American civic life is in crisis has been repeatedly heard since the beginnings of 
the American democracy, including during times—such as the 1950s—which were 
considered at the time to have been the heydays of civil engagement. Even 
Americans’ growing distrust of government, as reflected in public opinion polls, and 
disdain toward politics and politicians, is not necessarily a sign of democratic 
weakening, argues Schudson, as it may as well attest to the success of the American 
democracy, which facilitates the skepticism that would keep it on the right track of 
self-examination and improvement. High levels of trust in government, says 
Schudson, are a bigger cause for concern than low levels, because they are indicative 
of a dangerously compliant social climate (p. 302). As for the topic of the allegedly 
disappearing meaningful public discourse, Schudson appreciates the complexities of 
the increasingly informal conversational style: 
 
On the down side, public talk has clearly grown more harsh, more crude, and 
more uncivil over the past several decades. On the up side, however, public 
discourse is more honest and more inclusive of a wide range of persons and 
topics that the late, lamented “civility” excluded. (p.307) 
 
The ideological inclusiveness of which Schudson speaks has, as the limited 
war-related news discourse of the early 2000s proved, its exceptions. But all in all, the 
advantages and disadvantages that Schudson refers to in his argument have been part 
of the complex media experience of Peaceful Tomorrows. On the one hand, the 
proliferation of media platforms and the increasingly emotion-driven news talk 






and crudeness sometimes worked against them, as representatives of the political 
minority, exposing them to offensive attacks that at times, had a detrimental effect on 
their energy and motivation. 
 
Peaceful Tomorrows’ remembrance campaign and the receptive U.S. media 
 
Remembrance belonged to the families, much before the government or the 
American people. This was why, as Chapter 2 illustrated, acts of official remembrance 
always had to accord with the families’ wishes and sensitivities.  Any claims that the 
families made with respect to remembrance strongly echoed their original experience 
of victimhood, and as such, commanded attention and respect. Therefore, in terms of 
the Experience-Argument Scale, remembrance belonged to the reverence side of the 
Scale. When Peaceful Tomorrows insisted that Ground Zero could not be associated 
with political advertising, the Bush-Cheney campaign was put on the defensive. The 
campaign did not remove the ad—there were other 9/11 family members who 
publicly supported it—but Peaceful Tomorrow’s claim was heard loud and clear, and 


















On the other hand, three years after 9/11, the sacredness of victimhood began 
to erode, making Peaceful Tomorrows susceptible to harsher criticism, even in the 
relative “safe zone” of remembrance. Indeed, they were criticized before, but that was 
the inevitable cost of dealing with the more conceptually removed topic of war (the 
Experience-Argument Scale’s “overarching conflict”). Then, Peaceful Tomorrows’ 
members were mostly criticized for failing to understand the dangers of hostile 
regimes and for suffering from dogmatic, unthinking pacifism. Now, with respect to 
the Bush-Cheney ad, the main criticism that they faced was that the organization was 
a pawn of the political left. In the U.S., as opposed to Israel, political affiliation could 
be considered demeaning, and when victims’ claims were identified as partisan they 
could be dismissed on that basis alone. The realization that once “sounding political” 
the speaker may lose half of his audience was a response to a chilling effect that was 
largely responsible for the political evaporation of the U.S public sphere. 
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Peaceful Tomorrows were aware of the danger that “sounding political” posed to their 
credibility. They knew that their anti-war campaigning positioned them on the left 
side of the political scale, but nevertheless they made an effort to construct their 
message in a neutral way that emphasized the humanity of those who were in danger 
of becoming the next civilian victims of U.S. aggression. And when they initiated 
their assault on the Bush campaign for its use of the Ground Zero photo, they were 
consistently generalizing their message, directing it to all candidates. And in 2007, 
when David Potorti was searched by journalists for comment because Hillary Clinton 
used Ground Zero 9/11 images in her 2008 presidential campaign TV ads, he replied 




In my April 15, 2013 interview, David Potorti admitted to making one mistake 
in the course of the Bush-Cheney ad controversy, a small mistake that was only 
important in that it revealed the organization’s vigilance, even nervousness, in 
avoiding any signs of partisanship: 
 
We did have that situation in which we held a press conference to talk about 
Bush using 9/11 imagery in his re-election ads; the group MoveOn helped 
arrange the space for the press conference, which was politically a mistake for 
which we were criticized; we could just as easily arranged the space ourselves, 
but at the time we weren't real adept at doing that, so we let them do it for us. 
 
With the high stakes of the presidential campaign, and with the initial 
reverence to the families slowly dissipating during the passing three years, right wing 
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media went on the offensive against Peaceful Tomorrows for being an anti-Bush 
operative in disguise. The assault’s zenith was a March 10th, 2004 Wall Street Journal 
editorial, framed as a “gotcha” piece:79 
It seems to us that the media that gives these folks [Peaceful Tomorrows] so 
much free face time and column inches might push the story a bit further to 
help viewers and readers put this dispute in context. Alas, what a little pushing 
of our own unearths is that far from disinterested parties, the activists who 
claim to speak for all 9/11 families are in fact subsidiaries of established anti-
Bush forces -- political entities committed to defeating the President this fall. 
We guess transparency only applies to the business world. 
  
The editorial took issue with Peaceful Tomorrow’s relationship with the San 
Francisco based Tides Center, which supported left-leaning non-for-profit 
organizations. The connection between the Tides Center and the Heinz family (tied by 
marriage to Democratic candidate John Kerry) was used to associate Peaceful 
Tomorrows with the Democratic campaign: 
What we have, instead, are politically motivated activists standing willingly as 
a front organization for the Democratic Party. They've traded on the press's 
reluctance to question their motives, hoping for a free run to impugn Mr. Bush 
every time he discusses terrorism from now until the election. Peaceful 
Tomorrows is hardly alone; scratch the surface and many of the other groups 
and individuals making a fuss have similar ties. 
 
The News Corp-owned, right-leaning New York Post also published an 
editorial, titled“(Mrs.) Kerry’s cash Connection,80 which illustrated the same financial 
ties between Peaceful Tomorrows and the Heinz family, thereby associating it with 
the Kerry campaign. This editorial described the Peaceful Tomorrows campaign for 
the Afghan victims in terms that it could not have used two and a half years earlier, 
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such as the charge that the group was “drawing a detestable moral equivalence 
between the 9/11 attacks and U.S. bombing of the Taliban” called Peaceful 
Tomorrows “the fringe crowd that declares itself “offended” by the Bush ads.” 
 
These were exactly the kind of attacks that propelled Noelle-Neumann’s 
“spiral of silence” and underpinned the general reluctance to “talk politics.” 
Following the Bush ad media blitz, Peaceful Tomorrows’ media appearances lessened 
in frequency and in volume. The organization concentrated on face-to-face encounters 
with citizens’ groups and victims’ organizations, and as this chapter will further 
argue, their moral authority was in any case dwindling as the memory of 9/11 was 
losing its emotional immediacy.  
 
The eroding effect of time 
 
September 2006 was a busy anniversary month for Peaceful Tomorrows. They 
held a convention in Garrison, NY, bringing together terrorism victims from all parts 
of the world. In Washington, the Eminent Jurists panel on Terrorism, 
Counterterrorism and Human Rights convened to deliberate on the question of how to 
confront terrorism without infringing human rights, and its hearing sessions included 








went basically uncovered here in the U.S.  What we heard from major outlets 
like National Public radio was that they were profiling 12 ordinary people 
whose lives had been changed by 9/11 (e.g. they profiled someone who 
became an atheist)—it was a similar story elsewhere. The political 
ramifications are simply not part of the story here. The New York Times 
revisited their Portraits of Grief and actually interviewed three of our 
members, who mentioned Peaceful Tomorrows in their pages—but that was 
probably our most major coverage this year, but it wasn’t really an article 
about our group. (Potorti, November 2006 interview) 
 
By 2006, the interest in 9/11 family members was fading away. If in 2001 the 
“Jersey Widows” were able to gather the enormous attention and influence necessary 
to corner the Bush administration into establishing the 9/11 Commission, in 2006 no 
9/11 family member organization could mount anything close to the Widows’ 
campaign. The devastating singularity of 9/11 made the family members the 
protagonists of world events for a while, but within a few years others took their 
place. Potorti feels that the declining interest in 9/11 family members is a symptom of 




It’s been quite interesting to see how the topic of 9/11 has dropped off the 
radar screens as time as gone by; as a story, we have been replaced largely by 
military families and people like Cindy Sheehan, which makes total sense 
(Potorti interview, November 2006). 
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Indeed, Cindy Sheehan, whose son Casey was killed in Iraq in April 2004, 
began confronting President G. W. Bush in 2004, demanding explanations for the U.S 
involvement in Iraq. She initiated numerous sit-ins, most famously the “Camp Casey” 
outside G.W. Bush’s Texas ranch, as well as marches and demonstrations, and she 
was arrested occasionally in connection with her protest activities. Sheehan’s moral 
authority superseded that of Peaceful Tomorrows in that she was a direct victim of the 
war, searching for justifications for her loss. In the terms of the Experience-Argument 
Scale, her experience (her loss) and her argument (that her loss was in vain) were 
intertwined, and as such they commanded deference. Sheehan, dubbed Peace Mom, 
became a symbol of the anti-war movement. And she became even more prominent as 
the anti-war perspective was gaining legitimacy in the face of the unfolding Iraqi 
quagmire, and with the revelations that the information that had supported the Iraq 
invasion was fundamentally false.  It was then, that Sheehan gained support within 
Congress and within the government-dependent press.   
 
By the time Barack Obama was elected president—Sheehan continued her 
anti-war campaign throughout his presidency—she was gradually associated with 
fringe politics and criticized for attacking American values rather than American 
policies. She was marginalized when she ran as vice-president with Roseanne Barr in 
the 2012 elections and in any case, her attempt at politics meant a diminishing 
association with her particular victimhood. And as her argument—to go back to the 
Scale—broadened to general politics and moved farther away from her experience, 







Peaceful Tomorrows’ media experience with respect to the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iraq can be summarized in saying that at the beginning, Peaceful 
Tomorrows were an appealing source for commentary but also constrained by a 
message-driven, government-compliant media. By the time that Peaceful Tomorrows’ 
point of view—namely the call for a U.S. withdrawal—entered the government 
discourse and, consequently, the media discourse, there were already better, more 
relevant, representatives of the “politics of personal trauma”—parents of fallen 
soldiers and veterans—to fill Peaceful Tomorrows’ position and furnish the anti-war 
policy arguments with their moral authority.  
 
This chapter will later analyze the Israeli equivalents of 9/11 family members 
and it will argue, that the reality of routine terrorism in Israel has created a steadier 
place for the victims within Israeli society, so that as a group, they do not experience 
dramatic declines in public interest even if the individual attacks are gradually 
forgotten. In other words, unlike 9/11 family members, Israeli victims are not a group 
associated with a single event, but a small population whose internal makeup has been 
constantly changing along with and as a result of recurring violence, but its presence 
has been constant. 
 
The anti-victimist approach 
 
The slow degradation in the media visibility of Peaceful Tomorrows was 






the 9/11 family member group—with independent commentators who did not practice 
victim-politics.  As Chapter 2 illustrated with respect to the debate on the 
establishment of Park51 in close proximity to Ground Zero, these new representatives 
of the “unprofessional,” independent voice have been political bloggers.  
 
The media fatigue toward family members is closely related to the general, 
growing anti-victimist approach within U.S. sociology and political science circles 
and, outside academia, in the institutional and media-reflected conservative discourse. 
The anti-victimist movement’s argument has been that the U.S. was overly responsive 
to claims of victims and representatives of alleged disenfranchised populations, 
granting them excessive rights (e.g. Sykes 1992). In this respect, anti-victimism, 
which calls for personal responsibility instead of finding fault in the social order, is 
the contemporary reaction against progressive policies such as affirmative action and 
the welfare system. Advocates of anti-victimism attempt to distinguish between “real” 
victims and “fake,” self-proclaimed ones, and introduce new “real” victims such as 
unborn children.
82
 Once victimhood came under attack, argues Cole (2006), its 
political use became judicious, and the “victim” label was replaced with “hero” or 
“survivor”.  
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9/11 victims, in this respect, have been both the beneficiaries and the victims of the 
anti-victimist approach. On the one hand, they were initially regarded as “true 
victims,” in line with the belief system of the anti-victimist Bush administration (Cole 
2006:167). The Bush administration portrayed the country as a victim of the terrorist 
attack, but not as a passive, incompetent victim, rather as a heroic victim who takes 
charge of his fate. Similarly, the anti-victimist approach described 9/11 victimhood in 
heroic terms, and assigned the victims with pro-activity as much as the circumstances 
allowed (the examples of Avrame Zelmanowitz, who perished in his loyalty to his 
paraplegic friend, or of Todd Beamer’s phrase “Let’s Roll,” come to mind). On the 
other hand, an application of Cole’s analysis to 9/11 family members also illuminated 
their limited status, because their “heroism” was temporary. Surly, they began as 
heroes, enduring their grief. But with time, as family members were awarded 
compensation, and as spouses remarried, not much of the initial heroism necessarily 
remained.  
 
Peaceful Tomorrows and counterterrorism: the 9/11 trials  
 
The Experience-Argument Scale positions victims’ participation in 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism somewhere in the middle, where routine 
journalistic practices apply. There, there is no particular reverence toward the victims, 
and on the other hand, the victims are neither dismissed nor marginalized. The Scale’s 
middle is neutral toward the victims in the sense that they are usually one side within 






complexity, they are still closely related to the victims’ originating experience and 
therefore the victims do have a modest claim for participation.  
 
Anti- and counter-terrorism are typical residents of Hallin’s “sphere of 
legitimate controversy,” because as the consensus is that terrorism should be fought 
and punished, government deliberates on the effective, necessary measures. And since 
inter-government arguments on the appropriate anti- and counter-terrorism strategies 
always exist, they are reproduced in the media, who broaden the discussion and 













A typical example of the coverage of families’ advocacy in counter-terrorism 
issues has been the question of which judicial system would prosecute the five alleged 
9/11 perpetrators. When President Obama stated that he was deliberating whether to 
reverse President G. W. Bush’s decision to conduct military trials rather than civil 
Experience 













Professionally oriented, Critical 






trials, Peaceful Tomorrows called for such reversal. A March 6
th





September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows, a group of more than 200 
relatives of victims of the attacks, issued a statement saying it was “deeply 
troubled” by reports that Mr. Mohammed, accused of being the mastermind of 
the attacks, and four accused of conspiring with him, might not receive a 
civilian trial after all.  
“Civilian trials in federal courts have resulted in hundreds of successful 
terrorism prosecutions,” said Donna O'Connor, a spokeswoman for the group, 
“whereas military commissions are an illegitimate system that undermines the 
rule of law.”  
 
The reporting style here is matter-of-factly; it doesn’t question the group’s 
qualifications or standing in the complex question of what exactly infringes the rule of 
law in military trials compared to civilian ones. The tone is not emotional at all, not 
because this is the New York Times but because the speaker for the group is identified 
as an official spokesperson and not as a bereaved family member. Peaceful 
Tomorrows are presented in the story as just one voice, balanced with others who 
prefer military trials to be held in the Guantanamo base. 
 
The following paragraphs will concentrate on Peaceful Tomorrows’ attempts 
at guaranteeing fair trials for the 9/11 alleged perpetrators. Employing the Experience-
Argument terminology, we see that the trials resurface the confrontation between 
victims and alleged perpetrators.  The trials bring closure to the events in the form of 
state sanctioned justice, where the perpetrators are either acquitted, namely dismissed 
                                                           
83







as unrelated to the events, or convicted and punished for their acts. In any case, the 
justice system sheds light on the events’ facts and their perpetrators’ motives, issues 
that are extremely meaningful to the families, not to mention sentencing, which serves 
a personal need for revenge. In Experience-Argument terms, the experience is 
reconstructed in court to examine the alleged perpetrators’ involvement, and the 
families’ pain is even a factor in the sentencing phase. So the families are undoubtedly 
relevant.  
 
But the families do not dominate the legal proceedings. The trial itself operates 
according to legal reasoning and legal principles as to which evidence is admissible 
and which is not, which motive is considered criminal and which is not, as well as 
other rules—appropriate jurisdiction, the right against self-incrimination, the 
confidentiality of classified evidence that is kept outside of the public proceedings, 
and the defense’s privilege to initiate procedural motions that cause delay. These and 
other principles might conflict with the families’ intuitive sense of justice. But most 
importantly, unlike remembrance or other issues, which the families dominate, here 
the families have no decision power over the trial’s outcome. In other words, while a 
monument cannot be erected if its design angers a substantial population of involved 
families, the court is expected to apply its unbiased judgment according to legal rules 
and precedents, and not according to the wishes of the families.  
 
It has been hard for some 9/11 families, for example, to come to terms with the 
alleged perpetrators’ fundamental right to state-funded legal defense. The Miami 






the Guantanamo base in January 2013 between family members and a group of 
defense lawyers. While the reporter, Carol Rosenberg, could not attend the meeting, 
her post-facto interviews mentioned many tears, shed both by the family members and 
the lawyers, and also a sense that the families realized that the defense lawyers were 




“But by the end,” said Loreen Sellitto, mother of 23-year-old Matthew who 
also was killed at Cantor Fitzgerald, “I saw them love our Constitution. Their 
goal is to present a case and defend someone. It’s what our country is built 
on.” 
 
The family members that participated in the meeting were identified as 
individuals and not as members of any organization. The Miami Herald report did not 
mention that Phyllis Rodriguez, identified as the person who initiated the meeting, 
was a member of Peaceful Tomorrows. This was probably because the story needed to 
maintain its personal, human dimension intact, and not to involve the political 
connotations that were already strongly attached to Peaceful Tomorrows, such as their 
uncompromised insistence on the protection of human rights. 
 
A few days later, a New York Times piece about the pre-trial proceedings in 
Guantanamo noted Rodriguez’s objection to the government’s censorship of the video 
feed which transmitted the proceedings from the Guantanamo courtroom to several 
locations in the U.S.
85
 The military court had just prohibited this censorship, which 
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was possible due to a 40 second delay in the transmission, and Rodriguez was quoted 
saying that she was concerned that the trial proceedings were not sufficiently open to 
the public. Here, again, she was identified by name alone and her association with 
Peaceful Tomorrows was not mentioned, although Peaceful Tomorrow’s website did 
announce her Guantanamo initiatives under the organization’s “Rule of Law” 
campaign. The media appearance of Rodriguez as a private 9/11 family member 
rather than as a representative of Peaceful Tomorrows was consistent
86
 and indicative 
of a mutual interest—of the news media and of Peaceful Tomorrows—to maintain the 
genuine appeal of a personal opinion, and not to risk any discredit that might come 
with an organizational, prescribed “message.” 
 
The following paragraphs will illustrate the relationship between the Israeli 
news media and the joint Israeli-Palestinian organization Parents Circle. Like Peaceful 
Tomorrows, the Parents Circle seeks dialogue between bereaved family members of 
the two sides of the conflict. Its members bear the same risks of seeming politically 
radical, unrealistic and overbearing. But to judge from the coverage and from the 
organization’s public relations manager, with whom I have met, the Israeli media 
have been more accommodating and less judgmental of the organization than the U.S. 
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The Parents Circle 
 
The Parents Circle – Families Forum was established in 1995 by a group of 
Israeli bereaved family members, led by Yitzhak Frankenthal, whose son Arik was 
abducted and murdered by Hamas in 1994. The organization members began meeting 
with Palestinian bereaved family members in 1998, and consequently re-established 
the organization as a joint Israeli-Palestinian forum.  The Parents Circle has two 
CEOs who serve jointly, a Palestinian and an Israeli, and it brings together more than 
600 family members.  
 
The Parents Circle, much like Peaceful Tomorrows, concentrates on 
educational work, and conducts joint appearances of Israeli and Palestinian bereaved 
family members before high school students in Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
This is unique in a reality where Israelis and Palestinians have no opportunities to 
meet face to face, except perhaps as Israeli soldiers who guard the settlements against 
Palestinian aggression—or protect Palestinians from settlers’ aggression—or as 
guards in the checkpoints between Israel, the Palestinian Authority or the Gaza strip. 
The Parents Circle organizes a summer camp for Israeli and Palestinian children, and 
also brings together Israelis and Palestinians from similar occupations – doctors, 
journalists – to help them get acquainted through a “history narrative weekend” 
session. There, participants tell their personal history within their subjective historical 
context, not in order to turn the session into a simulation of peace negotiations, but in 
order to develop some understanding and respect for each other’s narratives. Through 






working relations. Beyond their wish for Israelis and Palestinians to engage in a 
continuous dialogue, the Parents Circle works for a practical truth and reconciliation 
mechanism, such as the one that was instituted in South Africa after the Apartheid. 
 
Like Peaceful Tomorrows, the Parents Circle does not identify itself 
politically. In Israel, just like in the U.S., concrete identification with a political party 
is not recommended (it might reduce funding opportunities, to name one reason) and 
is therefore not typical of not-for-profit organizations. At the same time, and as in the 
U.S., the general political leaning of the organization is self-evident. The Parents 
Circle mission statement does exactly that, refraining from political specifics and yet 
being very clear: 
 
Although the PCFF has no stated position on the political solution of the 
conflict, most of its members agree that the solution must be based on free 
negotiations between the leadership of both sides to ensure basic human rights, 
the establishment of two states for two peoples, and the signing of a peace 
treaty.  
 
Robi Damelin is the Parents Circle’s public relations manager. Damelin joined 
the Parents Circle after her son David was killed by a sniper in March 2002 at a West 
Bank checkpoint. Soon after she began work with the Parents Circle she quit her 
public relations management job. “I couldn’t do it anymore. My priorities have 
changed,” she says. Damelin was born and raised in South Africa. She came to Israel 
in 1967 for voluntary military service and stayed ever since. She strongly believes that 
Israel and the Palestinians must prepare themselves for the day after peace, where 






reconciliation process that Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu instituted in post-
Apartheid South Africa in 1996. 
 
I interviewed Damelin in Tel Aviv in April 2013. I asked her to reflect on the 
Parents Circle’s media performance, and whether she felt that they achieved their 
coverage goals. The interview took place after my correspondence with Peaceful 
Tomorrows’ David Potorti, who had professed that it was hard and occasionally 
impossible to convey messages that were perceived as far-left and therefore not in line 
with the government position. Surely, by U.S. political standards, the Parents Circle 
would have had a very hard time entering the mainstream political debate. To give an 
idea about the inclusive orientation of the group, some of the male Palestinian 
members of the Parents Circle had served time in Israeli prisons for terrorism-related 
offences, and turned, after they were released, to peace activism. In the U.S, ex-
terrorists would have been probably written off on a moral basis even before a 
political one, taking down any group that accommodated them. But this chapter will 
further illustrate how the political spectrum in Israel, and in the media even more so, 
tends to be wider and more accommodating compared to the U.S.  To go back to the 
question that I presented to Damelin with respect to the Parents Circle’s media 
performance, she replied—and she could not be suspected of lacking critical 
faculties—that she was happy with the Israeli media. “They don’t cover everything 
we do,” she said, “but they are kind to us.” 
 
Indeed, if the Parents Circle’s activities were reported regularly, it was most 






charismatic Damelin. That said, the coverage itself has been inevitably modest, as 
news about good intentions tend to be. Besides, the essence of the Family Circle as an 
Israeli-Palestinian interrelations effort occupied the right end, “disregarding” side of 
the Experience-Argument Scale.  
 








While the fact that bereaved families believed in peace and connected with 
Palestinian victims was commendable, it was not “important” according to Israeli 
news criteria. For once, Israeli relatives of terrorism victims had no better claim over 
the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than the relatives of soldiers who died in 
the conflict. And the Palestinian members of the Parents Circle did not improve the 
palatability of the organization for the media, but quite the opposite, as Palestinians 
were at the bottom of the source-desirability list, facing an alienated Israeli public, if 
not occasionally hostile. Suffering from the worst starting position in the political 
discourse, relatives of Palestinian victims had to work very hard to generate attention 
and sympathy, and they were never sent alone to represent the organization at the 
Israeli media. If at all, in their appearances in the Israeli media they were always 
joined by an Israeli peer.  
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To take the 2007 coverage of the Parents Circle as an example, the 
organization started that year its summer camp program for bereaved Israeli and 
Palestinian children, and at that same summer, held a seminar for 90 of its members in 
East Jerusalem, titled “Knowing is the Beginning.” The seminar, aimed to introduce 
each side with the other’s narrative, was made possible through financial aid from the 
government of Japan. These activities were reported in Ha’aretz and Ynet, 
respectively, with one report in each. In Ha’aretz, the summer camp report consisted 
of no more than 50 words. In Ynet, the conference story was detailed but appeared in 
the quite out-of-the-way, bottom of the webpage news category of “Activism”.87  But 
the more effective coverage of the Parents Circle activities and ideas came not 
through the organization’s “direct sale” of its activities to the polite but not over 
enthusiastic news media, but rather through special projects that became known in 
other, more creative ways than “the Parents Circle’s latest initiative.” 
 
In 2011, the organization, together with the Peres Center for Peace and the 
Israeli office of Saatchi and Saatchi, initiated an Israeli-Palestinian blood drive titled 
“Blood Relations,” in which Israeli and Palestinian members of the Parents Circle 
donated blood to one another and Israeli and Palestinian hospitals exchanged blood 
donations. The project itself did not receive meaningful coverage when it took place. 
However, it became well known when the advertising agency that organized it 
received an international award from the UN as well as a prize at the Cannes Lions 
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International Festival of Creativity.  The awards were reported both as general news 
items as well as in business news publications.
88
 The great esteem and pride in having 
an Israeli advertising agency win international prizes over a peace-related campaign, 
thereby reaffirming the Israeli ingenuity and cleverness, were happily received by the 
news media, apparently much more than Blood Relations project itself. 
 
With time, it became clear that this type of “indirect” coverage was in fact the 
most effective one, and that there were ways to replace the uninspiring general news 
reports with stories that provided more unique angles in the organization’s activity 
and in news sections where people were more engaged, be it the business or the art 
and culture sections. The organization’s public relations effort shifted to the co-
production of documentary films about the organization’s members and activities, and 
was even a partner, together with the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), for the production of the drama series Good Intentions (2008) for the 
commercial Channel 2. The series depicted two chefs, one is a Palestinian whose 
brother was injured by the Israeli army, and the other is an Israeli whose soldier son 
serves in the West Bank, as they co-appear in television cooking show. After the first 
documentary film about the organization, the successful Encounter Point (2006), 
which followed the beginnings of the Parents Circle in Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories, came One Day After Peace (2012), which followed Robi Damelin as she 
traveled to South Africa to meet with the people involved in the truth and 
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reconciliation process, and then Two Sided Story (2012), about the frictions and 
emotions involved in the Israeli-Palestinian gatherings of the Parents Circle. 
 
Apart from the strong emotional effect of films and TV projects on their 
viewers, the news media, the Parents Circle found, were much more interested in the 
success and impact of these projects—involving coverage-friendly gala openings, film 
festivals, awards and special screenings in distinguished international institutions—
than in local initiatives such as seminars or conferences.  This public relations 
strategy, which focused on translating the organization’s message into an emotional, 
nationally or even internationally successful cultural product, has been the Parents 
Circle’s creative way of overcoming that unfavorable place, the right end 
“indifference” side of the Experience-Argument Scale, which made it hard for them to 
occupy the top of the news agenda.  
 
Parents Circle campaigns vs. reactive media 
 
One observation that both Potorti and Damelin shared was their notion of the 
“utility” that family members had in the media, as they were called upon to fill some 
sort of needed viewpoint within the coverage. Peaceful Tomorrows, for example, 
came to the Oprah show because the show’s topic was the suffering of the deprived 
and politically repressed Afghani people, and Peaceful Tomorrows happened to have 
just come back from their Afghanistan trip with photos and stories of Afghan victims. 






caused by U.S. bombings, and the Peaceful Tomorrows guests ultimately felt that 
their message was distorted to fit within the world that the show was trying to portray.  
However, time and again Peaceful Tomorrows members professed that they were 
willing to take that risk for the opportunity to spread their message, even if partially or 
covertly. 
 
Robi Damelin also admitted that she often felt used, but not in a negative way, 
because there was mutual exploitation going on between her and the media and it was, 
she said, a “two sided game.”  However, she did not share the notion that her message 
was being distorted in any way.  I asked her if she felt that the organization was 
successful in promoting its agenda in the media, and she said that she did, but that it 
happened more often that Parents Circle representatives were called upon by the 
press, and less often that they initiated and won cooperation. They were usually 
summoned, she said, to provide a contrasting view to right wing opinions, often 
professed by hawkish victims families’ groups. In her PR terminology, Damelin said 
that the organization’s public exposure was achieved mainly through “reactive 
media”—media that reacted to current events and sought comment— than through its 
own media campaigns. 
 
A typical “utilitarian” or “reactive media” situation took place at the Channel 
10 morning show on October 14
th
 2011, four days before the return of Gilad Shalit.  
The guest panel consisted of three people: The first was Yossi Mendelevitch, a 
bereaved father. His 13 year old son Yuval had died in a suicide bombing in a Haifa 






for release in the Shalit deal. Robi Damelin was there, as the sniper who killed her son 
was thought to be bound for release as well (eventually he was not).  The third guest 
was a psychiatrist who specialized in the rehabilitation of POWs.  Mendelevitch and 
Damelin were asked whether they supported the Shalit deal, and they provided the 
anticipated, opposite views.  Mendelevitch warned that released prisoners would 
return to terrorist activity, and that no country had the privilege of preferring the 
safety of its soldiers over the safety of the civilian population. The Shalit family, he 
said, must wait for the time where a military rescue operation would be possible. 
Damelin said that she supported the deal because “I would release the entire world 
from prison just to get David back.” While the discussion was cordial, as morning-
show discussions tended to be, tensions were high. Upon hearing Damelin’s 
conciliatory approach, Mendelevitch retorted: “As far as I am concerned, anybody 
who favors the release of murderers also favors the murdering of Jews.”89 
 
The forum that Channel 10 gathered to discuss the Shalit deal was explosive. 
It brought together bereaved parents from the two far sides of the political spectrum, 
in an issue that was extremely close to their hearts. During the preparations for the 
interview, Mendelevitch and Damelin were told to sit together at the desk. But 
Mendelevitch refused to sit next to Damelin and asked instead to sit across from her.
90
 
The show, despite the respectful and somber tone of its hosts, was essentially pitting 
the parents against each other. It is doubtful whether a U.S news show would ever do 
that, namely play on the raw nerves of bereaved parents as they are put in a 
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coordinated situation of direct opposition. The ethics of U.S news would probably 
consider that setup excessively cruel to the parents, calling for raw, emotional 
confrontations that tend to explode in Jerry Springer type of shows and not in news 
programming.  
 
When Damelin spoke of “reactive media,” she meant the media’s search for 
the victims in issues that belonged to the left and center areas of the Experience-
Argument Scale, rather than the issue of “overarching conflict” which was on the 
right, more indifferent side. When she and Yossi Mendelevitch were called to speak 
for or against the Shalit deal, they were –again, in terms of the Experience-Argument 
Scale—somewhere between “hostage situations” and “anti/counterterrorism.” 
Terrorism victims were always part of the discussion whenever the perpetrators of the 
acts that caused their losses were planned for release. But here, the collective release 
of the perpetrators would end an ongoing hostage crisis. The families’ pain in 
witnessing the release of the prisoners was the major price to be paid for the return of 
Shalit (together with the feared price of the prisoners resorting to terrorist activity) 
and therefore the families were sought for comment. 
 
The Parents Circle was often sought for comment for another reason, which 
has to do with the short history of political appropriation of terrorism victimhood in 
Israel. Since the mid-1980s, terrorism victims were consistently tied to right leaning 
claims to toughen national security and resist prisoner exchange deals. Yossi 
Mendelevitch, for example, has been a member of the Almagor – Terror Victims 






Almagor was founded in 1986, and its mission, according to its website, included 
“representation for terror victims to demand harsh punishment for terrorists, expulsion 
of suicide terrorists’ families, and demolition of terrorists’ homes.”91 Indeed, Almagor 
has constantly filed petitions to the Israeli Court of Justice, asking the court to prohibit 
any release of prisoners that were involved in terrorist activity. The voice of Almagor 
dominated the media as the voice of Israeli terrorism victims. 
 
The Parents Circle, found in its present form in 1998, was the first (and so far 
– the only) organization to connect its members’ victimhood to its claim for peace. 
For the first time, the media had a source that could “balance,” a source that had an 
equivalent standing to that of Almagor. Almagor were predominantly active on the 
“center” area of the Experience-Argument Scale, as its members called for tighter 
security measures and harsher punishments for convicts. Between 1986 and 2000 they 
were the exclusive voice of the victims, exerting their moral authority on the military 
and political milieu that occupied television studios and was sought for print and 
digital news commentary. So when the media became familiar with the Parents Circle 
and Robi Damelin, they were called to fill the space that was apparently awaiting 
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Political talk in the Israeli media 
 
Israelis like talking politics, and political talk exists in the public and private 
spheres. Israeli culture is known to be—and is sometimes romanticized as—a highly 
politicized culture. This argument is supported by high voter turnout (64.7% of 
eligible voters voted in the 2013 general elections, a high figure given the low 
participation of the Arab population)
92
, political arguments transcend the Knesset and 
find their way into coffee shops, Saturday night Shabbat dinners, and even chats with 
taxi drivers. According to this romantic notion, talking—or rather, arguing—about 
politics is in fact a kind of playful pastime.  
 
While it is common to think that Israelis are much more politically involved 
than Americans, and that Israelis “use political talk the way Americans use talk about 
sports: to create common ground, with political disagreements only adding to the 
entertainment value” (Wyatt and Liebes 1995:21), the research data on this question is 
inconclusive. For example, a comparative survey conducted by Wyatt, Katz, 
Levinsohn and Al-Haj (1996) posed Americans, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs 
questions regarding how comfortable they felt “speaking their minds” in their 
everyday social environment, and which political actions they undertook, such as 
attending public meetings, signing petitions or writing letters to government officials. 
The survey found Americans to be least inhibited discussing politics, with Israeli Jews 
ranking second, and Israeli Arabs found to be most apprehensive in this respect. As 
for participation in political action, Americans were first, Israeli Arabs second and 
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Israeli Jews third, except for attendance in demonstrations, in which Israeli Arabs 
were first, Israeli Jews second and Americans third. The survey was limited, however, 
in that it did not distinguish between local and national politics. It is likely that 
Americans were indeed much more involved in the management of their local affairs 
(this was precisely Eliasoph’s criticism), while Israelis—Jews and Arabs alike—were 
more focused on broader national issues. In any case, these survey findings should 
have been no less than startling for anyone who shared the routine grievance about the 
Americans' political apathy. 
 
The perception of Israelis as political enthusiasts has changed over the past 
three decades, as Zionism developed to and divided into Post-Zionism and Neo-
Zionism. As far as Post-Zionism was concerned, the combination of individualism 
and a globally driven economy came at the expense of Israelis’ public mindedness and 
political edge. Also, the absence of active peace negotiations since the Oslo Accords 
of the mid-1990s has weakened the Post-Zionist fragments while the Neo-Zionist 
camp has been content with things as they were. In other words, the diminishing 
prospect for change in the status of Israeli-Palestinian affairs has made the public 
debate mute on the most fundamental issue of Israeli politics, the one that has the 
most effect on both national security and the national budget. At the same time, the 
rising food and housing prices and the deterioration of living standards of the middle 
and lower classes ignited mass protests in 2012. The middle class regained its political 
consciousness, and demanded the break-up of monopolies, government price controls 
and other reforms aimed at a renewed distribution of wealth. So while Israelis were no 






on increasing the middle class’s living conditions, and on the possibilities of that class 
to acquire minimal personal wealth. 
 
The different attitudes toward political talk in the U.S. and Israel are rooted in 
these two nations’ vastly different cultural backgrounds. On the most obvious level, 
Israel has a very small population, which provides individuals with a greater sense of 
influence. Israeli daily life comes to frequent contact with the country’s geo-political 
problems, both through the mandatory and reserve army service, and also because 
anti-Israeli violence has been reaching deeper into Israel’s cities—whether through 
suicide bombings, Hamas rockets from Gaza to as north as Tel Aviv, or Hezbollah 
rockets from Lebanon to as south as Hadera.   
  
Another important factor in the differing legitimacy of political talk in these 
two societies is their different political systems. Unlike the U.S. two-party system, the 
Israeli Knesset comprises many political parties, big and small, whose power depends 
on their inclusion in the ruling coalition. The diversity of opinion in the Knesset 
means that the institutional political debate is varied, offering more ideological 
options for the citizenry to choose from (Liebes 2000). Variation invariably also 
means governmental representation of political positions that if judged by their share 
of actual public support, would be considered, in U.S. standards, as extreme or fringe. 
Their presence within the political establishment widens the “sphere of legitimate 
controversy” on the expense of the “sphere of deviance” and increases the general 







Media's hyper-aggressive political discourse 
 
The entertainment value of political talk in Israel can explain certain 
idiosyncratic program genres on Israeli television and radio. The popular IDF radio 
station Galei Tzahal, for example, aired for almost 20 years the show Yesh Im Mi 
Ledaber (“We Can Talk”,) a call-in political program. In the early 1990s, as part of 
the new competition between the traditional, public Channel 1 and the newly 
established Channel 2, which was the first privatized broadcast television channel, a 
new genre of political talkshows emerged almost simultaneously by both channels. 
That genre, “characterized by the substitution of reporting by argument, the 
substitution of a sense of unity by conflict, and the sense of the anchor’s control by an 
image of playful chaos” (Liebes 1999), immediately took over Israeli prime time 
television. The most political one was Channel 1’s Popolitica, a live talkshow, hosted 
by a journalist who sat at a round table with a selection of personalities from the top 
of the news, mostly politicians but also journalists, academics and representatives of 
interest groups. The host had three regular sidekicks, journalists too, whose job was to 
opinionate provocatively, to expose the guests’ “real” motives and to fuel the already 
ferocious debate, to the cheers or boos of the loud studio audience present.  Popolitica 
had no regard for civil, regulated conversation of the type that Schudson (1997) saw 
necessary for democratic talk. It was a verbal gladiator match and indeed the 
discussions tended to go nowhere, with incomprehensible moments of chaotic 
shouting, and guests announcing that they are on the verge of walking out. The lack of 







Representatives of radical politics, from both left and right, served Popolitica 
well because they were zealous and because the wider was the gap between the 
guests, the more potentially hostile was the conversation.  And while Popolitica and 
the other political talk shows had left prime time to be replaced, in the early 2000s, 
with entertainment talk shows of the Jay Leno type, and later with reality shows, 
Popolitica yet remained a symbol of Israel’s aggressive political culture.  The 
provocative nature of political talk summoned, paradoxically, the inclusion of 
minority points of views, to be gingerly bashed. In such a climate, terrorism victims—
who could also contribute to the ever-desired emotionality of the discussion—were 
free to express unpopular views. They could call for peace in the midst of a military 
conflict between Israel and its neighbors, demand the release of terrorists, or call for 
the death penalty for convicted terrorists. These were all acceptable within the noisy 
political discourse in the Israeli media.  
 
The inclusiveness of Israeli political media 
 
In 2011, the Parents Circle faced a potential image crisis, when one of its 
Palestinian members was identified as a relative of terrorists, rather than a relative of 
innocent victims of the conflict. The Palestinian member, Osama Abu Ayash, lost his 






forces and were eventually assassinated.
93
 Abu Ayash joined the Parents Circle, as he 
believed that Kamal and Tayseer were victims of the cycle of violence. He perceived 
the tragedies of Kamal and Tayseer as cautionary tales, because their revengefulness 
eventually brought to their deaths, whereas the cycle of violence had to be broken.  
When he was scheduled to speak on behalf of the Parents Circle in Kfar Saba’s Rabin 
high school, the word spread on right wing online forums that a relative of terrorists 
was going to speak to Israeli children. These children, they said, were soon to become 
the Israeli soldiers whose duty would be to fight people just like those who Osama 
was mourning.  
 
But while this story was potentially explosive and damaging to the Parents 
Circle, it was hardly reported at all. Ma’ariv reported on the controversy in its local 
news section.
94
 The report spoke of some parents who said that they were angry, and 
that had they known who Osama was they would not have let their children attend his 
talk, and it included this unusually hostile quote by the right wing Knesset member 
Michael Ben-Ari: 
 
To identify with families of murderers? This is incomprehensible and insane. 
What is the logic in this? This is simply a matter of mental illness and an 
inhuman mutation. These are the murderers of our people that we are talking 
about, and the principal of this school wants our students to identify with 
them? I would send a psychiatrist to that principal to hospitalize her. 
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The reporter than posed a question to Ben Ari: “Don’t you think that you are 
overreacting?” and Ben Ari replied that he was not and continued his tirade. The 
chairman of Almagor was also in the story, who said that “to compare shahids 
[martyrs] with dead Israeli soldiers is a diabolical narrative.” 
 
This story, however, was the only story by the mainstream press about the 
Kfar Saba controversy. No other news outlet picked the story.  I asked Robi Damelin  
why that story remained so small, and she replied that journalists knew that it was just 
another right wing provocation, not to be taken seriously. It seemed that Israeli 
journalists found no fault in the pro-Palestinian narrative or in the possibility of 
learning something from someone whose relatives were wanted and then killed by the 
Israeli army. But on the other hand, when journalists did chose to report—as Ma’ariv 
did—they had no qualms about citing the brutal language of the Parents Circle’s 
adversaries from the extreme right. This, again, was another illustration of the 
inclusiveness of Israeli journalism. An organization like the Parents Circle benefited 
from the political tolerance of the press, even at the price of suffering the occasional 
brutal attack. Robi Damelin said that she did not mind anymore what people had said 




















This dissertation began with curiosity over the boundaries of journalistic deference to 
victims of political violence, not in their vastly researched role as participants or 
witnesses to the attacks, but in their activist role. It began with the notion that any 
initial journalistic deference that the victims received in the aftermath of an attack, by 
virtue of journalism’s role as upholding society’s dominant myths and values, was 
likely to dissipate as their victimhood ignited political ambition and political activism, 
and as they began to operate within the political establishment.  There, the press’s role 
was the much less empathetic watchdog role. There, victims risked being suspected of 
capitalizing on their victimhood in order to achieve political glory.  
 
This dissertation also began with the notion that victims of political violence 






victims of diseases, accidents, natural disasters or criminal mass killings, because they 
were victims of an ideological battle of which they became symbols. The ideological 
dimension of their victimhood, the heroism associated with their sacrifice (whether 
they personally demonstrated bravery or not), the fact that the victims were (usually) 
not soldiers but plain folks with whom the community could identify—all contributed 
to the special status of the victims and merited deference that was beyond plain 
empathy for human suffering.  
 
The identification and deference that journalists displayed toward terrorism 
victims had different shades and different motives. When, for example, the Israeli 
press exhibited complete identification with families of abducted soldiers, it was 
sometimes because journalists were genuinely carried away with emotion, as it was 
sometimes a calculated decision to set aside professional norms and give way 
completely to emotionalism. The analysis of the Shalit phenomenon in Chapter 3 
demonstrated the unprecedented dedication of the Israeli press to the Shalit cause. 
Israel's mainstream news media collaborated with the campaign to carry out organized 
campaign activity on a massive scale, such as attaching yellow bracelets to the print 
edition and sponsoring public registration for the Shalit march. This was beyond 
journalistic deference—this was a meeting of the promotional needs of both the Shalit 
campaign and the news industry. 
 
Also, deference had its limitations, and these limitations, which were at the 
center of this dissertation, varied according to the different matters in which the 






victims’ arguments at face value to displaying the methodology of objectivity; from 
taking the victims’ side to offering contradicting views; from an admiring portrayal to 
indifference and even scorn—all organized into a frame of thought that became the 
prime conceptual tool that this dissertation offers, and that is the Experience-
Argument Scale. The premise of the Scale has been that the victims received media 
prominence on those issues that were perceived to be in close proximity to the tragic 
events that had politically empowered them.  And the more they diverted to issues 
beyond the particular attack or its perpetrators, the more the press—as any other 
institution that operated in the public sphere, such as government agencies—was 
prone to challenge them, question their motives and doubt their relevance to the 
policymaking process. The issue that I found to merit the left end of the Scale, which 
represented the most deferential treatment possible, was the issue of ongoing hostage 
crises. The experience—captivity—occupied both present “news time” and ”mythic” 
time, namely the timelessness reserved for national, heroic narratives. In Israel, where 
the case of abducted soldiers generated angst equivalent to that of abducted children, 
the press was keeping the story alive even if it prolonged without change for years, 
treating speculations as facts and futile diplomatic moves as potentially 
groundbreaking negotiations. In other words, the level of commitment to the plight of 
abducted soldiers was such that the press was “making up” news where there was 
none. 
 
This work focused on an analysis of the national press coverage of terrorism 
victims’ political efforts in the U.S. and Israel, an analysis that confirmed the 






underlying connection that it suggested between the proximity of the issue at hand to 
the violent act on the one hand, to the press’s willingness to accommodate the victims 
and their positions on the other.  Obviously, there were exceptions. For example, the 
long periods of routine terrorism in Israel had an “equalizing” effect on the status of 
individual victims, so that “proximity” from the individual attack mattered much less. 
Israeli victims did not feel the decline in their influence, as time was passing, as their 
U.S. 9/11 counterparts did, simply because the Israeli victim group had a constant 
presence in a reality of routine terrorism.  When Israeli victims' relatives were 
advocating for stricter security measures or for peaceful alternatives to violence, it did 
not matter whether their relatives had been killed five or seven years before, in a 
Jerusalem market or on a Tel Aviv bus. In a way, Israeli victims have become a small 
population, where new members constantly joined, and with no particular hierarchy 
except for the known parameters, some unique to Israel—such as the superiority of 
victims from certain groups in the population (e.g. Tel Aviv residents) over others 
(e.g. Jewish settlers in the West Bank)—and some universal, such as greater 
intolerance to victimized children. 
 
While the Scale offered a way to assess the “media status” of victims based on 
a universal principle of proximity between the originating experience of terror to the 
victims’ arguments, and while the Scale could be usefully applied on every media 
system, it was also useful as a departure point for understanding the differences 
between U.S. and Israeli journalistic cultures. The different attitudes toward victims in 






sense, or with a different political culture, or with journalists’ different perception of 
their obligation to the state or the public.  
 
In a somewhat excessively broad brushstroke, it is yet fair to observe that the 
U.S. and Israel have different cultures of grief, as reflected in their news coverage of 
tragedies. Israelis tend to adhere to the Mediterranean stereotype as they wear their 
emotions on their sleeves. Funerals are commonly shown in the news, and Israelis are 
used to images of coffins carried in a procession to an open grave, followed by grief 
stricken family members.  
 
In the U.S., while uncontrolled grief is still considered too private and even 
too tasteless to appear on the Six O’clock news, there is a steady trend toward 
authenticity and the display of feeling. Obviously, this has a lot do to with the 
increasingly informal style of news presentation and the diffusion of the personal style 
of blog culture into mainstream media. The Obama administration made its 
contribution to this trend in 2009, when it lifted the ban over media coverage of 
returning coffins of fallen soldiers. 
 
Interestingly, the appearance of victims as news protagonists is a relatively 
new phenomenon in both the U.S. and Israel, and their evolution from victims to 
political activists is even more recent (once the media were interested in them as 
spontaneous political commentators, their general acceptance as political activists 






commensurate with the shift from traditional Zionism to Neo and Post Zionism. 
During Israel’s formative years, characterized by a socialist orientation as well as a 
post-traumatic, Holocaust-driven, collective paranoia, citizens were expected to make 
boundless personal sacrifices for the national Zionist cause, and to grieve over their 
sacrifices quietly and privately. Victims of wars and terrorism received the highest 
esteem because the living—according to the most common phrase used in 
remembrance days—“owed” their lives to the dead.  To use the phrase coined by poet 
Nathan Alterman, the victims were “the silver tray on which the Jewish State was 
served.” The victims “paid the price” of the Zionist ambition and therefore deference 
to them had the added dimension of gratitude. With the rise of Post-Zionist capitalist 
and individualist values in the 1980s, the willingness to subordinate one’s life and 
possessions for the greater interest eroded, as Israel aligned with Western theories of 
individual rights, underscoring a fundamental right to a long and fulfilling life. The 
1982 Lebanon War, considered Israel’s first “war of choice,” was also the first in 
which questions of justification for the fallen soldiers’ sacrifice arose, shaking Israel’s 
peace-loving self-image. Since Lebanon, the Israeli "rally around the flag" period 
became ever shorter, providing an impression that Israelis expected all armed 
conflicts to end with no casualties on their side.  
 
The political consolidation of the Jewish-religious Neo-Zionist ideology also 
changed the nature of grief and victimhood. Neo-Zionism, which focused on the 
Jewish elements of the democratic-Jewish state, was an expansionist ideology of 
struggle. From a Neo-Zionist perspective, Jewish victims justified the deployment of 






population. For this ideological but politically concrete purpose, mourning had to be 
known and public.  
 
Another determining factor over the status of terrorism victims has been the 
public perception of the might of the perpetrators and the risk posed by the ideology 
on whose name the attack was carried out. An attack could be considered an isolated 
incident, associated more with plain criminality than with any serious or compelling 
ideology. It could, on the other hand, suggest the existence of a powerful enemy 
whose competing ideology challenged the dominant ideology of the attacked 
community. A third option would be a terrorist war of attrition, where repeating 
attacks constitute a new normalcy and do not challenge the political status quo, at 
least for some time. In any case, the level of the perceived threat to the community’s 
security is invariably tied to the status of the victims. It is most likely that when these 
words are written, in 2014, Americans identify more with victims of school shootings 
than with terrorism victims, because the mass murdering epidemic feels “closer to 
home,” and represents a more viable threat to the average American, compared to the 
threat of international terrorism on U.S. soil. 
 
The U.S. experience of terrorism has been very different from the Israeli one, 
and in a way that directly affected the social place of the victims. The U.S. experience 
of terrorism has mostly consisted of cataclysmic terrorism ("New Terrorism"), first 
the Oklahoma City bombing and then 9/11(the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center 
did not register as a precursor of a much more ominous threat, and was quickly 






nevertheless, comparisons of the two victims groups ensued. 9/11 victims have been 
said to be “higher” in the social hierarchy of victims compared to the victims of the 
Oklahoma City bombing because they were either New York investment bankers and 
lawyers or heroic fire fighters. If they were indeed more prominent in the media—a 
variable which was hard to isolate as these catastrophes were so different in scale—it 
was also because 9/11 victims were the casualties of international terrorism. 
 
The overarching conflict that was the context for the Oklahoma City bombing 
was an internal conflict, involving what has been widely considered as a fringe 
ideology, which lacked the potential of gaining the critical mass of support necessary 
to challenge the existing political order.  The anti-government militias with which 
Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols associated were not perceived as an existential 
national threat and the case was considered isolated, associated with lunacy and 
criminality compared to the calculated, clear-headed intent ascribed to the Al Qaeda 
perpetrators (even though the latter killed themselves in the attacks while McVeigh 
and Nichols did not).  
 
The 9/11 attacks were extraordinarily traumatic not just because the death toll 
was more than 15 times that of the Oklahoma bombing, but also because the U.S. 
suddenly realized that while it was apparently sleeping, a sophisticated network of 
international terrorist cells has been developing and training in rogue, underdeveloped 
countries, practicing a yet unpopular but nevertheless comprehensive ideology that 
included not only Islamic religious components but also concrete criticism of U.S. 






menacing Osama Bin Laden, seemed to carry the theoretical potential, albeit to an 
unknown extent, to take hold through systematic indoctrination within entire segments 
of the international Muslim population. When Al Qaeda resurfaced to strike in 2004 
and 2005 in Madrid and London, it did so precisely in order to position itself as a 
worthy opponent of the U.S. empire. The new world disorder following 9/11, as 
articulated by President G. W. Bush, had in fact brought the U.S. back to the “us vs. 
them” mentality of the Cold War. This had a profound effect on the place of 9/11 
victims, who have become a symbol of the virtue, bravery and moral superiority that 
characterized the U.S. in its fight against the Axis of Evil.  
 
In Israel, the Oslo accords-related wave of recurring suicide bombings 
between 1994 and 1996 generated a news genre of disaster marathons, where the 
hysterical and uncensored coverage gave particular prominence to the victims at the 
scene of the attacks. In their hardest time of shock and anger, much of the victims’ 
frustration was directed at the Israeli government, who repeatedly failed to protect 
them. That wave of terror culminated in the replacement of the Shimon Peres Labor 
government (Peres was appointed Prime minister as a replacement for Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin, following Rabin’s assassination in 1995) with a Benjamin Netanyahu 
right wing government in the 1996 general elections.  
 
The "disaster mode" that characterized the media coverage of the First Intifada 
resembled the coverage of Israeli military operations in the Palestinian media. The 
Palestinian media provided extensive coverage of funerals, including footage of dead 






the U.S., as they were automatically labeled Shahids, namely martyrs. For the same 
reason, the status of Palestinian victims' relatives in the Palestinian Authority, as Robi 
Damelin attested with respect to her fellow Parents Circle’s Palestinian members, was 
much higher than the status of Israeli victims within Israeli society. Palestinian family 
members were considered heroic because they sacrificed most in the struggle for 
Palestinian independence, and perhaps also because of the place of victimhood within 
the Islamic belief. 
 
Following criticism of Israeli regulators, academics and media commentators 
over the bloody coverage of the suicide bombings of the 1990s, Israeli news 
organizations began to practice more caution and restraint in their terrorism coverage. 
The routinization of terrorism coverage during the Second Intifada (2000-2005) took 
the form of a new and elaborate set of professional prctices. These did not only 
involve new standards for news gathering and presentation (such as the limitation on 
disturbing photos), but also dominated the entire programming schedule, where 
television producers were in constant readiness to make last minute changes in 
entertainment shows in order to adjust them to the somber marathon mood. In this 
“contained” marathon mode, which reflected the fact that terrorism was a feature of 
Israeli normalcy, the victims held a more mundane, and less heroic, place, and their 
coverage gravitated toward the personal aspects of their victimhood, without 
particular interest in their politics. The routinization of terror during the Second 
Intifada was symptomatic, at the time, of the Israeli-Palestinian political deadlock, 







The examination of the appearance of victims in the various capacities that the 
Experience-Argument Scale offers, highlights differences and similarities in the 
journalistic cultures of the U.S. and Israeli news media, both with respect to the 
victims but also with respect to the political establishment on which the victims were 
attempting to influence. The victims groups that I have researched and that worked for 
peaceful solutions for the conflicts that engendered terrorism, namely Peaceful 
Tomorrows and the Parents Circle, met different expectations from the U.S. and 
Israeli news media, respectively. In the U.S., Peaceful Tomorrows’ members felt that 
the press was trying to compartmentalize them into the pre-ordained position that they 
were expected to represent. The limited discourse in the U.S. news media in the days 
before and during U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq allowed only for 
so called “American” views, which excluded reservations regarding U.S. military 
intervention abroad. The members of Peaceful Tomorrows, operating in the least 
deferential, right-end side of the Experience-Argument Scale, learned to strategically 
cooperate with these expectations. That meant that they occasionally compromised 
their message in order to gain media access, settling for partial public relation 
achievements. Another strategic necessity that quickly revealed itself was the need to 
studiously keep away from political language that could be identified as partisan. 
Once they chose to speak of U.S. global interests instead of expressing a 
compassionate wish to prevent the families of the "other side" from experiencing loss, 
they risked an abrupt journalistic discreditation. Their moral superiority depended on 
a particular idea of political abstinence. Their argument could go so far as to express 
human concern, but had to fall short of advocating for any concrete policy solutions 







Peaceful Tomorrows members were not the only 9/11 victims to experience 
the discursive limitations that American media set at that time. In a famous February 
2002 segment from The O’Reilly Factor, Bill O’Reilly interviewed Jeremy Glick, the 
son of a Port Authority worker who perished in 9/11. Glick was invited to the show 
after he had added his signature to an anti-war ad in the New York Times.  At the 
outset of the interview, Glick stated that the U.S. was “responsible for training 
militarily, economically, and situating geopolitically the parties involved in the 
alleged assassination and the murder of my father and countless of thousands of 
others.” O’Reilly’s immediate response was: “You are mouthing a far left position 
that is a marginal position in this society, which you're entitled to.” Clearly, the act of 
attaching a partisan label to a terrorism victim was detrimental to his credibility, and if 
Glick could be identified as “political,” let alone as a representing the extreme left on 
Fox News, he could no longer enjoy the protections of his victimhood. O’Reilly 
continued to say, “I don't think your father would be approving of this,” which was a 
way of saying that Glick was a traitor, and sending him to exile in the “sphere of 
deviance.” 
 
But the interview was not over yet. When Glick further mentioned that the 
U.S. had aided Islamic groups in Afghanistan in order to weaken Soviet presence 
there, he was moving dangerously deeper into the right-end side of the Experience-
Argument Scale, abandoning his privileges as a terrorism victim striving for an end to 
violence, and assuming instead the position of a regular guy trying to outsmart Bill 
O’Reilly in a political match. These were the circumstances in which O’Reilly felt 







O'Reilly: I don't want to debate world politics with you. 
Glick: Well, why not? This is about world politics. 
O'Reilly: Because, No. 1, I don't really care what you think. 
 
O’Reilly eventually told Glick to “shut up,” muttered that he hoped Glick’s 
mother wasn’t watching, and finally ordered cutting of Glick’s microphone.  While 
this exchange should not be seen as representative of the U.S. news media’s treatment 
of 9/11 victims turned peace or human rights activists, it yet demonstrates that the 
right-end, “disregarding” side of the Experience-Argument Scale could be brutal for 
U.S victims. In Israel, if to judge by the coverage of the Parents Circle, the right end 
side of the Experience-Argument Scale was a safer place for the Israeli equivalents of 
Peaceful Tomorrows and Jeremy Glick. In Israel, victimhood served as a stronger 
shield, because of the continuous conflict that generated new victims and kept the 
victims’ authority consistently present and alive. Moreover, In Israel, there was 
probably no need for the strong shield of victimhood in the first place, because talking 
politics, even extreme politics, was legitimate and did not threaten to compromise the 
victims’ moral authority. To judge by the experience of the Parents Circle, Israeli 
terrorism victimhood provided only modest access to the press, but once the cameras 
rolled—as the Parents Circle's Robi Damelin said—“I’m not a politician. I can say 
what I like.” 
 
That sense of freedom that the Israeli victims felt was also evident when they 
practiced the politics of remembrance. Israeli terrorism victims could—and did— 






journalistic coverage of their efforts consistently favored their right to mourn in any 
manner and place they chose, occasionally at the expense of other interests, such as 
that of property owners for their land to be clear of makeshift monuments, or that of 
drivers to have their roads clear of visual diversions. But the downside of the Israeli 
coverage, from the victims’ perspective, was that the issue of remembrance interested 
the news for only a very short time period. Characteristically to the realities of routine 
terrorism, individual incidents (unless exceptionally deadly) merged within the 
repetitive line of attacks. A subsequent attack was always more newsworthy than the 
remembrance efforts related to the previous one.  
 
American journalism was walking down a similar path, increasingly 
embracing spontaneous displays of victims' grief.  This was part of the previously 
discussed, broader trend toward authenticity, in which the victims were invited to play 
a more salient role in the design and execution of remembrance projects, and where 
the projects themselves were more ambitious. Just as the Oklahoma City memorial 
was the first memorial to “sanctify” the site of a terrorist attack, sanctification went 
further, beyond the site, to characterize the reverential coverage of the 
memorialization process in the local Oklahoma press. In fact, the local press identified 
with the victims to such an extent that it refrained from reporting on internal problems 
in the victim-led memorial task force. Local papers, for example, kept silent about a 
major incident in which the task force had fired the architect who was in charge of the 
planning process, following the architect's objection to the inclusion of victims in the 
design selection committee. That crisis, had it been reported, could have sparked a 






a debate would have inevitably externalized the doubts over the appropriateness of 
victims’ participation, something that the victims and the local press wanted to avoid. 
The national press, on the other hand, was much more candid in its coverage of the 
memorialization process and it did question the sensibility of the decision to let 
victims lead the project. And when local Oklahoman figures, such as a University of 
Oklahoma history professor, argued for the over-involvement of the victims, they 
were accommodated in the national press, while the local press, faithful to the victims, 
ignored them.  
 
16 years later, the Ground Zero saga also exemplified the moral and political 
power of American terrorism victims over issues of remembrance. In fact, Chapter 2's 
review of the coverage of the 9/11 memorialization debates demonstrated that at least 
until 2004, no claim that family members had made was rejected as irrelevant, 
unimportant or preposterous. The seriousness and lack of judgment with which 
journalists approached the victims, joined by the similarly unanimous deference from 
the part of the New York political establishment, helped the victims gain almost 
unlimited control over the memorialization process during those early, formative 
years. It was during that time frame, that a group of 9/11 family members succeeded, 
within a few months’ advocacy work, to derail the International Freedom Center, a 
museum dedicated to the concept of freedom, despite its already advanced planning 
phase. The still-traumatized press, engulfed with deference to the victims, not only 
reported the victims’ objections to the IFC uncritically, it even rephrased them in 
anodyne, non-political terms, leaving out explicit references to the IFC as a liberal, 






memorial as grounded in the worry that the IFC would “detract from the solemnity of 
the memorial by focusing on geopolitics and on national and international social 
history.”1  This kind of journalistic protection was only granted when issues on the 
left, deferential, side of the Experience-Argument Scale were concerned. 
 
It was during that time frame that the ideological foundations of the Ground 
Zero memorial complex were cemented.  The site, in its present form, was shaped in 
the ideological image of those victims who achieved dominance at the outset of the 
memorialization saga. Another dominant feature of the IFC dispute coverage was the 
confinement of the memorialization debate to three dominant players: the families, the 
developer of the IFC, and New York officials. Coverage, both in the tabloids and in 
the quality papers of the likes of the New York Times, lacked the informing, educated 
opinion of memorial designers, historians or even plain New Yorkers. It was as if the 
press was reluctant to invite opinions that might have contradicted or otherwise 
offended the family member activist group. 
 
It took a few years for cracks to appear in the wall of journalistic deference to 
those 9/11 victims who were engaged in remembrance, and for journalists to begin to 
wonder whether the victims who initially took the lead in the Ground Zero debate 
were in fact representative of the 9/11 relatives group. With time, the family member 
activists went through the inevitable process of assuming a political identity, namely 
being labeled, willingly or not, as partisan.  As some of them were identified with the 
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political right, and some with the political left, their overall politics reached a zero 
sum game and their overall influence diminished. This was evident in the coverage of 
the Park51 dispute in 2010, where so many family members contributed their opinion, 
that none could be considered “representative” of the majority of the family members’ 
population. The coverage of the Park51 dispute also exhibited the diminishing 
influence of the victims, not just because their diversity prevented the emergence of a 
clear victim agenda, but also because time was taking its toll on their relevance. While 
the tabloids were offering different perspectives of different victims with respect to 
the Park51 debate, the New York Times discounted the victims altogether and replaced 
them with independent bloggers. By 2010, those family members who remained 
politically active were “professional victims,” with a clear political agenda that 
according to American social convention, undermined their moral authority. Bloggers, 
on the other hand, were overtly political, but their position as influential bloggers has 
given them the authority of mass popularity. 
 
One strategy that characterized victims’ campaigns across the entire spectrum 
of the Experience-Argument Scale was the victims' attempts at bringing their 
advocacy as conceptually close as possible to their personal loss. Even in Israel, 
where political talk was not likely to downgrade the victims to suspected pseudo-
politicians, victims still employed the first person and emphasized the instructional 
value of their experience. They spoke of the directions that their anger and grief have 
taken them, of their ideas as victims on the appropriate punishments for the 
perpetrators of terrorism or on ways to enhance peace or personal safety, all the while 






deducing policy solutions from their personal experience (e.g. “we should build a wall 
between Israel and the Palestinian Territories so that no suicide bomber would be able 
to kill other people’s children.”) In fact, the more the victims' arguments belonged to 
the right end, "disregarding" side of the Scale, the more they needed to rely on their 
victimhood. It was precisely because their involvement was least obvious, and their 
relevance questionable, that they needed to emphasize their victimhood and de-
politicize the discourse in order to disarm opponents in issues that were, by their 
nature, highly political. 
 
In instances of extreme deference, the press, both in the U.S. and in Israel, 
took an active role de-politicizing the victims’ campaigns. In the U.S. the national 
press depoliticized the statements of those 9/11 family members who were against the 
institution of the International Freedom Center in Ground Zero. In Israel, the 
journalistic coverage of the captivity of Gilad Shalit was depoliticized in that it did 
not analyze in great depths the possible implications of an exchange deal, nor did it 
identify the positions pro or against the deal in partisan, left vs. right terms. Rather, it 
was politically evasive, serving mostly as a platform to reverberate the popular wish 
for Shalit’s return through emotional op-eds and extensive coverage of the campaign 
efforts: Gilad’s mock chamber, the 200,000 people march, and so forth. There was 
also active campaigning on behalf of media outlets. Yedioth Aharonoth, for example, 
provided its readers with a phone number to which they could text message their 
intention to join the Shalit march, rewarding them by publishing their names in a 
designated list of participants.  The more traditional coverage advocated for hope and 






calling in the name of military purism to “leave no man behind,” and thus drawing the 
support of the majority of Israelis, from all across the political spectrum, for the 1027 
to 1 exchange deal. 
 
My analysis of the coverage of prolonged detentions of abducted soldiers by 
hostile organizations also showed that much of the media cooperation that the 
soldiers’ families received had to do with an unspoken media assessment of the 
chances that a prisoner exchange deal would materialize. It is has been widely 
accepted and substantiated that the news discourse always reflected the internal 
governmental discourse, mainly because of the reliance of the press on government 
sources. The Shalit coverage, however, demonstrated a related point, which was that 
the press pursued a governmental policy only if it recognized it as possibly viable. 
Once the Israeli government was known to be open to prisoner exchange deals, the 
possibility of supporting the Shalit family’s mission also presented itself. In the U.S., 
the “no negotiating with terrorists” policy with respect to kidnapped American 
soldiers, which has perhaps changed into willingness to negotiate over the release of 
but a handful of suspected terrorists,
2
  discouraged the press and explained the 
relatively low-key coverage of the Taliban keeping of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl.  
 
This dissertation hopes to offer a new prism with which to evaluate the media 
presence of activists who practice the politics of personal trauma—namely, people 
who speak by virtue of a transformative traumatic experience that enhanced their 
                                                           
2
 According to CNN.com, the U.S. was willing to release five Taliban prisoners in exchange for Bowe 
Bergdahl. Jim Sciutto, Source: Missing U.S. Soldier Bowe Bergdahl Seen in Video, CNN.com, January 






thinking and involvement in a specific subject matter and that lends their arguments 
the special moral authority that is the authority of grief. Such a conceptual tool may 
be employed in analyses of the media power of all types of victims. The school 
shootings epidemic in the U.S., for example, calls for an examination of the place of 
the victims in the national debate over gun control. Is there any particular validity to 
the policy claims of parents of the assassinated children, or are they heard only as part 
of the coverage of the aftermath of the tragedy? Are the U.S. media still in search for 
the voice of the victims in their capacity as commentators, or is the public arena 
reserved only for officials, experts and pundits, while the plain folks express 
themselves among friends and in the limited confines of their Internet social 
networks? To be sure, the role of the “unprofessional” activist is changing as the 
media landscape changes. For once, the discursive nature of contemporary journalism, 
which combines traditional reporting with a plethora of reader/viewer participation 
possibilities, may dilute the presence and effect of victim-advocates.  
 
This work explored the journalistic treatment of victims' involvement in a 
wide array of issues, but it consciously concentrated on the extreme ends of the 
Experience-Argument Scale. There, in the left "deferential" end, and in the right 
"disregarding" end, journalism was in a danger of compromise.  Deference could have 
the positive effect of engendering compassionate policies: The role of victims in the 
advancement of social values has been undoubtedly profound, and they have been 
responsible for raising awareness and critically contributing to advancements in social 
equality, personal safety, governmental protections for the disadvantaged and even in 






pro-victim policies that have not been sufficiently debated or were too emotion-driven 
to be rational. The right, "disregarding" end of the Scale was similarly perilous to 
journalism.  There, journalism was blinding itself to the realities and consequences of 
political violence. I hope that this work enhances the understanding of journalism's 
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